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Chapter 1
Introduction
Most economic decisions, such as how much to save for retirement and whether to start
a business, involve choices among options with delayed and uncertain consequences. Not
surprisingly then, theories of choice over time and choice under risk constitute essential
building blocks of a broad range of economic models. To be useful for policy makers
and economists, these fundamental theories must capture the relevant aspects of decision
making, and they must be able to produce suﬃciently accurate predictions. The standard
theories of intertemporal and risky choice, discounted utility theory (Samuelson, 1937) and
expected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947), seem not to meet these
requirements. While they are often taken as criteria for rational choice, it is now well
known that people tend to act in ways which systematically violate these theories’ core
axioms (Starmer (2000), Frederick et al. (2002)). In a nutshell, the literature documents
the following anomalous behaviors. People are typically more impatient in the short
run than in the long run, and they typically overweight small-probability outcomes and
underweight large-probability outcomes. Their choice behavior seems to depend on both,
outcome magnitude and outcome sign. Other puzzling findings are the vast behavioral
diﬀerences among subjects from the same cohort, the considerable temporal instability
of individual behavior, and the apparent situation-dependency of discount rates and risk
attitudes. Taken together, these findings suggest that the standard theories only provide
an incomplete characterization of eﬀective choice behavior.
Many attempts have been made to solve this issue, the most prominent ones being
hyperbolic discounting models (Ainslie (1975), Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), Laibson
(1997), among others) and models incorporating nonlinear probability weights (Quiggin
(1982), Tversky and Kahneman (1992), among others), but these “solutions” entail a
number of novel hitches. The probably most critical ones are the following two.
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First, in the literature these models are generally interpreted as pure preference mod-
els. That is, anomalous behavior is attributed in its entirety to the decision maker’s
preferences. From the perspective of standard economic theory, these preferences are ex-
otic because they do no longer obey the standard theories’ key axioms. In particular,
hyperbolic discounting models introduce dynamically inconsistent time preferences, and,
hence, violate stationarity, whereas models incorporating nonlinear probability weighting
violate independence. Making such strict assumptions about preferences can pose severe
problems. Crawford (1990) and Krusell and Smith (2003), for instance, point out that
dropping the standard axioms can complicate game-theoretic analyses in a considerable
way.1 Moreover, by being pure descriptions of behavior, these models remain silent about
the sources of anomalous behaviors. They (implicitly) assume that diﬀerences in subjects’
behavior are exclusively due to diﬀerences in their preferences, but they neglect other im-
portant factors aﬀecting choice behavior, such as constraints limiting the decision maker’s
scope of action. This lack is of particular practical relevance. Policy makers, for example,
need to know what drives the behavior they observe, and they need to know whether
this behavior is due to rational reasons or other factors. Only with a profound knowledge
of where and how to intervene is it possible to implement policies which aﬀect the right
people in the right way. As the descriptive theories do not provide an answer to these
questions, their potential applications remain quite limited. To sum up, useful theories
of intertemporal and risky choice addressing this issue should retain the tractability and
normative appeal of the standard theories, while, at the same time, they should improve
their descriptive validity and provide a clear and intuitive story for systematic departures
from standard behavior.
Second, these models do not provide a unifying approach to anomalous behavior in
intertemporal and risky choice. None of the models proposed gives a coherent explanation
for all the stylized facts of the domain they are concerned with. In fact, models such as
hyperbolic discounting capture one single anomaly only, in this particular case the decline
of discount rates in time horizon. They fail, however, at predicting the vast number of
at least equally important facts, such as the dependency of discount rates on outcome
magnitude and outcome sign. Some attempts were made to cope with a broader set of
anomalies (e.g. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), but
1Krusell and Smith (2003) discuss the problem of multiple equilibria in settings with competing
“selves” for the case of quasi-geometric discounting. Crawford (1990) shows that the Nash equilibrium
concept requires independence and proposes an extension to make analyses possible under quasi-concave
preferences.
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they do so by imposing an even larger number of ex-ante assumptions on preferences.2
Why is it so important to have a coherent explanation at hand? The literature on the
anomalies in intertemporal and risky choice suggests that all the stylized facts listed above
usually appear at the same time and not in isolation. This raises the suspicion that all
these findings have one common explanation. Only when the mechanism generating these
patterns can be uncovered is it possible to also understand interactions between these
anomalous behaviors, and, hence, their consequences. Moreover, choices over time and
choices under risk are very similar in their nature and in the way people deviate from the
standard models’ predictions (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991). It seems therefore likely
that anomalous behavior in the two domains has the same cause or that this behavior, at
least, carries over from one domain to the other. In this case, an integrated explanation
for the anomalies should go much further than just explaining all patterns in one single
domain, but, instead, it should embed both choice domains into one coherent framework.
Such a unifying approach would allow economists to get a better understanding of the
similarities and interdependencies between choices over time and choices under risk, an
understanding of particular relevance since most real-world choices involve both, a time
and a risk dimension.3 All these points stress the ultimate need for theories which provide
a clear and unifying explanation for the patterns observed.
This thesis addresses these issues. I present three papers which oﬀer novel explanations
for anomalously appearing behavior in choice over time and choice under risk, and provide
the following key insights.
First, I show that environmental factors rather than exotic preferences may drive
systematic departures from the standard theories’ predictions. I consider two kinds of
such factors: Inherent uncertainty which generates an additional layer of uncertainty over
even allegedly guaranteed future outcomes, and environmental constraints which limit
the decision maker’s access to the commodity of interest.4 As it turns out, these factors
2Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), for instance, capture magnitude-dependent time preferences by as-
suming that the value function has increasing elasticity, and they capture sign-dependent time preferences
by assuming that the value function is more elastic for losses than for gains. With cumulative prospect
theory, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) account for sign-dependency, but not magnitude-dependency (see
Holt and Laury (2002) and Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) for empirical evidence on stake eﬀects in choice under
risk). They also impose restrictions on the value function.
3While there is always some uncertainty about the materialization of future outcomes (see first paper
of this thesis), there are some examples for risky choices where time discounting plays no role. Among
others, these are casino gambling and the situation subjects are confronted with in controlled risky choice
experiments (see third paper of this thesis).
4It has long been recognized that other factors than pure preferences drive behavior. Most notably, the
early work on intertemporal choice (Bo¨hm-Bawerk (1921), Fisher (1930)) provides an extensive discussion
on such drivers. Surprisingly, however, these factors received little attention during the last few decades
3
can lead even decision makers obeying the standard axioms on the level of preferences to
reveal behavior consistent with the findings documented in the literature. Anomalous
behavior then results from the discounted utility maximizer’s or the expected utility
maximizer’s rational responses to her environment. Hence, this thesis does not only
provide an intuitive explanation for systematic departures from standard predictions, but
it also demonstrates that these findings can have rational reasons. Put diﬀerently, it is
the observer who eventually wrongly ascribes anomalous behavior to irrational, exotic
preferences rather than to potentially rational responses to environmental factors.
Second, as it turns out, my theory is able to explain all anomalies at one single blow.
As all the stylized facts of behavior may originate from the decision maker’s reaction to
her limited access to the commodity of interest, there is no need to impose a plethora
of ex-ante assumptions on preferences to capture these patterns. Since all anomalous
behaviors can be explained within a theory retaining the standard assumptions about
preferences, my approach builds the bridge between the standard preference models of
intertemporal and risky choice and eﬀectively observed behavior in these two domains.
That is, it brings together the normative appeal and tractability of the standard models
with the descriptive validity and intuition policy makers and economists ask for.
Third, taken together, the papers in this thesis develop a unifying approach to in-
tertemporal and risky choice behavior. They do not only provide a coherent explanation
for the anomalies in one single domain, but also work out a common explanation for
departures in both domains. In principle, there are two diﬀerent pathways over which
the risk domain may interweave with the time domain. On the one hand, the same basic
intuition can explain the apparent systematic departures from standard predictions in
both choice domains. This is the case in the presence of environmental constraints. On
the other hand, for decision makers prone to probability distortions, the core anomalies
of intertemporal choice naturally arise as a consequence of inherent uncertainty. The
research presented in this thesis therefore contributes to a better understanding of the
similarities and interactions between the two choice domains, an understanding inevitable
for most applications of these theories.
Finally, the findings presented here have a number of important implications relevant
for both, policy makers and economists. First of all, it is shown that the most prominent
anomalies of intertemporal and risky choice, hyperbolic discounting and probability dis-
tortions, are exhibited by the same people. This empirical result supports the conjecture
that systematic departures from standard theories’ predictions in both choice domains
of decision research.
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have one common source. The two explanations I oﬀer show how the environment can
influence choice behavior and foster this result. My theories generate much more precise
and testable predictions with respect to behavior in changing environments than most
other theories of intertemporal and risky choice. This is the case since behavior is ex-
plicitly modeled as an outcome of the interplay between the decision maker’s preferences
and her environment. Furthermore, I argue that conditions where the environment is
subject to change should make it possible to separate rational from less rational motives
for anomalous behavior. Some of these less rational intuitions are presented in the course
of this thesis. In particular, these are self-imposed constraints, optimistically biased be-
liefs or evolutionary-shaped preferences. Disentangling rational from less rational reasons
is of particular relevance for developing suitable policy instruments which help economic
agents to behave in a more rational way without harming those that already do (Camerer
et al., 2003).5 Policy interventions based on wrong assumptions about preferences or ra-
tionality may give economic agents an incentive to depart from optimal behavior, and,
hence, may - in the worst case - induce severe welfare losses. The theories proposed here
make clear that the decision maker’s environment provides a natural starting point for
policy interventions. Typically, such policies will aim at improving the surrounding condi-
tions the decision maker is confronted with. For example, in the presence of institutional
uncertainty general norms of pacta sunt servanda and the possibility to ensure against
background risks can promote retirement savings. Similarly, when environmental con-
straints limit the economic agents’ scope of action, facilitating economic agents’ market
access can help them overcome these limitations.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2.1 to 2.3 give a summary
of the main results of the three papers in this thesis.
A first paper, introduced in Chapter 2.1, deals with the most prominent anomalies in
choice over time and choice under risk, hyperbolic discounting and probability distortions,
and shows that the same people are prone to these systematic departures from the stan-
dard predictions. It argues that inherent uncertainty together with probability distortions
can rationalize hyperbolic discounting.
A second paper, introduced in Chapter 2.2, shows that the apparent anomalies in
intertemporal choice naturally arise for rational discounted utility maximizers if they face
liquidity constraints and hold positive income expectations. I find considerable support
for this theory in two experimental data sets.
A third paper, introduced in Chapter 2.3, closes the gap between the other two theo-
5Under the restriction that there are no negative external eﬀects caused by rational behavior.
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ries. It shows that the same basic argument motivating anomalies in intertemporal choice
can also be applied to risky choice. Anomalous behaviors can emerge for expected utility
maximizers facing environmental constraints. Together with one of the other two theo-
ries, this theory can provide a unifying explanation for the anomalies in intertemporal
and risky choice.
Chapter 3 concludes and gives a short outlook to my future research agenda.
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Chapter 2
Contents of this Thesis
2.1 Viewing the Future through a Warped Lens:
Why Uncertainty Generates Hyperbolic Discount-
ing
Experimental evidence suggests that, on aggregate, behavior in choice over time and choice
under risk is best characterized by hyperbolic discounting and probability distortions.
Most recent descriptive theories in these two domains capture these findings. Despite
the significant parallels between intertemporal and risky choice (Prelec and Loewenstein,
1991), little research has been done to examine the link between these two domains
empirically. Most surprisingly, there seems to be no previous study examining whether
these anomalous behaviors are exhibited by the same people. An answer to that question,
however, is of central interest from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view.
Only if there is a systematic relationship between departures from standard predictions
in the two domains, a theory which ascribes these departures to the same factor would
be legitimate. In addition, predicting behavior for situations where both, time and risk,
play a role requires the researcher to understand the alleged interactions between these
two domains.
The first article of this thesis explores the link between hyperbolic discounting and
probability distortions on the individual level and gives an interpretation for the results
found in the empirical data.
Together with my coauthors, Helga Fehr-Duda and Adrian Bruhin, I present the fol-
lowing insights. Based on an experiment with salient monetary incentives we demonstrate
that there is a strong and significant relationship between the degree of decreasing discount
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rates and greater departures from linear probability weighting at the level of individual
behavior. People departing more strongly from the standard model’s prediction in one do-
main also depart more strongly from the standard model’s prediction in the other domain.
Other factors such as the curvature of the utility function or socioeconomic characteristics
do not contribute to explaining this link. Our results suggest that anomalous behaviors
in both choice domains have a common source.
A possible interpretation for these findings is provided in the second part of the pa-
per. It is argued that the relationship between hyperbolic discounting and probability
distortions can be rationalized by the uncertainty inherent in any future event. Even
allegedly guaranteed future outcomes are uncertain by their very nature as unforeseen
circumstances may prevent these outcomes from materializing. For example, sudden ill-
ness may make it impossible for the decision maker to collect a promised reward. In the
presence of such uncertainty, the evaluation of future outcomes crucially depends on the
decision maker’s risk preferences. While, in this analysis, we stay agnostic about the rea-
sons for probability distortions, our framework posits a possible causal link between the
anomalies in the two domains. In particular, decreasing discount rates may be generated
by people’s proneness to probability distortions. Put diﬀerently, hyperbolic discounting
is driven by viewing the uncertain future through a warped lens, produced by systematic
distortions of probabilities. The theoretical framework we derive not only organizes our
experimental findings but also accounts for previous evidence of interactions of time and
risk.
The findings of this study have a number of important implications. First, while the-
ories of choice over time and choice under risk evolved to a large extent in two separate
branches, our results make clear that we should head towards a coherent explanation for
anomalies in both domains. This is of particular importance since the vast majority of
choices we are confronted with in the real world involve both a time and a risk dimension.
An integrated approach can therefore contribute to a better understanding of the inter-
actions between these two choice domains and, hence, may be inevitable when predicting
outcomes in more complex settings.
Second, if inherent uncertainty is the driving factor of anomalous behavior, it is possi-
ble to derive a number of policy recommendations which help economic agents to tempo-
rally allocate quantities of the commodity in question in agreement with their preferences.
According to our framework, the link between the risk and the time dimension becomes
only eﬀective if there is uncertainty about the materialization of future outcomes. As a
result, policies reducing this inherent uncertainty may attenuate the ties between the two
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domains, and, hence, may reduce excessive short-run impatience.
The framework proposed in this article takes probability distortions as given. While
it rationalizes the link between the time and the risk domain, it does not make any
statements about the rationality of these probability distortions per se. There may be
many reasons for weighting probabilities nonlinearly. I provide a rational explanation for it
in the third article of this thesis. There, I argue that apparent probability distortions can
be the result of an expected utility maximizer’s rational response to constraints imposed
by her environment.1
An alternative pathway to the relationship between intertemporal and risky choice
behavior is presented by the following two articles. They demonstrate that environmental
constraints can produce the apparent anomalies in both choice domains, and, hence, that
such constraints can lead to some very similar conclusions as the explanation based on
inherent uncertainty.
2.2 Rational Planners or Myopic Fools?
Liquidity Constraints, Positive Expectations and
Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice
Empirical research on intertemporal choice documents a broad number of anomalies other
than the decline of discount rates in time horizon. Observed discount rates also tend to
decline in outcome magnitude, and seem to be larger for gains than for losses. These
systematic departures from discounted utility theory’s predictions usually appear at the
same time. There are a number of additional puzzling patterns, such as the vast het-
erogeneity in behavior, its apparent temporal instability, and its ostensible dependency
on situational factors, which are hardly explainable within traditional preference theo-
ries. This poses the question of whether there is a unifying approach explaining all these
anomalies, and, if yes, whether these patterns can be explained within rational choice and
without making exotic assumptions about the decision maker’s risk preferences.
The second article of this thesis answers these questions. It presents a theory which
explains anomalous behavior within the bounds of the standard model of intertemporal
choice, and it provides empirical support for this explanation. I show the following results.
1As can be shown, under this particular kind of probability distortions the “Warped Lens”-framework
can also explain anomalies in intertemporal choice beyond hyperbolic discounting, such as the dependency
of discount rates on outcome magnitude and outcome sign. An elaborate discussion of this interaction is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
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First, there are situations where it is optimal for discounted utility maximizers to ex-
hibit a behavior consistent with the apparent anomalies of intertemporal choice. Liquidity
constraints can prevent rational discounters to temporally (re-)allocate future consump-
tion in a way they prefer to. If they have an aversion towards consumption fluctuations
and rationally expect their income to substantially rise in the future, such constraints can
force them to allocate new cash inflows at earlier rather than later dates. As a result, the
discount rate they reveal may exceed their rate of time preference. Observed discounting
behavior then mimics that of a hyperbolic discounter with magnitude- and sign-dependent
preferences. Probably most interestingly, it can be shown that if an economic agent holds
rational expectations, hyperbolic discounting can be dynamically consistent. My ap-
proach can also account for other phenomena which have remained largely unexplained
so far, such as increasing discount rates, the vast heterogeneity, the ostensibly dynamic
instability of behavior, and situation-specific discounting behavior.
Second, I give an alternative, boundedly rational explanation for these results. Anoma-
lous looking behavior is not necessarily caused by rational planner, but may be due to
myopic fools, i.e. decision makers with standard preferences but optimistically biased
expectations. For the latter group, anomalously appearing behavior emerges even if they
have unlimited access to liquidity. Put diﬀerently, the optimism bias drives a wedge
between the present and the future. The resulting model shares some characteristics
with quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997), but is able to capture a much wider
spectrum of anomalies.
Third, I use data from two experiments to test some of my theory’s most central
hypotheses. The two experiments involve the same choices, but were conducted with two
diﬀerent groups of college students which are likely to hold diﬀerent income expectations.
I find strong support for my approach on the descriptive level for both groups. Income
expectations seem to explain a large part of the anomalous patterns found in the data.
Moreover, estimation of a structural model indicates that the proposed model performs
much better than hyperbolic discounting. The group of students entering the job market
sooner indeed reveal higher consumption expectations than the reference group. The
theory is therefore able to explain behavioral diﬀerences by diﬀerences in the environment
these groups face.
These findings have a number of strong implications. First, since very similar behavior
may be caused by rational planners and myopic fools, policy makers must be careful
in employing interventions which aim at helping economic agents to behave in a more
rational way without harming those that already do (Camerer et al., 2003). Such policies
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may give rational economic agents an incentive to depart from optimal behavior. Policy
makers may therefore search for mechanisms which distinguish between diﬀerent sources
of anomalous behavior. Dynamic consistency may be one criterion which can serve as a
starting point for developing such mechanisms.
Second, the proposed model helps to understand the eﬀect the environment has on
choice behavior. It makes precise and testable predictions for given environments and
given preferences, and may provide an explanation for the vast heterogeneity in discount-
ing behavior and its dependence on situational factors.
The theory presented in this article only covers anomalies in choice over time, however.
This raises the question whether similar reasoning can rationalize systematic departures
from standard predictions in the domain of choice under risk. The following article answers
this question, and lies the foundation for a unifying approach to anomalous behavior in
both domains.
2.3 Preferences or Constraints?
A Rational Explanation for Probability-Dependent
Risk Attitudes
On aggregate, people violate expected utility theory in similar ways as they violate dis-
counted utility theory (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991). Risk taking behavior appears
to depend on probabilities, outcome magnitude and outcome sign. Congruent with the
domain of choice over time, risk taking behavior is very heterogenous and temporally
unstable, and it seems to depend on situational factors. This suggests that a similar
argument may explain anomalous behaviors in choice over time and choice under risk.
To provide such an explanation for the domain of choice under risk is the goal pursued
by the third article of this thesis. In this article, I argue that environmental constraints
similar to those described in the second article can explain a broad number of expected
utility violations. The following results arise.
First, I show that anomalous behavior is not necessarily driven by the decision maker’s
probabilistic risk attitudes, i.e. her preferences, but may result naturally from the rational
expected utility maximizer’s response to exogenous constraints, i.e. her environment. The
decision maker I consider obeys the standard axioms, but she has to bear some negative
consequences in form of costs if the terminal outcome she achieves does not allow her
to attain a certain minimal subsistence level. For example, a consumer has to meet her
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existential needs, has to honor her contracts and has to settle her bills. If she does not, she
gets prosecuted or, in the extreme case, will starve. If this is not possible with any option
in the choice set and there is no opportunity to overcome this limitation by accessing a
market, she is constrained. As I show, these environmental constraints can force her to
take higher risks than her preferences would suggest.
Second, like in the case of intertemporal choice, I give an alternative explanation for
anomalous behavior. Similar behavior may also emerge if constraints are self-imposed,
i.e. if the minimal subsistence level is indeed an aspiration level. Such behavior is hard
to defend as rational and its sources are diﬃcult to verify. Alternatively, risk attitudes
may also be an innate characteristic of preferences which adapted over thousands of years
of human evolution. In this sense, the theory I propose may provide the underlying
mechanism which shaped these preferences.
The implications of these findings are manifold. First, it is, to the best of my knowl-
edge, the first theory which provides a rationalization of probability distortions.2 This
result challenges the view that rational economic agents should reveal linear probability
weighting. Put diﬀerently, it calls into question that linear probability weighting is the
benchmark for rational choice. Moreover, as pointed out earlier, there are two pathways
through which the model proposed in this article can provide a coherent and rational
explanation for the anomalies in choice over time and choice under risk.
Second, the policy implications are very similar to that proposed in the second paper.
The same interventions, in particular policies which facilitate market access, may help
economic agents irrespective of whether they face intertemporal or risky choice problems
or a combination of both.
2Some economists, however, argue that emotions drive departures from standard predictions and that
anomalous behavior due to the anticipation of these emotions can be considered as rational (e.g. Loomes
and Sugden (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1986)). I discuss the weaknesses of such approaches in the
literature section of the paper.
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Chapter 3
Conclusion
Descriptive theories proposed in response to the anomalies in intertemporal and risky
choice follow quite a radical route. They capture anomalous behavior by preferences
alone. The fast adoption of these theories is probably the reason why many researchers
forgot about other important drivers of behavior. However, this is by far not the only novel
problem these theories bring with. As, in these theories, anomalous behavior arises by
assumption and not endogenously, every additional anomaly they capture also requires
additional restrictions on preferences. Hence, these theories do not provide a unifying
approach to the anomalies in the domain they deal with. A direct consequence of modeling
behavior the way they do is that these theories drop many desirable properties of the
standard theories. As a result, they may hamper economic analyses in fundamental ways.
Moreover, as these theories of choice over time and choice under risk developed in separate
branches, they do not provide an integrated approach to the two domains, and, hence,
remain silent about how behavior between these two domains interacts.
This thesis presents a solution for these issues and shows that they can be resolved ele-
gantly by explicitly taking into account the environment the decision maker is confronted
with. This leads to a number of novel insights. For example, it suggests that, although
many researchers have accepted constant discount rates and linear probability weights
as benchmarks of rational choice, this presumption may be fundamentally wrong. There
are rational reasons for departing from discounted utility theory’s and expected utility
theory’s standard predictions. This is of particular relevance for policy makers interested
in employing paternalistic regulations, i.e. regulations which help on the individual level
and encourage people to act in a more rational way. This thesis discusses potential instru-
ments which policy makers can implement to foster behaviors in accordance to agents’
preferences.
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Another focal point is that the approach presented in this thesis retains the desirable
properties of the standard theories on the level of preferences. The theories presented can
therefore simplify game-theoretic analyses in considerable ways when compared to theo-
ries incorporating hyperbolic time preferences or nonlinear probability weighting. As can
be shown, for rational decision makers, they permit the researcher to conduct these anal-
yses without messing around with multiple equilibria problems or alternative equilibrium
concepts.
All these features are important for most applications of such theories. For economists
theories of choice over time and choice under risk constitute essential building blocks of a
broad range of economic models. They should therefore be both, descriptively valid and
normatively appealing. Moreover, most management decisions rely on assumptions about
preferences of second or third parties. Managers must therefore know what eﬀectively
drives behavior.
The present thesis opens up a whole branch of research. I see three principal directions
worth pursuing for future research.
First, there is need for causal tests of the theories proposed. In this thesis I am
interested in rationalizing observed discount rates and risk-taking behavior by controlling
for environmental factors. Controlled laboratory experiments, however, are easily carried
out and may complement the findings presented here. They can help to get a better
understanding of the prevalent drivers of behavior.
Second, for the policy maker it is important to have mechanisms at hand which dis-
tinguish between diﬀerent motives underlying behavior. Only with this knowledge is it
possible to decide whether and how to intervene. In this thesis it is argued that anoma-
lously appearing behavior may be generated by both, fully rational economic agents and
boundedly rational economic agents. Possible reasons for being boundedly rational are
that economic agents face self-imposed constraints, hold biased beliefs or have evolution-
adapted preferences. In the course of this thesis possible starting points for the develop-
ment of suitable mechanisms are proposed.
Finally, the basic ideas pursued in this thesis may also be applied to other choice do-
mains. Environmental constraints, for example, can help to understand the evolutionary
foundations of social preferences. In this sense, the case of risk taking behavior is just one
of possibly many examples in which apparent violations of classical economic theory may
be traced back to constraints rather than to a failure of the standard preference model.
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Appendix A
Viewing the Future through a
Warped Lens:
Why Uncertainty Generates
Hyperbolic Discounting
This chapter is joint work with Helga Fehr-Duda and Adrian Bruhin.
Another version of this chapter has been published as IEW Working Paper No. 510 and
is currently under review at Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.
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“Future income is always subject to some uncertainty, and this uncertainty must naturally
have an influence on the rate of time preference, or degree of impatience, of its possessor.”
Fisher (1930)
A.1 Introduction
It has long been recognized by practitioners and theorists alike that the domains of choice
under risk and over time are intimately related. Unlike gambling in the casino, where
uncertainty is resolved almost immediately, many real world decisions, and probably the
most important ones for our happiness, involve risky consequences materializing over
the course of time. In the realm of economic theory, the dimensions of risk and time
are treated as largely independent attributes, modeled in an equivalent way (Prelec and
Loewenstein, 1991): The classical models of choice, expected utility theory (EUT) and
discounted utility theory (DUT), view decision makers as maximizing a weighted sum of
utilities with the weights representing either probabilities or discount factors, respectively.
A large body of empirical evidence has challenged the validity of EUT and DUT as
descriptive models of choice, however. In the domain of risk, one of the best documented
phenomena concerns the Common Ratio Eﬀect : Often, people’s preference for a smaller
more probable outcome over a larger less probable one changes in favor of the larger out-
come when both outcome probabilities are scaled down by a common factor. This pattern
of behavior constitutes a violation of the independence axiom of EUT (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Starmer and Sugden, 1989).1 The stationarity axiom of DUT, according
to which preferences should depend on the absolute time interval between delivery of the
objects, has met a similar fate. The Common Diﬀerence Eﬀect describes the empirical
regularity that preference for a smaller earlier payoﬀ over a larger later payoﬀ reverses
when both payoﬀs are shifted into the more remote future, keeping the timing diﬀerence
constant (Thaler, 1981; Benzion et al., 1989).
Researchers have reacted to these anomalies by relaxing the assumptions on the cor-
responding decision weights while leaving the overall structure of the models intact. Vi-
olations of independence can be captured by a suitable nonlinear transformation of the
probabilities, as discussed by Quiggin (1982) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Viola-
tions of stationarity, on the other hand, are accounted for by allowing the discount factors
1Prominent special cases are the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953) and the Bergen paradox (Hagen, 1972).
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to decline hyperbolically in time, i.e. at a decreasing rate (Ainslie, 1991; Laibson, 1997;
Prelec, 2004). These generalizations seem to perform much better at explaining aggregate
choices than do EUT and DUT (Rachlin et al., 1991; Harless and Camerer, 1994; Hey and
Orme, 1994; Myerson and Green, 1995; Kirby, 1997). At the individual level, however,
there is vast heterogeneity in observed behavior in both decision domains (Hey and Orme,
1994; Chesson and Viscusi, 2000; Abdellaoui et al., 2010a; Bruhin et al., 2010) and it is
an open question whether the superior fit of the generalized models is a manifestation of
common regularities of individual behavior. Clearly, endeavors of integrating risk taking
and intertemporal choice in one single model, such as for example in Prelec and Loewen-
stein (1991), only make sense if the latter is the case. The question then arises whether
violations of independence and stationarity are actually committed by the same people.
In the empirical literature, the relationship between individuals’ attitudes towards risk
and delay has been examined from various diﬀerent angles. One strand of the literature
focuses on people’s risk tolerance measured independently from their degree of impatience.
These studies find that more risk averse people tend to discount the future more heav-
ily (Leigh, 1986; Anderhub et al., 2001; Eckel et al., 2004). Discount rates are inferred
directly from choices over dated monetary amounts and, therefore, their measurement is
confounded by the curvature of the utility function. Andersen et al. (2008) correct for
utility curvature and still find a positive, but much reduced, correlation in their predicted
degrees of risk aversion and impatience. None of the studies so far have accounted for
probability weighting and, therefore, they cannot address the question of whether de-
partures from linear probability weighting are systematically related to departures from
constant discounting. Similarly, the psychological literature has dealt with comparisons
of highly reduced forms of discounting functions for delay and probability, ignoring utility
curvature as well as probability weighting (Myerson et al., 2003). These findings also
indicate moderate positive correlations between both types of discounting.
Another strand of the literature investigates people’s choices when both risk and delay
are present (Keren and Roelofsma, 1995; Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1997; Weber and Chap-
man, 2005; Noussair and Wu, 2006; Anderson and Staﬀord, 2009; Baucells and Heukamp,
2010; Coble and Lusk, 2010). These studies generally conclude that there are interaction
eﬀects between time and risk, such as risk tolerance increasing with delay, which are not
easily justifiable within the frameworks of EUT and DUT. Again, probability weighting
does not feature in any of these papers. A notable exception is the contribution by Ab-
dellaoui et al. (2010b) who estimate individual probability weights over varying delays,
but do not elicit discount functions for guaranteed payoﬀs.
19
Finally, some recent papers examine the eﬀects of risk in the payment date, rather than
in outcome magnitude. Parallel to the findings on delayed guaranteed outcomes, Chesson
and Viscusi (2000) report discount rates to decline with time horizon. Moreover, Chesson
and Viscusi (2003) show that aversion to timing risk is positively related to ambiguity
aversion, suggesting that uncertainty may be processed similarly in both the dimensions
of time and risk. In a follow-up study Onay and O¨ncu¨ler (2007) argue that the prevalence
of timing risk aversion, which runs against the predictions of EUT, can be accommodated
within a rank-dependent model involving probability weighting. They did not test their
conjecture empirically, however.
This brief review of the literature shows that, to the best of our knowledge, there is no
previous study that investigates the same individuals’ probability weights and discount
functions. While evidence of hyperbolic discounting is occasionally reported, simultaneous
estimates of individual probability weights are usually not provided. This lack may be
due to the fact that a comparatively rich data set, and for that matter also a fairly
sophisticated estimation strategy, is needed to be able to disentangle utility curvature
and probability weighting.
In order to close this gap, we conducted an experiment with salient monetary incen-
tives, which exhibits a number of distinguishing features: First, the experiment generated
data rich enough to be able to estimate individual probability weighting functions and
relate them to the same subjects’ revealed discount rates. Second, in contrast to many
previous discounting experiments, every single subject got paid for her intertemporal
choices, involving substantial payoﬀs, in an incentive compatible manner. Third, we kept
transaction costs equal across diﬀerent payment dates in order to preclude confounding
eﬀects. Finally, we controlled for utility curvature.
We present the following experimental results. First, we show that subjects’ departures
from linear probability weighting are highly significantly associated with the strength of
decreasing discount rates. The curvature of the utility function, however, seems not to
be directly related to their decline. Second, estimation results are robust to controlling
for socioeconomic characteristics, such as gender, age, experience with investment deci-
sions and cognitive abilities. In fact, the only variable associated with decreasing discount
rates turns out to be the degree of nonlinearity of probability weights, which explains a,
by any standard, large percentage of the variation in the extent of the decline. In partic-
ular, cognitive abilities, as measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005),
cannot account for the link between proneness to probability distortions and hyperbolic
discounting. Moreover, all our results are insensitive to model specification.
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Our findings demonstrate that it is the same people who tend to violate the axioms of
independence and stationarity. We suggest that this relationship is driven by a natural
link between the domains of time and risk (Halevy, 2008; Walther, 2010): Arguably, only
immediate consequences can be totally certain whereas delayed ones are uncertain by
their very nature. For instance, a promised reward may, due to unforeseen circumstances,
materialize later or turn out to be smaller than expected, or sudden illness or death may
keep the decision maker from collecting her reward. For these reasons, future consequences
are inextricably associated with uncertainty, implying that the decision maker’s valuation
of delayed outcomes not only depends on her pure time preference, i.e. her preference
for immediate utility over delayed utility, but also on her perception of uncertainty and,
consequently, on her risk preferences. We show theoretically that stronger departures
from linear probability weighting entail more strongly declining discount rates, providing
us with a theoretical underpinning of our experimental results. Figuratively speaking,
hyperbolic discounting is driven by viewing the uncertain future through a warped lens,
produced by systematic distortions of probabilities. This theoretical framework not only
organizes our experimental findings but also accounts for previous evidence of interactions
of time and risk. A number of studies detected preference reversals when either risk is
added to temporal prospects (Baucells and Heukamp, 2010) or delay is added to simple
risky prospects (Keren and Roelofsma, 1995; Weber and Chapman, 2005).
Our analysis suggests that institutionally generated uncertainties, such as lack of con-
tract enforcement and weak property rights, may induce extreme short-run impatience
even if people’s pure rate of time preference is constant and relatively low. This insight
is important because it implies that revealed behavior may be predominantly driven by
environmental factors rather than by the underlying preferences themselves and, conse-
quently, may be amenable to economic policy. While uncertainty may be an important
channel through which hyperbolicity of discount rates is generated there may be other
sources of hyperbolic discounting behavior as well. For instance, pure time preferences
may be hyperbolic per se, as could be argued for addictive behavior. And when visceral
motives, such as hunger or lust, come into play, uncertainty may not be the dominant
dimension decision makers are concerned about. An excessive preference for the present
may then be driven by factors other than potential disappearance of the object of desire.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section A.2 we describe the
experimental design and procedures. Section A.3 outlines our approach to estimation.
Section A.4 presents our results. Section A.5 discusses our hypothesis on the role of risk
preferences in time discounting. Section C.5 concludes.
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A.2 Experimental Design
The experiment took place at the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IERE),
University of Zurich, in May 2006. Participants were recruited from the IERE subject
pool, which consists of students from all fields oﬀered at the University of Zurich and
the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. In total, we analyzed 112 subject’s re-
sponses.2 The experiment consisted of two main parts, one dedicated to eliciting certainty
equivalents for non-delayed risky prospects,3 the other one to eliciting future equivalents
and their corresponding imputed discount rates for temporal prospects involving guaran-
teed payments.4
We used similar procedures to elicit certainty equivalents and discount rates, in order
to economize on subjects’ cognitive eﬀort. For both types of tasks we implemented choice
menus containing a list of 20 varying alternatives which had to be judged against a
fixed option. To familiarize subjects with the nature of the procedure, the instructions
contained examples and trial problems. Besides a show up fee of CHF 10 (CHF 1 ≈
USD 0.8 at the time of the experiment), each subject was paid according to one of her
risky choices and one of her temporal choices selected randomly at the very end of the
experiment. Subjects received their compensation for the risky choices and the show-up
fee in cash immediately after completion of all the tasks. The compensation for their
intertemporal choices was paid out to them at the respective dates when they cashed in
vouchers issued to them at the end of the experiment. Payment modalities are described
in detail below. Subjects could work at their own speed. On average, it took them 1.25
hours to complete the experiment, including a socioeconomic questionnaire presented after
the choice tasks.
A.2.1 Elicitation of Certainty Equivalents
Since the objective of the risk task was to obtain data on the basis of which individual
probability weights could be estimated, a fairly large number of observations per person
2We omitted six subjects’ responses from our analysis. Four subjects reported that they would not
be able to cash in their delayed payments at the respective payment dates. Three of them would have
been on vacation then, the fourth person had planned a long visit abroad. Hence, their choices were not
informative of their time preferences. Concerning the remaining two subjects we could not disentangle
utility eﬀects from probability weighting eﬀects. Nonetheless, our results do not change when we include
these two individuals in the data set.
3The risk data was also used in Bruhin et al. (2010).
4Instructions are available upon request. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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was needed. To elicit individual lottery evaluations, subjects were presented with 20 choice
menus, each one involving a specific binary lottery L = (x1, p; x2), with x1 > x2 ≥ 0,
labeled Option A in Figure A.1. Option B in the choice menu represented the guaranteed
alternatives, ranging from the higher lottery outcome x1 to the lower outcome x2. Every
subject had to choose her preferred option in each row of the choice menu. In Figure
A.1, a hypothetical subject prefers all guaranteed payments larger than CHF 36 to the
stated lottery, and prefers the lottery in the remaining rows. This subject’s valuation of
the lottery, her certainty equivalent ce, is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the two
amounts next to her indiﬀerence point, amounting to CHF 37 in the example here. The
set of lotteries, listed in Table A.1, included a wide range of outcomes and probabilities.
Every subject was confronted with this set of lotteries once. The choice menus appeared
in an individualized random order.
Figure A.1: Choice Menu — Risk
Option A Your Choice
Option B
(guaranteed reward)
1
Gain
of CHF 50 with a 
probability of
75%
and
Gain
of CHF 10 with a 
probability of
25%
A B CHF 50
2 A B CHF 48
3 A B CHF 46
4 A B CHF 44
5 A B CHF 42
6 A B CHF 40
7 A B CHF 38
8 A B CHF 36
9 A B CHF 34
10 A B CHF 32
11 A B CHF 30
12 A B CHF 28
13 A B CHF 26
14 A B CHF 24
15 A B CHF 22
16 A B CHF 20
17 A B CHF 18
18 A B CHF 16
19 A B CHF 14
20 A B CHF 12
At the end of the experiment, after the subject had completed all the tasks, one row
of one choice menu was randomly selected for payment. If the subject had opted for
the lottery there, her decision was played out for real. If the subject had opted for the
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Table A.1: Risky Prospects
p x1 x2 p x1 x2
0.1 20 10 0.25 50 20
0.5 20 10 0.5 50 20
0.9 20 10 0.75 50 20
0.05 40 10 0.95 50 20
0.25 40 10 0.05 150 50
0.5 40 10 0.5 10 0
0.75 40 10 0.5 20 0
0.95 40 10 0.05 40 0
0.05 50 20 0.95 50 0
0.1 150 0 0.25 40 0
Outcomes x1 and x2 are stated in CHF, p
denotes the probability of x1 materializing.
guaranteed payoﬀ, the respective amount was paid out to her. On average, subjects
earned CHF 37.22 in cash for the risk task, including the show-up fee of CHF 10, to be
paid out immediately. Cash payments for the risk task were considerably higher than the
local student assistant’s hourly wage.
A.2.2 Elicitation of Discount Rates
Using a similar format as in the risk task we elicited individual discount rates for temporal
prospects T = (x, t), with x > 0, over payments x delayed by tmonths. The choice menus,
designed as in Figure A.2, contained 20 binary choices each.5 Subjects had to choose
between a guaranteed payment pe of CHF 60 the next day (Option A) and a guaranteed
later payment x (Option B), delayed by two months or four months, respectively. The
varying alternatives x were sorted in descending order from the highest amount to the
lowest amount, incorporating an interest payment at a simple annualized rate of δt ∈
[0%, 95%] over the corresponding time interval [0, t]. These rates were exhibited in the
right-most column of the choice menu.6 The present amount of CHF 60 and the range
of interest rates were chosen to provide salient incentives, so that deferring the reward
was actually worthwhile. The arithmetic mean of the two monetary amounts next to
the indiﬀerence point on the choice menu provided the imputed discount rate δt. The
hypothetical subject in Figure A.2, for instance, is indiﬀerent between CHF 60 and CHF
5A similar design was proposed by Coller and Williams (1999).
6The discounting experiment consisted of one additional task not reported here.
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70.50, implying a discount rate of 52.5% per annum.
Figure A.2: Choice Menu — Time
Option A
payment tomorrow
Your Choice
Option B
payment in 4 months + 1 day
1
Amount
of CHF 60
A B CHF 79 95%
2 A B CHF 78 90%
3 A B CHF 77 85%
4 A B CHF 76 80%
5 A B CHF 75 75%
6 A B CHF 74 70%
7 A B CHF 73 65%
8 A B CHF 72 60%
9 A B CHF 71 55%
10 A B CHF 70 50%
11 A B CHF 69 45%
12 A B CHF 68 40%
13 A B CHF 67 35%
14 A B CHF 66 30%
15 A B CHF 65 25%
16 A B CHF 64 20%
17 A B CHF 63 15%
18 A B CHF 62 10%
19 A B CHF 61 5%
20 A B CHF 60 0%
We applied a similar random payment method in the time task as in the risk task: One
of each subject’s choices was paid out for real at the corresponding payment date. Average
payoﬀs for the time task amounted to CHF 64.34. Therefore, total average payments for
both risk and time tasks summed to more than four times students’ opportunity costs,
measured by the student assistants’ hourly wages.
Since our objective was to elicit discount rates over guaranteed payments, we took
special care with the payment procedure: First, every single subject got paid for one of
her intertemporal choices all of which entailed a payment of the same order of magnitude.
Not paying oﬀ everyone may render the stochastic nature of the experimental earnings
salient and interfere with the objective of eliciting discount rates over guaranteed amounts
of money. The second issue concerns the credibility of payment. In order to control for
uncertainty arising from subjects’ doubts about experimenter reliability, an oﬃcial voucher
of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology was issued to them. This payment method
was explained in detail in the instructions, and a specimen of the voucher was included
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in the instruction set.
A third possibly confounding factor are transaction costs. Transaction costs should be
the same regardless of the payment date in order to avoid inducing present bias resulting
from immediately available cash payments. Therefore, every subject had to make a trip
to the cash desk to collect her earnings for the discounting task.7
A.3 Econometric Specification
The data elicited in the experiment provide two types of main variables: certainty equiva-
lents ce for risky prospects, and imputed discount rates δt for temporal prospects. We first
discuss our econometric approach to risky choice and, subsequently, describe the method
employed to test for a link between risk preferences and time discounting.
A.3.1 Behavior under Risk
Modeling decisions under risk encompasses two components, a model of behavior on the
one hand, and assumptions regarding decision errors on the other hand. Risk taking
behavior is modeled by rank dependent utility theory (RDU).
According to RDU, an individual values a two-outcome lottery L = (x1, p; x2), where
x1 > x2 ≥ 0, by w(p)u(x1) + (1 − w(p))u(x2). The function u(x), with u(0) = 0 and
u￿(x) > 0, describes how monetary outcomes x are subjectively valued. The function
w(p) assigns a subjective weight to every outcome probability p, with w(0) = 0, w(1) = 1,
and w￿(p) > 0. The decision maker’s predicted certainty equivalent cˆe for this lottery can
then be written as
cˆe = u−1 [w(p)u(x1) + (1− w(p))u(x2)] . (A.1)
In order to make RDU operational, we have to assume specific functional forms for the
utility function u(x) and the probability weighting function w(p). Given our objective of
describing individual behavior, we choose flexible functional forms for u as well as for w.
A natural candidate for utility u is a power function. In its extensive form, as discussed
by Wakker (2008), u is modeled as8
7People entitled to payoﬀs the next day were issued vouchers immediately after the experiment. All
the others received oﬃcial certificates of indebtedness after the experiment, the vouchers themselves were
sent to them by registered mail several days before they could cash them in, so they did not have to
worry about forgetting encashment or misplacing their vouchers.
8Note that lnx is not defined for x = 0. Therefore, estimation is carried out after shifting all outcomes
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u(x) =

xη if η > 0,
ln x if η = 0,
−xη if η < 0.
A variety of parameterizations of probability weighting functions w(p) have been pro-
posed in the literature (Karmarkar, 1979; Lattimore et al., 1992; Tversky and Kahneman,
1992; Prelec, 1998). Since our primary interest lies in common ratio violations we focus
on a specific characteristic of the weighting function, subproportionality. Subproportion-
ality means that for a fixed ratio of probabilities the ratio of the corresponding proba-
bility weights is closer to unity when the probabilities are low than when they are high
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Intuitively speaking, scaling down the original probabil-
ities makes them less distinguishable from each other, thus favoring preference reversals.
Therefore, subproportionality maps common ratio violations. Expressed formally (Prelec,
1998), subproportionality holds if 1 ≥ p > q > 0 and 0 < λ < 1 implies the inequality
w(p)
w(q)
>
w(λp)
w(λq)
. (A.2)
As we rely on subproportionality as the crucial characteristic of the probability weight-
ing function, to be estimated for each single individual, we adopt the flexible and empir-
ically well-founded two-parameter specification suggested by Prelec (1998),
w(p) = e−β(− ln p)
α
. (A.3)
For α < 1, the function is subproportional everywhere, with the parameter α measuring
the degree of subproportionality.9 A smaller value of α reflects a more subproportional
curve. Therefore, this specification enables us to rank individuals according to their their
proneness to common ratio violations. The second parameter, β > 0, is a net index of
convexity in that increasing β increases the convexity of the function without aﬀecting
subproportionality (Prelec (1998), p.505). Linear weighting is characterized by α = β = 1.
With regard to error specification we have to reconsider our measurement procedure.
In the course of the experiment, an individual’s risk taking behavior was captured by her
certainty equivalents cel for a set of 20 diﬀerent lotteries Ll = (x1l, pl; x2l), l ∈ {1, . . . , 20}.
by one unit of money (cmp. Wakker (2008), p.1335).
9Prelec (2000) uses the term “Allais paradox index” (p.78).
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Since RDU explains deterministic choice, actual certainty equivalents cel are likely to
deviate from the predicted certainty equivalents cˆel by a stochastic error ￿l, which has to
be taken account of. Therefore, we assume that the observed certainty equivalents cel can
be expressed as cel = cˆel + ￿l, with ￿l being normally distributed with zero mean.10
Concerning the error variance, we need to account for heteroskedasticity: For each
lottery subjects had to consider 20 guaranteed outcomes, equally spaced throughout the
lottery’s outcome range x1l−x2l. Since the observed certainty equivalent cel is calculated
as the arithmetic mean of the smallest guaranteed amount preferred to the lottery and the
subsequent guaranteed amount, the error is proportional to the outcome range. Therefore,
the standard deviation νl of the error term distribution has to be normalized by the
outcome range, yielding νl = ν(x1l − x2l), where ν denotes an additional parameter to be
estimated. In total, therefore, four parameters per subject were estimated by maximum
likelihood: the curvature of the utility function η, subproportionality and convexity of
the probability weighting function α and β, as well as the normalized standard deviation
of the decision error parameter ν.
A.3.2 Behavior over Time
Subjects’ responses to the intertemporal choice tasks in the experiment provided us with
measurements of discount rates δ2 and δ4, imputed from the intertemporal tradeoﬀs be-
tween present payments pe and payments x delayed by two and four months, respectively.
However, the true underlying discount factors D(t) are defined in terms of utilities, not
payoﬀs.11 For a temporal prospect T = (x, t), true discount rates are inferred from the
indiﬀerence relation u(pe) = D(t)u(x). Measured discount rates, therefore, deviate from
the underlying true rates unless u is linear. While in our specification utility curvature
aﬀects the level of discount rates but cannot, by itself, induce their decline, it may have
a confounding eﬀect on the magnitude of the change in the measured discount rates
∆δ = δ2 − δ4: In the presence of nonlinear probability weighting, ∆δ gets amplified by
the concavity of the power utility function (see Appendix A.7.4). Specifically, the more
concave u, the larger the measured diﬀerence in the discount rates ∆δ if w(p) is not linear.
Therefore, we have to control for the degree of concavity η in the regression model.
10Since ce is calculated as the arithmetic mean of two neighboring amounts in the choice menu it
possibly contains some measurement error. As ce is the dependent variable in the model a measurement
error does not pose a problem other than potentially increasing noise.
11We assume that the utility of money is a general cardinal function which applies to risky as well as
to delayed payoﬀs. See Wakker (1994) for a justification of this assumption.
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A.3.3 Regression Model
We investigate the hypothesized relationship between probability weighting and decreas-
ing discount rates by regressing the diﬀerence between the imputed discount rates δ2 and
δ4, ∆δ, on a vector of regressors c. In the base model, Model 1, the vector c consists
of a constant and the individuals’ estimated risk preference parameters: η captures con-
cavity of the utility function, α captures subproportionality of the probability weighting
function, and β its convexity. Additionally, we estimate an extended version of the base
model, Model 2, by controlling for a set of individual characteristics. In particular, these
controls comprise gender (labeled Female), age (Age), the logarithm of disposable income
per month (Log-Income), a binary variable indicating whether the subject is familiar with
investment decisions (Experience) as well as the test score for the Cognitive Reflection Test
(CRT) (Frederick, 2005).12 This three-question test measures specific aspects of cogni-
tive ability which were found to be strongly correlated with risk taking and discounting
behavior.
Unlike the exemplary choice pattern displayed in Figure A.2, a decision maker may
have opted for the same option in all rows of the choice menu, which results in a censored
observation. In particular, she may have always preferred the smaller sooner option,
indicating that her discount rate may lie beyond the maximum value of 95%.13 As a
consequence, the diﬀerence between the observed discount rates δ2 and δ4 is aﬀected by
censoring as well. As ordinary least square (OLS) yields biased estimates in this case,
we account for this issue by a censored regression model, described in detail in Appendix
A.8. The model has the following form:
∆δ∗i = ci (γ2 − γ4)￿ ￿￿ ￿
∆γ
+ e2,i − e4,i￿ ￿￿ ￿
∆ei
, (A.4)
where ∆δ∗i specifies the true, but potentially unobserved, diﬀerence between δ2 and δ4
for individual i, i ∈ {1, . . . , 112}. The error term ∆ei is normally distributed with mean
zero and variance σ2. The interpretation of the regression coeﬃcients ∆γ is equivalent to
those of OLS regression, also displayed in the regression output (Table A.3 below).
12Summary statistics of the controls are included in Appendix A.11, Table A.4.
13A decision maker may also always prefer the later larger option. In this case, we assume a discount
rate of 0%. The number of observations at the boundary of the choice menu are listed in Table A.5 of
Appendix A.11.
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A.4 Results
In the following section we analyze the raw data on risk taking behavior and time dis-
counting, and present the estimates for subjects’ probability weights. Finally, we examine
the relationship between subjects’ sensitivities with respect to changes in probability and
delay.
A.4.1 Descriptive Analysis
For the domain of risk taking, Figure B.11 summarizes observed behavior by the median
relative risk premia RRP = (ev − ce)/|ev|, where ev denotes the expected value of a
lottery’s payoﬀ and ce stands for the observed certainty equivalent. RRP > 0 indicates
risk aversion, RRP < 0 risk seeking, and RRP = 0 risk neutrality. The median relative
risk premia, sorted by the probability p of the higher gain, show a systematic relationship
between aggregated risk attitudes and lottery probabilities: Subjects’ choices display the
familiar pattern, i.e. they are risk averse for high-probability gains, but risk seeking for
low-probability gains, supporting the existence of nonlinear probability weighting.
Figure A.3: Median Relative Risk Premia (RRP)
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p
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P
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.4
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.2
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As far as intertemporal choices are concerned, people’s average behavior exhibits de-
creasing discount rates, i.e. subjects discount less remote outcomes more strongly than
more remote ones: The first column in Table A.2 reveals that the discount rates im-
puted from subject’s choices decline on average by 7 percentage points per annum when
the time horizon is extended from two months to four months. The average data veil
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heterogeneity as well as the extent of decreasing discount rates, however. Whereas the
majority of approximately 54% of all subjects exhibit decreasing discount rates over time,
∆δ > 0 (second column), about 29% exhibit constant discount rates (third column), and
the residual group reveals increasing discount rates (fourth column). Average discount
rates of subjects with decreasing discount rates amount to δ2 = 47% p.a. and δ4 = 31%
p.a., respectively, reflecting a much greater change than do the overall averages.14
Table A.2: Average Discount Rates and Risk Parameters
Subjects with
all ∆δ > 0 ∆δ = 0 ∆δ < 0
100% 53.9% 29.2% 16.9%
δ2 0.368 0.465 0.328
(0.023) (0.029) 0.213 (0.058)
δ4 0.299 0.307 (0.045) 0.418
(0.020) (0.025) (0.068)
∆δ 0.070 0.157 0 -0.090
(0.012) (0.015) (0.019)
η 0.873 0.808 0.948 0.953
(0.032) (0.046) (0.074) (0.072)
α 0.505 0.426 0.574 0.634
(0.021) (0.027) (0.040) (0.063)
β 0.974 0.936 1.064 0.940
(0.026) (0.036) (0.068) (0.045)
Observations 89 48 26 15
Standard errors in parentheses. Excluding 23 subjects with
censored observations.
A.4.2 Risk Preference Parameters
Whereas one of our central variables, change in discount rates ∆δ, is directly observable,
the other one, departure from linear probability weighting, has to be estimated from our
data on certainty equivalents.
Individual risk preference parameters η, α and β were estimated on the basis of the
econometric model discussed in Section A.3.1. As Table A.2 reveals, the values of the
curvature parameter η of the utility function reflect slight concavity or linearity. The
average subproportionality index α amounts to 0.505, indicating a pronounced departure
from linear probability weighting in line with previous findings (Tversky and Kahneman,
14The distributions of the observed discount rates are shown in Appendix A.9.
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1992; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999; Abdellaoui, 2000). The average estimates for β lie in
the vicinity of one, implying that the respective curves intersect the diagonal at about
p = 1/e.15
The overall picture revealed by our data is consistent with the typical empirical find-
ings: On average, subjects systematically violate linear probability weighting and constant
discounting. But the central question, namely whether the degree of subproportionality
of probability weighting is associated with hyperbolicity of discounting behavior at the
level of the individual has yet to be answered.
A.4.3 Relationship between Probability Weights and Hyper-
bolic Discounting
A first indication of a systematic relationship between probability weighting and dis-
counting can be found in Table A.2. The average estimated subproportionality index α
varies substantially across discounting types and exhibits a systematic pattern: α is lowest
for the group with decreasing discount rates and highest for the group with increasing
discount rates.
This finding is confirmed by the estimates of the regression models. Table A.3 displays
the results derived by OLS as well as by the censored regression method. Inspection of
the coeﬃcients indicates that censoring seems not to be an important problem: After
omitting the 23 censored observations, OLS yields coeﬃcients very close to the estimates
of the censored regression model. Furthermore, both specifications (Models 1 and 2)
lead to the same conclusion: Subproportionality of probability weighting is significantly
associated with decreasing discount rates ∆δ. Table A.3 shows the estimated coeﬃcient
of α to be approximately −0.2. All the respective estimates are significant at the 1%-
level and remain robust to inclusion of additional controls. The eﬀect is not only highly
significant, it is also quite substantial: A decrease in the subproportionality index α by
0.1 is associated with an increase in ∆δ by 2 percentage points per annum. In particular,
the decline in discount rates is related to the degree of subproportionality, but not to the
index of convexity β. We obtained the same order of magnitude for the coeﬃcient of α
when we restricted β to be equal to one. Regression coeﬃcients and their standard errors
also remain stable when either η or β are deleted from the list of regressors. Moreover,
it can be shown that estimates are totally robust to alternative parameterizations of the
15Histograms of the parameter distributions are included in Appendix A.10.
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Table A.3: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: ∆δ (∆δ∗)
OLSa Censored
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 0.226∗∗∗ 0.279 0.247∗∗∗ 0.321
(0.063) (0.228) (0.057) (0.225)
η 0.018 0.002 -0.006 -0.022
(0.042) (0.043) (0.039) (0.041)
α -0.205∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.074) (0.062) (0.075)
β -0.070 -0.040 -0.074 -0.045
(0.067) (0.068) (0.060) (0.063)
Female -0.012 -0.011
(0.031) (0.032)
Age -0.001 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007)
Log-Income -0.013 -0.012
(0.024) (0.023)
Experience 0.015 0.020
(0.032) (0.033)
CRT 0.021 0.021
(0.017) (0.017)
σˆ 0.123 0.124 0.084 0.082
R2 or (LogLik) 0.137 0.170 (48.693) (51.123)
Observations 89 89 112 112
Parameters 4 9 9 19
a) without censored observations.
∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (10,000 replications). Boot-
strapping accounts for the fact that the regressors α, β and η are
estimated quantities.
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probability weighting curve as well.16
The coeﬃcients of the utility parameter η are not statistically diﬀerent from zero,
either.17 This result is consistent with our hypothesis that utility curvature per se does not
impact the extent of decreasing discount rates. Furthermore, none of the other individual
characteristics show a significant eﬀect.18
An F -test comparing the OLS Model 1 with Model 2 renders a p-value of 0.670,
favoring the more parsimonious Model 1, as the controls do not substantially contribute to
explaining the variance in ∆δ.19 Furthermore, the regression models explain a rather large
fraction of total variance: Model 2, for instance, yields an R-squared value of 17%.20 These
findings present conclusive evidence that comparatively more subproportional probability
weighting is associated with a stronger decline in discount rates.
A.5 Discussion
The strong and significant correlation between subproportionality of probability weight-
ing and extent of hyperbolic discounting begs the question of whether this relationship
can be explained in causal terms. In principle, there are three pathways through which
correlation could be generated. First, the tendency towards hyperbolic discounting could
cause distortions in probability weights. Since, in experiments, estimates of probability
weights are generally based on atemporal choices, i.e. when there is practically no time
delay between choice and payment, this possibility can be eﬀectively ruled out. Second,
the direction of causality could work the other way round, with proneness to probability
distortions inducing hyperbolic discounting. Finally, there could be a third factor driving
both types of departures from the standard model predictions. We will discuss the latter
possibility first and then turn to the second alternative.
Since the Common Ratio Eﬀect and the Common Diﬀerence Eﬀect pertain to dimin-
ishing sensitivity towards probability and delay, respectively, similar cognitive processes
may govern the evaluation of risky and delayed outcomes. A natural candidate for a
common factor driving both processes is cognitive abilities. Several papers have looked
16Results are available upon request.
17Nor does an interaction term α× η contribute to explaining variation in ∆δ.
18While not significantly diﬀerent from zero, coeﬃcients exhibit the expected signs: Females have a
slightly more subproportional weighting curve, consistent with previous findings (Fehr-Duda et al., 2006).
Both experience with investment decisions and high CRT scores are associated with smaller departures
from linearity.
19The same is the case when the two censored models are compared. A likelihood ratio test of Model
2 against Model 1 renders a p-value of 0.9.
20When regressing ∆δ exclusively on the socioeconomic variables, R-squared amounts to 3.9%!
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into the relationship between cognitive abilities and risk tolerance on the one hand, and
between cognitive abilities and patience on the other hand (Frederick, 2005; Benjamin
et al., 2006; Dohmen et al., 2007). Generally, they conclude that better cognitive abilities
tend to be associated with higher risk tolerance as well as higher patience. For instance,
Frederick (2005) finds that students with high Cognitive Reflection Test scores gambled
significantly more often that did the low CRT group, and exhibited lower imputed dis-
count rates, albeit not for choices involving longer time horizons. These previous findings
seem to conflict with the insignificant coeﬃcient of CRT in Table A.3. Since CRT is not
correlated with α,21 the lack of correlation between CRT and ∆δ indeed suggests that
CRT scores cannot explain the variance in the hyperbolicity of discount rates. However,
we are concerned with sensitivities towards changes in probability and delay and not with
measures of average risk aversion and impatience, the focus of previous research. Of
course, there could be other factors than cognitive abilities, or aspects of cognitive ability
not captured by CRT scores, that drive the correlation between subproportionality and
hyperbolic discounting. Clearly, this possibility cannot be ruled out and needs further
exploration.
Finally, we discuss the last one of our options, direct impact of subproportionality on
hyperbolicity of discounting. Many authors have noted before that “[a]nything that is
delayed is almost by definition uncertain” (Prelec and Loewenstein (1991), p.784). For
instance, a promised reward may, due to unforeseen circumstances, materialize later or
turn out to be smaller than expected, or death may keep the decision maker from collecting
her reward at all. For these reasons, future consequences are inextricably associated
with uncertainty, implying that the decision maker’s valuation of temporal prospects not
only depends on her pure time preference, i.e. her preference for immediate utility over
delayed utility, but also on her perception of uncertainty and, consequently, on her risk
preferences. In other words, uncertainty drives a wedge between pure time preferences
and time discounting.
If this account is an accurate description of intertemporal choice it has far reaching
implications for observed discounting behavior, the most obvious one being that behav-
iorally revealed discount rates will be higher than the rate of pure time preference as
they include a risk premium. Not surprisingly then, uncertainty has been identified to
be an important confound in the measurement of time preferences, which may, at least
partly, explain the notoriously high discount rates found in empirical studies (Frederick
et al., 2002). The story does not stop here, however. If risk preferences influence time
21The Pearson correlation coeﬃcient amounts to -0.0049 (p-value 0.964).
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discounting, then people’s proneness to probability weighting has to be taken into ac-
count as well. Recent contributions have examined the impact of nonlinear probability
weighting on discounting behavior theoretically (Halevy, 2008; Walther, 2010). Halevy,
for instance, motivated by interaction eﬀects between time and risk found by Keren and
Roelofsma (1995) and Weber and Chapman (2005), is concerned with convex probability
transformations that can accommodate the certainty eﬀect inherent in the classical Allais
paradox. We investigate the more general case of common ratio violations which can
be modeled by subproportional probability weights. Subproportionality is not confined
to convex functions but may also be present in inverse S-shaped probability transforma-
tions, which organize a large part of the empirical evidence. In the following, we show
that the degree of subproportionality of probability weights indeed predicts the extent of
decreasing discount rates. Furthermore, we derive comparative static results with respect
to degree of uncertainty and exemplify the model predictions by graphical illustrations.
A.5.1 A Model of Discounting: The Warped Lens
If the future is perceived as uncertain an allegedly guaranteed delayed outcome T = (x, t)
is eﬀectively evaluated as a risky prospect. Suppose that any future payment is perceived
to materialize with a constant per-period probability of contract survival s, 0 < s ≤ 1.
Consequently, T is evaluated as L = (x, st), rendering x with probability st and zero
otherwise.
As far as the rate of pure time preference is concerned, we adopt the conventional
assumption: the rate of pure time preference is characterized by a constant per-period
rate r ≥ 0, resulting in a pure time discount factor ρ equal to e−r.
These assumptions imply that the present equivalent pe of the future payment x, such
that the decision maker is indiﬀerent between pe and x, is defined by
u(pe) = w(st)ρtu(x). (A.5)
The eﬀective discount factor D(t) at delay t equals the weight attached to u(x), i.e.
D(t) = w(st)ρt, (A.6)
which depends not only on the pure rate of time preference r, but also on the probability
of contract survival s as well as on the shape of the probability weighting function w.
Clearly, if w is linear, D(t) declines exponentially irrespective of the magnitude of s. If
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0 < s < 1, the resulting discount factor is lower than for s = 1, implying that uncertainty
per se increases the absolute level of discount rates, but cannot account for discount
rates declining over time. In fact, due to uncertainty, discounting would be observed
even for a zero rate of pure time preference. If, however, w is nonlinear and 0 < s < 1,
the component w(st) distorts the discount factor: As shown formally in Appendix A.7.1,
subproportionality of w generates hyperbolicity of w(st) in t and, consequently, decreasing
discount rates if the future is perceived as uncertain. Metaphorically speaking, the decision
maker, when looking into the future, perceives delayed events through the warped lens
of probability distortions. A natural extension of this insight is that higher degrees of
subproportionality induce more strongly declining discount rates (see Appendix A.7.2).
The eﬀective discount factor D(t) also depends on the level of uncertainty s. Higher
uncertainty implies more strongly declining discount rates as well. A formal proof appears
in Appendix A.7.3.
In order to illustrate the predictions of our model, which hold for any subproportional
probability weighting function, we demonstrate the comparative static eﬀects of subpro-
portionality α and uncertainty s graphically, using Prelec’s specification. The panels on
the left-hand side of Figure A.4 show the comparative static eﬀects of varying α, the
right-hand side ones are dedicated to varying levels of s.
Panel A1 of Figure A.4 depicts the probability weighting curves for three distinct
parameter values of α, with β = 1: a medium-sized departure from linearity (α = 0.5),
as exhibited on average by our experimental subjects, a strong departure from linearity
(α = 0.2), as well as the limiting case of linear probability weighting (α = 1). Panel B1 of
Figure A.4 shows, for each of the three cases of probability weighting, the eﬀective discount
factors resulting from Equation A.6 as they evolve over time.22 For a decision maker with
linear probability weighting the discount function, represented by the solid gray curve, is
exponential. In contrast, the dotted discount function of a typical decision maker with
α = 0.5 departs from exponentiality, exhibiting an apparently hyperbolic pattern. By
comparison, the decision maker characterized by the most strongly S-shaped probability
weighting curve underweights (overweights) large (small) probabilities more strongly than
does the decision maker with α = 0.5, which leads to an even more pronounced departure
from exponential discounting (dashed curve).
Finally, Panel C1 of Figure A.4 displays the imputed discount rates dt inferred from
D(t) = e−dtt. The solid gray line corresponds to linear probability weighting. Since this
22For illustrative purposes, in Figure A.4 r is fixed at 0.1 and s is assumed to be 0.8, which means that
80% of all contracts are anticipated to survive at least one period.
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Figure A.4: Probability Distortions and Discounting
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decision maker is not prone to probability distortions, her discount rate is independent
of time delay and, consequently, constant over time. In contrast to this decision maker,
the discount rates of the decision makers with nonlinear probability weights start out at
very high levels and then decline sharply. As is evident from comparing the dashed curve
with the dotted one, the more subproportional probability weighting function generates
a larger decline in discount rates between period 2 and period 1, i.e. the diﬀerence
d2 − d1 is greater for higher degrees of subproportionality α. For this prediction to
hold the probability of contract survival s needs to be smaller than one. Since people
vary in their perceptions of uncertainty our framework predicts a correlation between
subproportionality and decreasing discount rates. This is exactly what we find in our
data.
Another important insight from our approach concerns the direct impact of uncertainty
on discounting behavior. Hyperbolicity of discount rates is crucially influenced by people’s
perceptions of uncertainty: Increasing uncertainty not only raises the level of discount
rates but also exacerbates revealed short-term impatience. Panels A2 to C2 in Figure
A.4 illustrate this eﬀect for α = 0.5, the average index of subproportionality in our data,
and r = 0.1. When the survival probability s declines from 0.8 to 0.5, the resulting
discount function departs more strongly from exponentiality as Panel B2 shows. Hence,
the decrease in discount rates associated with higher uncertainty is more pronounced as
well (Panel C2 ).
A.5.2 Perceived Uncertainty and the Pure Rate of Time Pref-
erence
The model presented in the previous section provides a theoretical underpinning of our em-
pirical finding that the degree of subproportionality α predicts the extent of hyperbolic
discounting ∆δ. Our theoretical framework implies such a relationship ceteris paribus,
holding constant the other model parameters, specifically the subjective probability of
contract survival s and the pure rate of time preference r, both of which are not observ-
able. In our experimental setting with decisions over a short time horizon, the subjective
probability of contract survival s should lie very close to unity since mortality risk is very
low in our age group of subjects and we took great care to communicate experimenter
reliability. One way of checking the plausibility of the theoretical model is to investi-
gate whether, on average, actual choices are indeed consistent with this conjecture, i.e.
whether values of s implied by our data lie in the vicinity of one for a wide range of
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plausible values of the pure rate of time preference r.
For this purpose, we examine the combinations of s and r that are consistent with the
observed average intertemporal tradeoﬀs between more immediate and more remote pay-
ments pe and x. We solve for all feasible combinations of sˆ and rˆ that are compatible with
the observed choices by inserting the estimates for subjects’ average behavioral parame-
ters η, α and β into Equation A.5. As is clear from Equation A.5, a higher probability
of contract survival needs to be compensated by a higher pure rate of time preference,
ceteris paribus, to keep individuals indiﬀerent between more immediate and more remote
rewards.
As Figure A.5 shows, the feasible (sˆ, rˆ)-combinations indeed exhibit a rising profile,
with sˆ starting out at below 97% p.a. and converging to 100% p.a., when the pure rate
of time preference increases from 0% to 15% p.a. and beyond. For instance, s = 99%
is compatible with r ￿ 8.5% p.a. What this exercise shows is that the data, interpreted
within our framework, are consistent with a very high subjective probability that contracts
survive at least one year, in accordance with our conjecture. Furthermore, accounting
for inherent uncertainty implies rates of pure time preference in a plausible range lying
considerably below the observed average discount rates of more than 30% p.a.
Figure A.5: Feasible (sˆ, rˆ)-Combinations
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This suggests that even allegedly guaranteed future outcomes are viewed as slightly
uncertain, in line with direct questionnaire evidence provided in Patak and Reynolds
(2007). The authors asked respondents to rate their certainties for the same rewards,
delayed by 1, 2, 30, 180, and 365 days, respectively, which they had encountered during
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the preceding choice experiment. The respondents reported ratings that clearly declined
with the length of delay. Moreover, using a similar method, Takahashi et al. (2007) found
that such subjective probabilities of obtaining delayed rewards decay in a hyperbolic-like
manner, consistent with probability weights w(st) declining hyperbolically with delay t.
A.6 Conclusion
For several decades, decision research has been dominated by the quest for better de-
scriptive theories of behavior under risk and over time, triggered by a large body of
experimental evidence challenging the classical models of choice, expected utility theory
and discounted utility theory. Alternative models, accounting for nonlinear probability
weighting and hyperbolic discounting, describe behavior much more accurately than do
the classical models, at least at the aggregate level. In this paper we address the ques-
tion whether the better fit of the generalized models is actually a consequence of the
same subjects’ anomalous behaviors. We present the first evidence that more pronounced
systematic departures from linear probability weighting are indeed associated with more
strongly declining discount rates at the level of the individual decision makers. This result
is robust to inclusion of additional controls as well as model specification. In fact, the
only variable explaining a substantial fraction of heterogeneity in individual discounting
patterns turns out to be the degree of subproportionality of probability weights.
Several authors have proposed that the existence of matching violations of the classical
axioms is not coincidental, but rather reflects the close relationship between risk and
delay (e.g. Prelec and Loewenstein (1991)). Some researchers have even argued that
the two attributes are virtually the same, but there is no consensus as to which one
is the more fundamental of the two. We favor the view that, if there is a hierarchical
relationship between them at all, risk is the more likely candidate. To bolster this view,
we provide a theoretical model predicting the observed link between probability distortions
and decreasing discount rates. For hyperbolic discounting to emerge two factors need to
interact: probability distortions and future uncertainty.
Arguably, the future is uncertain by definition. Uncertainty may stem from diﬀerent
sources, either tied to the individual herself, such as lifetime expectancy, or to environ-
mental factors. Lack of contract enforcement and weak property rights, for instance, may
make people skeptical that promises will be actually kept. Therefore, institutionally gen-
erated uncertainties may induce extreme short-run impatience even if people’s pure rate
of time preference is low and constant. This insight is important because it implies that
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revealed behavior may be predominantly driven by environmental factors rather than by
the underlying preferences themselves and, consequently, may be amenable to economic
policy.
The channel through which uncertainty generates hyperbolic discounting is nonlinear
probability weighting, a robust phenomenon in the empirical literature. If probability
weighting plays such an important role in risk taking and discounting behavior, the obvi-
ous question concerning the source of these probability distortions arises. Unfortunately,
little is known about the forces driving probability distortions. A number of theoretical
contributions have invoked emotions to explain probability weighting (Wu, 1999; Caplin
and Leahy, 2001). Walther (2003, 2010), for instance, rationalizes nonlinear probability
weighting by generalizing expected utility theory: He assumes that, in addition to mon-
etary outcomes, the decision maker cares about emotions triggered by the resolution of
uncertainty. His approach predicts that, if the decision maker anticipates experiencing
elation or disappointment when the actual outcome lies above or below some normal level,
she will distort outcome probabilities according to an S-shaped pattern. The more emo-
tional a person expects to be, the stronger will be her departure from linear probability
weighting and, consequently, the more pronounced hyperbolic discounting will be. Of
course, sensitivity to anticipated emotions is not easily observable, and we have to leave
it to future research to investigate whether anticipated emotions or some other factors are
the primary drivers of probability weighting.
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A.7 Appendix: Formal Proofs
A.7.1 Hyperbolicity
In the framework proposed here, the discount factor D(t) equals
D(t) = w(st)ρt, (A.7)
with ρ defined as e−r. In order to establish that subproportional probability weights are
suﬃcient23 for discount rates to decrease, we define decreasing impatience at t in the
following way (Prelec, 2004): Let (x, t) be a temporal prospect paying oﬀ x at t with
certainty. A preference relation ￿ exhibits decreasing impatience if for any t > 0, 0 <
x < y, (x, v) ∼ (y, z) implies (y, z + t) ￿ (x, v + t).
According to our framework the temporal prospects (x, 0) ∼ (y, 1) are evaluated as
u(x)w(s0)ρ0 = u(y)w(s1)ρ1. As subproportionality of w implies that w(s) < w(st+1)/w(st),
deferring the prospects by t periods renders
1 =
u(y)w(s)ρ
v(x)
<
u(y)w(st+1)ρt+1
u(x)w(st)ρt
(A.8)
and, therefore, (y, t+ 1) ￿ (x, t), meeting the requirement for decreasing impatience. ￿
In the intertemporal tradeoﬀ between the present and the subsequent period the dis-
count factor equals w(s)ρ. At time t, u(x) is discounted by w(st)ρt. Compounding by
the initial one-period discount factor w(s)ρ would render w(s)w(st)ρt+1 at t+ 1, but the
discount factor eﬀectively amounts to w(st+1)ρt+1 then. Therefore, w(st+1)/(w(s)w(st)),
the wedge between the relative discount factors D(0)/D(1) and D(t)/D(t + 1), provides
a measure for the extent of departure from stationarity at t.
A.7.2 Comparative Hyperbolicity
The previous proof shows that, provided that s < 1, subproportionality of w engenders
hyperbolic discounting. As will become clear shortly, a decision maker with a compara-
tively more subproportional probability weighting function will also tend to exhibit more
strongly decreasing discount rates:
A preference relation ￿2 exhibits more strongly decreasing impatience than ￿1 if for
any intervals 0 ≤ v < z, t,∆t and outcomes 0 < x < y, 0 < x￿ < y￿, (x, v) ∼1 (y, z),
23Note that subproportionality is not necessary.
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(x, v + t) ∼1 (y, z + t + ∆t), and (x￿, v) ∼2 (y￿, z) imply (x￿, v + t) ￿2 (y￿, z + t + ∆t)
(Prelec, 2004).
In order to examine the eﬀect of the degree of subproportionality on hyperbolicity
suppose that the probability weighting function w2 is comparatively more subproportional
than w1, as defined in Prelec (1998), and that the following indiﬀerence relations hold for
two decision makers 1 and 2 at periods v = 0 and z = 1:
u1(x) = u1(y)w1(s)ρ for 0 < x < y,
u2(x￿) = u2(y￿)w2(s)ρ for 0 < x￿ < y￿.
Due to subproportionality, the following relation holds for decision maker 1 in period t:
1 =
u1(y)w1(s)ρ
u1(x)
<
u1(y)w1(st+1)ρt+1
u1(x)w1(st)ρt
. (A.9)
Therefore, the subjective probability of contract survival has to be reduced by compound-
ing s over an additional time period ∆t to re-establish indiﬀerence:
u1(x)w1(s
t)ρt = u1(y)w1(s
t+1+∆t)ρt+1. (A.10)
It follows from the definition of comparative subproportionality that this adjustment of
the survival probability by ∆t is not suﬃcient to re-establish indiﬀerence with respect to
w2, i.e.
u2(x
￿)w2(st)ρt < u2(y￿)w2(st+1+∆t)ρt+1. (A.11)
Therefore, (x￿, t) ≺ (y￿, t+ 1 +∆t). ￿
44
A.7.3 Uncertainty and Hyperbolicity
In order to derive the eﬀect of increasing uncertainty on hyperbolicity we examine the
sensitivity of the departure from stationarity at t, measured by w(st+1)/(w(s)w(st)), with
respect to changing s:
∂
∂s
￿
w(st+1)
w(s)w(st)
￿
= 1[w(s)w(st)]2 [(1 + t)s
tw(s)w(st)w￿(st+1)− tst−1w(s)w(st+1)w￿(st)− w(st)w(st+1)w￿(s)]
= 1s[w(s)w(st)]2 [(1 + t)s
t+1w(s)w(st)w￿(st+1)− tstw(s)w(st+1)w￿(st)− sw(st)w(st+1)w￿(s)]
= w(s
t+1)
sw(s)w(st)
￿
(1+t)st+1w￿(st+1)
w(st+1) − ts
tw￿(st)
w(st) − sw
￿(s)
w(s)
￿
= w(s
t+1)
sw(s)w(st) [(1 + t)ε(s
t+1)− tε(st)− ε(s)]
< 0
with ε(p) = pw￿(p)/w(p) defined as the elasticity of the probability weighting function
w. According to Segal (1987), p. 148, subproportionality holds iﬀ ε(p) is increasing. As
st+1 < st < s, ε(st+1) < ε(st) < ε(s) and, hence, the sum of the elasticities in the final line
of the derivation is negative. Therefore, increasing uncertainty, i.e. decreasing s, entails
a greater departure from stationarity and, consequently, a higher degree of hyperbolicity.
￿
A.7.4 Eﬀect of Concavity
In the course of the experiment we cannot observe discount factors at delay t, D(t),
directly, however, but infer D˜(t) from the intertemporal tradeoﬀs between payments at
diﬀerent dates, i.e. pe = D˜(t)xt. According to our assumptions, utility is modeled by a
power function u(x) = xη, η > 0, which renders D˜(t) = D(t)
1
η . It follows that
D˜(0)/D˜(1)
D˜(t)/D˜(t+ 1)
=
￿
D(0)/D(1)
D(t)/D(t+ 1)
￿ 1
η
(A.12)
and therefore the observed decrease in discount rates resulting from nonlinear probability
weighting gets amplified by η < 1 and, hence, concavity has to be controlled for in the
regression model.
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A.8 Appendix: Censored Regression Model
This appendix discusses the way we model the diﬀerence in the censored observed discount
rates, ∆δ = δ2 − δ4, and link it to individual risk preferences.
To relate time discounting to risk preferences, the model assumes the following linear
relationship between the discount rate δ∗t,i of individual i ∈ {1, . . . , N} over delay t ∈ {two
months, four months} and a vector of regressors ci, containing a constant, the parameters
of risk preferences, ηi, αi and βi, as well as some socioeconomic characteristics:
δ∗t,i = ciγt + et,i, (A.13)
where γt denotes a vector of slope parameters and et,i stands for a normally distributed
error term with mean zero and variance 12σ
2. Under the assumption of nonnegative
discounting, the choice menu, depicted in Figure A.2, allows us to directly elicit individual
discount rates that lie between 0% and 92.5%. However, if individual i always opts for
being paid out at the earlier point in time (Option A), we do not necessarily observe
her true discount rate δ∗t,i as we only know that it amounts to at least 95%. Thus, the
elicited discount rates, δ2,i and/or δ4,i, are censored from above at b = 0.95. In the data
we observe
δt,i =
￿
δ∗t,i if δ
∗
t,i < b,
b otherwise.
(A.14)
This immediately yields the diﬀerence in the discount rates over two and four months,
∆δ∗i = ci (γ2 − γ4)￿ ￿￿ ￿
∆γ
+ e2,i − e4,i￿ ￿￿ ￿
∆ei
, (A.15)
where ∆ei is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2. Consequently, this
diﬀerence ∆δ∗i is aﬀected by censoring, too, and only observed if both δ2,i < b and δ4,i < b.
In order to avoid biased estimators for γ2, γ4, and σ, the model needs to take the cen-
sored nature of the data into account. Therefore, its log likelihood takes on the following
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form:
lnL (γ2, γ4, σ; c, δ2, δ4) =
￿
i: δ2,i=b, δ4,i=b
P (δ2,i = b, δ4,i = b | c, δ2, δ4) (A.16)
+
￿
i: δ2,i<b, δ4,i=b
P (δ2,i < b, δ4,i = b | c, δ2, δ4)
+
￿
i: δ2,i=b, δ4,i<b
P (δ2,i = b, δ4,i < b | c, δ2, δ4)
+
￿
i: δ2,i<b, δ4,i<b
1
σ
φ
￿
∆δi − ci (γ2 − γ4)
σ
￿
,
where φ represents the standard normal distribution’s density and the probabilities P ,
accounting for the diﬀerent ways by which an observation may be censored, are given by
P (δ2,i = b, δ4,i = b | c, δ2, δ4) =
￿
1− Φ
￿
b− ciγ2
σ
￿￿ ￿
1− Φ
￿
b− ciγ4
σ
￿￿
,
P (δ2,i < b, δ4,i = b | c, δ2, δ4) = Φ
￿
b− ciγ2
σ
￿ ￿
1− Φ
￿
b− ciγ4
σ
￿￿
,
P (δ2,i = b, δ4,i < b | c, δ2, δ4) =
￿
1− Φ
￿
b− ciγ2
σ
￿￿
Φ
￿
b− ciγ4
σ
￿
,
with Φ denoting the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. Nu-
merical maximization of lnL (γ2, γ4, σ; c, δ2, δ4) yields the maximum likelihood estimates of
γˆ2, γˆ4, and σˆ. To obtain the maximum likelihood estimate of ∆γˆ we utilize the invariance
property.
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A.9 Appendix: Observed Discount Rates
Figure A.6: Discount Rates δ2 and δ4 and Their Change
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A.10 Appendix: Estimated Risk Parameters
Figure A.7: Distribution of η, α and β
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A.11 Appendix: Controls
Table A.4: Summary Statistics (n = 112)
Type Mean Std.Err.
Female binary 0.446 0.047
Age numeric 22.625 0.209
Log-Income numeric 6.380 0.067
Experience binary 0.304 0.044
CRT numeric 2.214 0.082
Table A.5: Number of Observations at the Bounds (n = 112)
δ2 δ4
≥ 95% 23 14
0% 2 0
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Appendix B
Rational Planners or Myopic Fools?
Liquidity Constraints, Positive
Expectations and Anomalies in
Intertemporal Choice
This chapter has not yet been published elsewhere.
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B.1 Introduction
Many of the most important choices we make involve alternatives with consequences
occurring at diﬀerent points in time. Prominent examples are how much to save for
later consumption, when to pay oﬀ debts, or in which training to invest. Understanding
the drivers of these choices is paramount to predicting individual behavior and market
outcomes. In particular, the design of incentive mechanisms, information programs or
optimal defaults helping individuals to behave in a more rational way needs to be based
on a sound knowledge of where and how to intervene.
This paper contributes to a better understanding of intertemporal choice behavior.
It is motivated by a large number of puzzling findings apparently inconsistent with ex-
ponential discounted utility, the canonical model of intertemporal choice. Indeed, most
solutions proposed to address these issues still suﬀer from fundamental shortcomings.
They typically focus on one single “anomaly” only and fail at predicting the vast number
of at least equally important stylized facts. Hyperbolic discounting models (Ainslie, 1975;
Herrnstein, 1981; Mazur, 1987; Laibson, 1997; Harris and Laibson, 2008), for example,
capture the decline of discount rates in time horizon. They do not, however, provide an
explanation for why subject’s behavior diﬀers from standard predictions in many more
respects.
Empirical evidence documents the following results. First, aggregate behavior departs
in systematic ways from exponential discounting (Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989; Loewen-
stein and Prelec, 1992; Frederick et al., 2002). Quite robust “anomalies” are that discount
rates lie far beyond market interest rates, decline in time horizon and in outcome magni-
tude, and are larger for gains compared to losses. A coherent explanation encompassing
all these findings is still lacking.
Second, quantitative result, such as estimated discount rates or the size of these eﬀects,
vary tremendously across and within studies (Frederick et al., 2002).1 This seems puzzling
as most experiments are based on similar designs and are conducted among similar cohorts,
i.e. subjects that are very homogenous with respect to their education, income and age.
Third, recent longitudinal studies show that behavior is not as dynamically stable as
current preference models imply (Sayman et al., 2007; Airoldi et al., 2009). The reason
for this finding is still underresearched, but suggests that intertemporal behavior may be
influenced by other factors than intrinsic preferences.
1In their overview article, Frederick et al. (2002) report discount rates ranging from -6 percent per
annum to infinity.
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Fourth, many studies find a substantial fraction of subjects exhibiting discount rates
increasing in time horizon (Read et al., 2005b; Sayman et al., 2007; Airoldi et al., 2009;
Abdellaoui et al., 2010).2 So far, it is not clear whether this behavior is due to errors,
trait or other reasons.
Providing an intuitively appealing and unifying explanation for all these findings is
the goal pursued by this article. When individuals want to sustain a smooth consump-
tion path, but are prevented from doing so because they are borrowing constrained and
only hold few liquid assets, positive income expectations can have a significant eﬀect on
their behavior. Opting for new alternatives materializing at dates when consumption
is expected to be relatively low allows them to reach consumption paths which better
measure up to their preferences. That such considerations can play an important role in
time discounting is supported by empirical evidence. In a study conducted among rural
households in developing countries, Holden et al. (1998) find that liquidity-constrained
households show much higher discount rates than others.
The idea that liquidity constraints provide a powerful approach for explaining empir-
ical regularities is not new. Deaton (1991) shows that such restrictions can explain many
important findings in consumer behavior not captured by most other models. The novelty
of our research is to apply this idea to unravel “anomalies” and other puzzling findings
in intertemporal choice behavior. We argue that new alternatives are not evaluated in
full isolation, as it is usually (implicitly) assumed in empirical studies, but that there are
situations where subjective income expectations are reflected in subject’s behavior.
We present the following insights. First, we show that all allegedly anomalous patterns
naturally arise for a liquidity-constrained, relative impatient consumer with positive, but
rational expectations. In fact, all the “anomalies” are closely intertwined with each other.
Hyperbolic discounting behavior can even be dynamically consistent. Heterogeneity in
the consumers’ constraints and subjective expectations provide an explanation for why
fairly homogenous subjects substantially diﬀer in behavior.
Second, our approach is first to provide a rationale for so far unexplained behavioral
patterns found in empirical data. As time passes, the consumer may face a diﬀerent life
and job situation or may be confronted with an altered economic environment. Her ac-
cess to liquidity and her expectations about future consumption are therefore likely to
change over time. As a result, our model gives a justification for the ostensibly dynamic
instability of revealed choice behavior. Furthermore, if the consumer expects her income
2Studies reporting similar results are Frederick (1999), Rubinstein (2003), Read et al. (2005a) and
Attema et al. (2009).
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to substantially decline in the not so distant future, but she is unable to accumulate
suﬃcient liquid assets to smooth away the upcoming low-consumption periods, she ex-
hibits increasing discount rates. Consequently, the distribution of exponential, hyperbolic
and counter-hyperbolic types in the population may be largely governed by the liquidity
constraints subjects face and the expectations they hold.
Third, in the latter part of the paper we provide empirical support for our approach.
We use data from two consumption-savings experiments with monetary incentives, one
conducted among junior students (mostly undergraduates) and one among senior students
(higher-semester graduates and post-graduates). This data is particularly suitable for
testing our conjectures not only because most previous experiments were conducted among
students, but also because students are the probably best example for subjects who are
limited with respect to their liquidity and who hold significant positive expectations. In
accordance with our theoretical model, we find a strong link between income expectations
and discounting behavior. A simple binary measure for positive income expectations can
explain a large part of the anomalously looking behavior found in our data. Estimation
of a structural model further reveals that our approach does well in capturing these
systematic patterns. Estimated rates of time preference lie in the vicinity of 10% per
annum and are considerably lower than discount rates observed on the descriptive level
(larger than 70% per annum). Most interestingly, estimated time preferences are not
statistically distinguishable from constant ones. Senior students do not only reveal a
more pronounced decline of discount rates in outcome magnitude, but, consistent with
their earlier entry into the job market, also seem to expect a larger rise in consumption.
Finally, we discuss the possibility that these behavioral patterns are not necessarily
caused by rational planners, i.e. liquidity-constrained consumers with positive, but ratio-
nal expectations, but may also be due to myopic fools, overoptimistic consumers who are
possibly not liquidity constrained. This alternative explanation for a link between subjec-
tive expectations and discounting behavior is motivated by the finding that subjects often
hold optimistically biased beliefs when it comes to asses future life events, such as income
(Weinstein, 1980, 1987; Dominitz, 1998; Armor and Taylor, 2002). Such consumers will
exhibit the typical “anomalies”, but, similar to consumers with hyperbolic preferences,
their behavior will not be dynamically consistent. More recent research also indicates that
the same mechanism can explain why people suﬀer from self-control problems. Nordgren
et al. (2009) find that people often overestimate their capacity for impulse control, leading
them to overexpose themselves to temptations.3
3There may also be rational reasons for self-control problems. Subjects are required to exert willpower
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That diﬀerent motives can result in observationally equivalent behavior has strong
implications for the design of proper policy instruments helping economic agents to behave
in a more rational way without harming those that already do. This is of particular
importance for paternalistic regulations, programs or regulations helping on an individual
basis (Camerer et al., 2003). We reason why mechanisms distinguishing rational planners
from myopic fools are ultimately needed to make suitable policy recommendations and
propose possible starting points to develop such mechanisms.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section B.2 introduces the
theoretical model and its predictions. Section B.3 presents the experiments, the econo-
metric specification and the empirical results. Section B.4 discusses some implications
our findings have, provides directions for future research and concludes.
B.2 Model and Predictions
This section introduces the basic model and its predictions. We focus on behavior of a
consumer with rational expectations who is limited with respect to her borrowing op-
portunities and only holds few liquid assets. The particular situation we are interested
in is how such a consumer evaluates new alternatives by integrating them in her exist-
ing consumption plan. An alternative explanation for a link between subjective income
expectations and discounting behavior is given in the concluding section of the paper.
The consumer considered here is characterized by the following preferences.4 First, she
has constant impatience, i.e. at any point in time she has the same strong preference for
earlier consumption over later consumption, ceteris paribus. In this case, the consumer
attributes the weight d(t) = δt, with δ ∈ (0, 1), to future consumption utility, where d
is her discount function, and η = − ln(δ) her (constant) rate of time preference. Strotz
(1955) shows that such preferences are a necessity for dynamically consistent behavior.5
We further assume that the consumer is relatively impatient meaning that her rate of time
preference η is larger than the real interest rate r. Only if this condition is satisfied, the
consumer has a need for additional liquidity and, hence, will demand credit or will dissave
from her liquid assets.6 Second, the consumer has an aversion towards consumption fluc-
in order to resist temptation. If they instead (temporarily) only have limited cognitive resources, they
may not be able to exhibit enough self-control.
4The assumptions made about preferences are quite standard in the literature (see for instance Fish-
burn and Rubinstein (1982) or Manzini and Mariotti (2009)).
5As we will see in the course of our analysis, however, such preferences are not suﬃcient to establish
dynamic consistency.
6See Deaton (1991) for a discussion of this issue.
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tuations, i.e. she favors less variable consumption paths over more variable consumption
paths, ceteris paribus. Her preferences over outcomes (or consumption quantities) are
captured by an instantaneous utility function u satisfying the Inada conditions (Inada,
1963).7 Comparatively more concave utility functions imply a stronger preference for
consumption smoothing.8
The consumer has a consumption plan. This plan consists of her expectations about
future consumption spendings. We assume rational expectations, i.e., on average, ex-
pected consumption coincides with realized consumption.9 To form a plan, the consumer
uses her information about (predictable) future income.10 Three types of income expec-
tations are distinguished. A consumer who does not expect her income to change within
the relevant time horizon is said to hold constant income expectations. Similarly, a con-
sumer who expects her income to substantially rise within the relevant time horizon holds
positive income expectations. The opposite is the case for negative income expectations.
Borrowing and saving permit the consumer to transfer income back and forth in time.
Likewise, a consumer may dissave from her liquid assets during periods with low income,
but save during periods with high income. This allows her to sustain a smooth consump-
tion path even if income is subject to variation. Consequently, if access to liquidity is not
restricted, expected short-term income changes should have little eﬀect on actual con-
sumption spendings.11 It is only expected lifetime income, but not its fluctuations, which
governs current consumption (Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), Friedman (1957)).12
7Viz. the utility function fulfills the following conditions: (1) u(0) = 0, (2) continuous diﬀerentiability,
(3) u￿ > 0 and u￿￿ < 0 (concavity), (4) u￿(0) =∞ and u￿(∞) = 0.
8Utility embodies the same preference property as in atemporal settings, where a comparatively more
concave utility function expresses a stronger aversion towards variability of outcomes at one single point
in time. It is well known that under the assumption of time-additive expected utility (EU) preferences,
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution are reciprocals.
Chew and Epstein (1990) show that this link is not retained for non-EU preferences, however.
9More precisely, the actual realization of consumption then deviates from expectations by some sym-
metric, independent random error, i.e. the expectational error has an expected value of zero, is i.i.d. and
uncorrelated with the information the consumer holds at the relevant point in time.
10Future income flows are not certain by their very nature. While, for instance, employment is con-
tractable, it is always bound to some residual risk such as a potential job loss or sudden illness. Such
considerations play a role when prospective income flows are evaluated. Within her constraints, the con-
sumer thus may form beliefs about the probability distribution of prospective consumption. In this case,
the consumption plan may also contain a risk premium, i.e. it consists of certainty equivalents of the
underlying distribution. Note that liquidity constraints truncate the income expectation distribution.
11For a patient consumer with η ≤ r similar predictions arise even if there are limited borrowing
opportunities (see Deaton (1991) for an elaborate discussion). For η = r, for example, Schechtman
(1976) and Bewley (1977) show that, under i.i.d. or stationary stochastic income processes, consumption
converges to the mean of income even if liquidity constraints are present, leading the consumer to reach
a perfectly smooth consumption path. Similarly, if η < r, the consumer will save indefinitely. As Deaton
(1991) says it: “[...] saving, not borrowing, is [such a consumers] main concern” (p.1225).
12As discussed later, the standard prediction of such a model is that discount rates are constant in
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Predictions, however, may diﬀer fundamentally if the consumer is limited with respect
to her possibilities to access sources of liquidity. In what follows, we analyze behavior of
an impatient consumer who is neither permitted to borrow, nor holds many liquid assets.
Nonetheless, as liquidity constraints only hamper borrowing, but not saving, the consumer
can still overcome expected future low-income periods. Her limited borrowing opportu-
nities and her limited assets, however, prevent her from smoothing away any enduring
low-income period preceding a substantial growth in income. As a result, consumption
behavior responds asymmetrically to expected short-term income changes. Consumer’s
expectations about changes in future income are informative about behavior only if income
expectations are positive, but not if they are negative or constant.13
That liquidity constraints play an important role in many situations is motivated by
the following facts.14 First, there exists support that a substantial fraction of the pop-
ulation in both, rich and poor countries, is aﬀected by such limitations (Zeldes (1989),
Deaton (1991)). Probably most interestingly, the vast majority of empirical evidence on
“anomalies” in intertemporal choice is based on experiments conducted among students
or residents of developing countries, i.e. subjects who are exceptionally exposed to such
constraints. Second, most empirical results rest upon hypothetical choices or hypothetical
survey questions. The lack of incentives may lead subjects to ignore borrowing oppor-
tunities they actually have. Third, there is direct empirical support for such constraints
aﬀecting discounting and consumption behavior. Holden et al. (1998), for instance, find
that liquidity-constrained households in developing countries exhibit much higher discount
rates than households not facing such constraints. Others (Altonji and Siow (1987), Shea
(1995), Drakos (2002)) find that (aggregate) consumption moves asymmetrically with
predictable changes in income, a pattern explainable by liquidity constraints, but not
myopia.15 Finally, a certain degree of impatience is required such that a consumer has
a need for additional liquidity. If her preferences instead do not comply with these re-
quirements, liquidity constraints will not be binding. There is good reason to believe that
time horizon and outcome magnitude and do not depend on outcome sign, irrespective of whether the
consumer expects her income to be constant, rise or decline in the future. These results are usually tested
in empirical settings, where departures from these predictions are interpreted as violations of exponential
discounted utility (see Frederick et al. (2002)). This empirical evidence is what originally motivated
hyperbolic preference models and alternative discounting models.
13Contrarily, if a poor consumer is neither permitted to borrow nor save, responses should be symmetric.
The consumption plan then reflects her income expectations.
14There are also psychological reasons that may lead a consumer to not borrow or dissave from accu-
mulated wealth, although it is in principal possible. Examples are psychological costs (“sleeping good at
night”, fearing an even more severe income shock), mental accounting or simply overlooking borrowing
opportunities.
15Myopia predicts symmetric co-movement of consumption and income.
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most subjects are suﬃciently impatient to meet this assumption (Frederick et al., 2002).
We now derive our formal model. It is based on standard discounted utility (Samuel-
son, 1937).16 We do, however, introduce liquidity constraints. The basic assumptions we
make closely follow those in Deaton (1991).17 Before being confronted with new alterna-
tives, the consumer maximizes her total expected consumption utility such that
max
(c0,...,c∞)
E
￿ ∞￿
t=0
δtu(ct) | I0
￿
, (B.1)
where E {·|I0} is her expectation conditional on the information available at the deci-
sion date 0 and ct is her planned consumption for period t. In period t+1, the consumers
liquid assets are wt+1 = (1 + r)(wt + yt − ct), where r is the real interest rate and yt her
exogenous (net) labor income earned in period t. The borrowing restriction takes the form
wt ≥ 0. The consumer is only allowed to consume out of her “cash-on-hand” wt + yt, i.e.
consumption ct is bounded from above at ct ≤ wt+yt and from below at zero. We further
assume that wt is relatively small. The nonnegative, but small liquid assets the consumer
maintains are only intended to insure herself against small and relatively short, negative
income shocks. If not stated otherwise, it will therefore be convenient to presume that
the consumer can sustain a constant consumption path before and after a substantial rise
in income. This is possible because small income fluctuations are easily smoothed away
by consuming out of liquid assets.18
Our particular interest lies in how new, i.e. previously unanticipated, alternatives are
evaluated by the consumer. Thereby, we restrict our attention to singular and certain
outcomes.19 An alternative is a temporal prospect (x, t), where x is the outcome amount
and t the outcome date.20 The consumer integrates new alternatives with her existing
consumption plan, her expectations about future baseline consumption ct. Information
16See Koopmans (1960) and Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) for a more formal treatment of the dis-
counted utility model either for outcome streams or singular outcomes, respectively.
17See also Schechtman (1976) and Bewley (1977) who impose similar borrowing constraints.
18Small fluctuations of (disposable) income are more likely to occur than substantial changes in labor
income. A consumer may therefore anticipate such small oscillations and build up a (more or less small)
buﬀer-stock.
19The case where allegedly guaranteed, future outcomes are perceived as inherently uncertain is dis-
cussed in Epper et al. (2009). Under this assumption people’s proneness to nonlinear probability weighting
induces decreasing discount rates and some other interesting links between risk and time behavior.
20In the typical intertemporal choice experiment, for example, subjects have to choose between sooner
smaller and later larger outcomes. Commonly, it is impossible for the subject to anticipate these outcomes
in advance as she does only have limited information about what exactly happens in the lab, what size
the payoﬀs have and when they are carried out.
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about liquidity constraints is included in the plan. As limited access to liquidity make
it impossible to transfer future income to earlier dates, positive income expectations are
reflected in increasing baseline consumption paths. Since saving is still allowed, however,
this is not the case for negative income expectations.21 In other words, liquidity con-
straints limit the consumer’s options to change her ex-ante consumption plan during the
evaluation of new alternatives.
The temporal prospect (x, t) is then evaluated relative to the planned consumption,
i.e.
U0 = E
￿
δt [u(ct + x)− u(ct)] | I0
￿
. (B.2)
The availability of new alternatives opens up new possibilities for the consumer to, at
least partly, overcome her limited borrowing capabilities and her deficient liquid assets. A
liquidity-constrained consumer with the above preferences and positive income expecta-
tions can make the huge gap between low and high baseline consumption periods smaller
by allocating new outcomes at earlier dates where baseline consumption is expected to
be low compared to dates where it is expected to be high. The intuition for this result is
straightforward. Due to concavity of the (instantaneous) utility function, marginal util-
ity derived from x additional monetary units of consumption is larger in periods where
planned consumption is small compared to when it is large. This result directly follows
from Equation B.2. Note that the consumer’s relative impatience, η > r, implies that
she does not have an incentive to spread consumption over the remaining low-income
periods. Rather, she will consume the entire amount at the point in time it materializes
(see Deaton (1991)).
In the following we present the model predictions. As our primary concern lies on
explaining observed behavior, we focus on imputed discount rates η˜ inferred from predicted
present equivalents.22 We do this for the typical consumer with the above described
preferences. Our illustrations and primary results are based on isoelastic utility.23 In
21A consumer with substantial negative income expectations must have enough opportunities to save
income during high-income periods. Only this allows her to smooth away the anticipated low-consumption
period.
22A more precise definition of imputed discount rates can be found in Appendix B.5. Note that all
interest and discount rates reported in this paper are per annum rates.
23Parameter values are listed in the corresponding figures. It is assumed that u(z) = z1−ρ and η > r.
We set wt = 0 and c0 = 0, such that ct equals to the expected change in baseline consumption. Note
that non-isoelastic utility may induce non-constant discount rates even for neutral expectations or when
no liquidity constraints are present. For details, see Appendix B.6.1 and B.6.2.
65
particular, we are interested in comparing behavior of a liquidity-constrained, impatient
consumer holding positive income expectations with a consumer who does not face such
constraints, either because she can borrow or is suﬃciently patient, or has constant income
expectations. According to our model, income expectations only contain information
about the consumer’s behavior if she is limited with respect to her liquidity.
The next subsections are devoted to illustrate the dependency of imputed discount
rates on time horizon, outcome magnitude and outcome sign. Our graphical illustrations
assume that the consumer expects an increase in baseline consumption between the point
in time she decides (t = 0) and the point in time the outcome x materializes (t > 0).
Additional predictions are sketched out in a special subsection.
B.2.1 Time Horizon
We first analyze the impact of delay on imputed discount rates. Our model’s predictions
are a direct result of the basic intuition provided earlier. Liquidity-constrained consumers
with positive income expectations allocate new cash inflows at dates where baseline con-
sumption is expected to be relatively low. Since low-income periods precede high-income
periods, these consumers show a stronger preference for more immediate payoﬀs than
consumers who do not face liquidity constraints or expect to maintain a constant baseline
consumption path, holding all other things fixed. This eﬀect, however, diminishes as the
delay grows larger, resulting in imputed discount rates declining hyperbolically in time
horizon and converging towards constant long-run rates. Intuitively, high baseline con-
sumption periods gain more weight in the consumers’s total welfare, overcompensating the
utility generated by consuming in the relatively short-lasting low baseline consumption
periods. Hence, for a liquidity-constrained, impatient consumer positive income expecta-
tions generate a markup on otherwise constant discount rates. The size of this markup
is predominantly driven by how large the consumer expects her income to rise. We prove
this formally in Appendix B.6.1.
Figure B.1 illustrates our findings. It plots predicted discount rates for both a con-
sumer with positive expectations (solid curve) and a consumer with constant expectations
(dotted line). As can be seen, positive expectations induce decreasing discount rates for
the liquidity-constrained consumer. Short-run discount rates appear much larger than
long-run discount rates. Although the consumer has constant impatience, her expecta-
tions drive a wedge between her time preferences and her discounting behavior.
We obtain very similar results for losses, i.e. consumption reductions rather than
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Figure B.1: Time Horizon
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consumption increases, given total consumption remains nonnegative. However, due to
concavity of the utility function, discount rates for losses converge faster towards constant
rates.24 We come back to this result later.
The predictions our model makes accord well with the empirical evidence on intertem-
poral choice behavior. For monetary rewards, Thaler (1981) observes annualized median
discount rates of several dozen to hundred percent. Discount rates decline sharply in time
horizon. Similar findings are reported by Benzion et al. (1989) and many others (see e.g.
Redelmeier and Heller (1993); Chapman and Elstein (1995); Chapman (1996); Pender
(1996); Frederick et al. (2002)). Empirical evidence also supports our long-run predic-
tions. Pender (1996), for example, finds that discount rates far away from the present
cannot be distinguished from constant ones. Similar results are also found for negatively
signed outcomes (Benzion et al., 1989; Chapman, 1996). Most studies find much lower
discount rates in this domain, a finding corresponding well with our predictions.25
24Subtracting x units from ct on a concave function leads to a utility loss which is in absolute terms
larger than the utility gain when adding x units to ct. In utility terms, losses then loom larger than gains.
25While Thaler (1981) also finds lower discount rates in the loss domain, he does not find supportive
evidence for hyperbolic discounting in this domain. His subjects, at least, seem to be less sensitive
to changes in time horizon for losses compared to gains. There are a number of possible explanations
for this divergent result. First, monetary losses are hard to implement, as it is usually not possible to
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One of the most remarkable results predicted by our model, however, is that hyperbolic
discounting behavior can be dynamically consistent. This is the case if the consumer’s
expectations do not diﬀer systematically when reevaluating previously made choices at
some later point in time. We prove stationarity under rational expectations in Appendix
B.7.
Our findings indicate that hyperbolic discounting is not necessarily a behavioral anomaly
caused by time-inconsistent preferences (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue
and Rabin, 1999; Harris and Laibson, 2008),26 but can be the result of the consumer’s
reaction to limited access to liquidity. Allocating new outcomes at dates where these con-
straints are binding can help to compensate for these limitations. A direct result from this
reaction is that revealed discount rates are subject to distortions. Contrary to hyperbolic
discounting models, however, our approach not only predicts that discount rates decline in
time horizon, but also provides a tractable explanation for a large number of additional,
anomalously-appearing findings. The basic distinction between hyperbolic discounting
behavior we predict and genuine hyperbolic preferences is that it is the calendar date the
outcome materializes and not the temporal delay which governs how much weight the
consumer puts on future consumption utility. As time passes, the temporal distance to
the payment date grows shorter in our model, but as average consumption expectations
may remain the same and time preferences are constant, this does not necessarily lead
the consumer to reverse her revealed preferences. For hyperbolic preference models this
is not the case. The two competing models’ predictions may therefore diﬀer in dramatic
ways, especially when it comes to repeated choices.
Our approach also provides a possible explanation for why many studies find a sub-
force participants to pay money (back) to the experimenter. Appropriate framings are therefore needed.
Thaler (1981) encounters this issue by using (hypothetical) monetary fines. Other use, for instance,
(hypothetical) debt repayments (Benzion et al., 1989) or (real) punishments, such as electric shocks
(Mischel et al., 1969). Obviously, the baseline level subjects consider is likely to strongly depend on the
situation they are confronted with. Second, the evaluation of prospective outcomes is often influenced
by psychological costs. Such costs may play an exceptional role when subjects are confronted with fines
(as in Thaler (1981)). Similarly, when electric shocks or a worsening of health state come into play
anxiety or dread during the time waiting for the event to materialize can even induce counter-hyperbolic
discounting patterns and negative discount rates (see Loewenstein (1987) for a discussion of savoring and
dread motives in time discounting).
26Hyperbolic discounting models typically explicitly model preferences as the outcome of an internal
conflict of interest between a short-run and a long-run self. The result is dynamically inconsistent
behavior. Note, however, that not all researchers introducing or applying hyperbolic preference models
provide such an intuition. Many consider these models as pure reduced-forms. Mostly these models are
motivated by the, at least on aggregate, superior fit they have compared to exponential discount functions
(Rachlin et al., 1991; Myerson and Green, 1995; Kirby, 1997) or the fact that many empirical regularities
can be explained within such a framework (Laibson, 1997). See Ainslie (1975), Herrnstein (1981) and
Mazur (1987) for some earlier proposals of hyperbolic discount functions.
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stantial fraction of subjects exhibiting discount rates increasing in time horizon (see for
instance Read et al. (2005b); Sayman et al. (2007); Airoldi et al. (2009); Abdellaoui et al.
(2010)). If a consumer expects her income to decline substantially in the not so distant
future, but is unable to accumulate suﬃcient liquid assets to overcome the anticipated
low-income periods, she exhibits increasing discount rates. The story is the same as above,
but this time the consumer is limited with respect to put aside present income for future
consumption. Opting for new alternatives materializing during future low-income periods
may help her to partially overcome these limitations. As a result, imputed discount rates
lie below her rate of time preference. To the best of our knowledge, our approach is the
first at explaining this economic relevant, but puzzling finding. We suspect that relatively
poor consumers with a marginal propensity to consume out of their “cash-on-hand” close
to one and substantial negative expectations are most likely to exhibit such behavior.
B.2.2 Outcome Magnitude
Our second finding concerns the magnitude eﬀect, i.e. the empirical regularity that smaller
outcomes are discounted more heavily than larger ones. This eﬀect directly follows from
the consumers’s temporal allocation of new cash inflows at dates where marginal utility
is largest. As fixed changes in baseline consumption have a higher impact on smaller
outcomes compared to larger outcomes, imputed discount rates decline in outcome mag-
nitude. The eﬀect strongly depends on the consumer’s marginal rate of intertemporal
substitution. It is more pronounced the more future baseline consumption is expected to
grow. Negligible or distant positive changes in baseline consumption are unlikely to drive
significant magnitude-dependency, however. We derive these results mathematically in
Appendix B.6.2.
Figure B.2 depicts our findings. For a liquidity-constrained, impatient consumer with
positive expectations, imputed discount rates are substantially larger for small outcomes
compared to large outcomes, but they decline as stake size increases (solid curve). This
is not the case for a liquidity-constrained consumer with constant expectations (dotted
line). Such a consumer is not sensitive to changes in outcome magnitude, but reveals
imputed discount rates constant in outcome magnitude. Similar behavior is predicted for
consumers who are not liquidity-constrained, irrespective of their expectations.
As long as total consumption does not become negative, we also predict a magnitude
eﬀect for losses, i.e. consumption reductions. Again, due to concavity of the utility
function the eﬀect is predicted to be less pronounced in this domain. Details follow in the
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Figure B.2: Outcome Magnitude
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next subsection.
Our predictions dovetail nicely with the empirical evidence provided by numerous
studies (Thaler, 1981; Loewenstein, 1987; Benzion et al., 1989; Holcomb and Nelson, 1992;
Raineri and Rachlin, 1993; Shelley, 1993; Green et al., 1994a,b; Kirby and Marakovic,
1995; Kirby, 1997; Kirby et al., 1999). For rewards, Thaler (1981) not only finds that
median discount rates decrease in outcome magnitude, but also that “subjects’ actions
are closer to the normative model, the larger are the stakes” (p.206). Similar results,
although much less pronounced, are also found for losses (Thaler (1981); Benzion et al.
(1989); Shelley (1993); Chapman (1996)).
Despite its prevalence and its relevance for understanding choices over small and large
stakes, most competing discounting models, such as hyperbolic discounting models, fail
to predict the magnitude eﬀect.27
27For example, the magnitude eﬀect and its interaction with time horizon can help to better understand
the purchase of durable goods. When diﬀerent alternatives are compared, the relatively small, recurring
costs often get too little weight compared to the relatively large, up-front purchasing costs. Exception
capturing the magnitude eﬀect are the reference-dependent model proposed by Loewenstein and Prelec
(1992) and the magnitude-dependent model by Noor (2010). Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) capture
many anomalies by imposing additional assumptions on preferences. In particular, they assume that
time preferences are hyperbolic and that the value function has a specific form. Our goal, however,
is not to provide a descriptive model, but rather a clear and intuitive explanation for departures from
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Figure B.3: Outcome Sign
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B.2.3 Outcome Sign
So far, we found that subjective income expectations can induce asymmetric discounting
behavior with respect to diﬀerently signed outcomes. The sign eﬀect, i.e. the regularity
that gains are discounted more heavily than losses, is predicted for liquidity-constrained,
impatient consumers with positive income expectations. The intuition is the following.
As the instantaneous utility function is concave, sacrificing consumption always hurts
more than increasing consumption by the same absolute quantity yields pleasure. It
follows from the previously examined eﬀects that the diﬀerence between domain-specific
discount rates diminishes as the time horizon or the absolute outcome magnitude becomes
larger. As a result, behavior is predicted to be more symmetric the larger the prospect’s
arguments become, ceteris paribus.
Figure B.3 shows our predictions by plotting the diﬀerence of the domain-specific dis-
count rates over time horizon. Liquidity-constrained consumers with positive expectations
show asymmetric discounting behavior (solid curve). The asymmetry between gains and
losses is largest for short time horizons, but diminishes the more remote the outcome
standard predictions, without violating exponential discounted utility. Noor (2010) ex-ante assumes a
magnitude-dependent discount factor and derives the hyperbolic discounting model as a special case.
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materializes. Symmetric behavior is predicted for a consumer with constant expectations
(dotted line) as well as for a consumer without liquidity constraints. Similar results arise
for large-stake outcomes.
Empirical studies such as Yates and Watts (1975), Thaler (1981), Loewenstein (1987),
Loewenstein (1988), Benzion et al. (1989), MacKeigan et al. (1993), and Chapman (1996),
all find that gains are discounted more heavily than losses. Evidence also seems to indicate
that this eﬀect diminishes as the time horizon and the outcome magnitude grows larger
(see e.g. the results in Thaler (1981)).
Most competing discounting models do not predict sign-dependency.28 This can have
severe consequences for predicting behavior for choices where both, gains and losses, are
involved.
B.2.4 Other Predictions
Beside the prominent anomalies we discussed so far, our model also explains numerous
other stylized facts.
First, as all the systematic patterns we examined originate from the consumer’s allo-
cation of new cash inflows at dates where baseline consumption is relatively low, they are
all inextricably linked with each other. The model predicts that excessive discounting,
decreasing discount rates, magnitude- and sign-dependency should not be observed in
isolation, but rather co-occur for liquidity-constrained, impatient consumers with positive
income expectations. How strong the respective eﬀects are is largely governed by the liq-
uidity constraints the consumer faces, her income expectations, her preference for smooth
consumption paths and her impatience. A liquidity-constrained, impatient consumer
with an aversion towards consumption fluctuations and comparatively higher income ex-
pectations, for instance, should exhibit discount rates decreasing more strongly in time
horizon, a more pronounced magnitude eﬀect, and more asymmetric discounting of gains
and losses, ceteris paribus. As the time horizon or the outcome magnitude grows larger,
however, imputed discount rates approach constant rates, rendering the exponential dis-
counted utility model a good approximation for long-run and large-stake behavior. The
empirical evidence we discussed above seems to support our conjecture. These behavioral
patterns usually appear conjointly, but they are less pronounced in the long run.
Second, as subjects are very heterogenous with respect to their preferences, their
liquidity, their expectations and possibly even their rationality, our model also provides
28See Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) for a notable exception. In their model this anomaly arises by
ex-ante assuming diﬀerent elasticities of the value function for gains and losses.
72
an explanation for the puzzling huge variation within and between studies (Frederick
et al., 2002). While most other models assume that behavioral heterogeneity is solely
driven by interpersonal diﬀerences in preferences, our analyses reveal the importance of
other factors for understanding the vast behavioral diﬀerences. Subjects may, for instance,
reveal diﬀerent intertemporal behavior because they have diﬀerent plans or face diﬀerent
environments.
Third, as the consumer’s life or job situation may change over time, or the consumer
may be confronted with an altered economic environment, liquidity constraints and sub-
jective income expectations are likely to diﬀer at some later point in time. This may
explain why recent longitudinal studies find that discounting behavior is so dynamically
unstable (Sayman et al., 2007; Airoldi et al., 2009).29 These studies allow the conclusion
that today’s preference models, such as hyperbolic discounting, do a rather bad job of
predicting behavior. Our approach provides a clear and testable intuition for the apparent
dynamic instability of behavior and may help to improve predictions in such settings.
Fourth, as relatively poor consumers are more likely to face liquidity constraints,
our model predicts that they should also depart more strongly from standard predictions,
holding all other things fixed.30 Hyperbolic discounting, the magnitude eﬀect and the sign
eﬀect should be more pronounced for subjects exposed to such limitations and expecting a
substantial rise in income. Students, for example, are likely to exhibit stronger departures
from exponential discounting than middle-aged employees. While it is a very robust
finding that wealthier subjects reveal more patience (see e.g. Tanaka et al. (2010)), our
results make clear that we should be careful in using lab evidence to make behavioral
predictions for other demographic groups or even make policy recommendations based
upon it.
To sum up, our model predicts and explains a broad number of anomalously looking
behaviors in intertemporal choice. What is still needed, however, is an empirical test of
our approach. In the next section we provide first supportive evidence for it.
29Sayman et al. (2007), for instance, find that subjects shift to the more patient option as they were
confronted the second time with the choice they made previously. This pattern contradicts hyperbolic
discounting. They do not find such an eﬀect in another study, however. Airoldi et al. (2009) do not find
dynamically stable behavior at all.
30Poor consumers are likely to consume the most part of their income. Consequently, they may also
react to predictable, short-term negative income shocks.
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B.3 Empirical Support
In this section we provide empirical support for our approach. As our primary concern is to
explain “anomalies” in intertemporal choice, our setup resembles the typical experiment.
In particular, our subjects were confronted with choices between sooner smaller and later
larger outcomes. Details of the procedure are described in the next few paragraphs. A
description of the structural econometric model follows. Empirical results are presented
in the last part of this section.
B.3.1 Data and Experiment
Our data stems from two experimental sessions conducted in Zurich (Switzerland) during
2008, the first one conducted with undergraduate students (juniors), the other one con-
ducted with higher-semester graduate and post-graduate students (seniors).31 For both
experiments, participants were recruited from all fields oﬀered at the University of Zurich
and the ETH Zurich. Every subject was confronted with the same procedure.32 In total,
we analyzed 110 subjects’, 57 juniors’ and 53 seniors’, responses.
Student data is particularly suitable for testing our model. Most previous evidence
reporting “anomalies” in intertemporal choice is based on student data. Students are
typically limited with respect to their borrowing opportunities and access to liquidity.33
Especially students entering the job market soon (in our case the senior group) should hold
substantial positive income expectations. For liquidity-constrained subjects, our model
makes distinct behavioral predictions for diﬀerent kinds of expectations.
The experiments consisted of two elicitation tasks, one dedicated to elicit intertemporal
choice behavior (time task), the other dedicated to elicit risk taking behavior (risk task).
The purpose of the latter task was to identify the curvature of the instantaneous utility
function, a goal which cannot be achieved by using intertemporal choice data alone.34 A
detailed description of the method is given later.
31Instructions are available upon request.
32The only diﬀerence between the two sessions was that juniors answered the questions on a computer,
but seniors on paper.
33The probably second most common subject pool are residents of developing countries. These subjects
are very likely to face similar constraints.
34Some recent research proposes ways to solve this issue by implementing special, and typically more
complicated experimental procedures. Attema et al. (2009), for instance, propose a method to control for
the concavity of the utility function without requiring to elicit it. Andreoni and Sprenger (2009), on the
other hand, presents an alternative method which allows to measure both, time and outcome preferences.
Earlier attempts to accomplish this goal usually first elicited the utility function and then discount rates
(e.g. Chapman (1996)). Our design has the advantage of not departing much from classic elicitation
tasks.
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The tasks appeared in an individualized random order. Subjects were not informed
about the content of the second part of the experiment before they had not finished the
first one. Both tasks involved the same range of payoﬀs, lying between CHF 20 and
80.35 We carefully selected these amounts such that they were large enough to encourage
subjects to consider sooner against later alternatives, but small enough so that they were
most probably used for daily consumption.36
The choice menus subjects were confronted with were very similar for both tasks. We
implemented menus containing a list of 20 varying alternatives which had to be judged
against a fixed option. To familiarize subjects with the nature of the procedure, the in-
structions contained examples and trial problems. The experimenters checked the choices
in the trial problems to verify that the subjects had comprehended the task. Besides
a show up fee of CHF 20, each subject was paid according to one of her intertemporal
choices and one of her risky choices selected randomly at the end of the experiment. Sub-
ject’s compensation for their intertemporal choices was paid out to them at the respective
dates when they received the payment in cash by mail. They received their compensation
for the risky choices in cash immediately after the experiment. The detailed payment
modalities are described below. It took subjects about one hour to complete the experi-
ment, including a questionnaire following the two choice tasks. They were informed about
the approximate duration of the experiment.
As our primary interest lies in intertemporal decision making, in the following we
focus on describing the time task. To obtain evaluations of delayed rewards, subjects
were presented with 20 choice menus, each one involving a specific temporal prospect
T = (x, t). In accordance with the theoretical part of the paper, we held the sooner date
fixed for all choices. The choices were framed as standard consumption-savings decisions.
A typical choice menu is presented in Figure B.4. The temporal prospect was displayed
on the right hand side of the screen (Option B). Option A in the choice menu presents
a menu of sooner alternatives, ranging from 0 to x. Every subject had to choose her
preferred option in each row of the choice menu. In Figure B.4, a hypothetical subject
prefers all sooner payments larger than CHF 36 to the later payment, and prefers the
later option in the remaining rows. The earlier reward y making the subject indiﬀerent
to the delayed reward x is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the two amounts next to
her indiﬀerence point, amounting to CHF 37.50 in the example here.
35CHF 1 ≈ USD 0.95 at the time of the experiment. Note that we did not include negative outcomes, as
they are much harder to incentivize and would make the experiment considerably more time-consuming.
36Table B.5 in Appendix B.8 illustrates that we achieved that goal.
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Figure B.4: Choice Menu — Time Task
Note, that contrary to previous attempts to elicit time preferences using choice menus
(Coller and Williams, 1999; Andersen et al., 2008), we asked people to state an earlier
amount making them indiﬀerent to a later fixed amount instead of the reverse. The main
advantage of this design is the absence of censoring issues stemming from arbitrarily
defining a range of discount rates per sheet. We therefore give subjects the option to
choose from the whole range of outcomes. Moreover, we do not display any interest rates in
addition to the monetary amounts as the above mentioned studies do. There are a number
of reasons for our choice. First, our econometric approach explicitly models indiﬀerence
between two temporally delayed outcomes. If interest rates and monetary amounts are
presented simultaneously, the researcher would need to know on which criteria choices
are based in order to specify the error correctly.37 Second, we do not want to provide
an anchor, e.g. a constant interest rate. For the same reason we do not report expected
values of risky prospects in the risk elicitation task. We think that the choices displayed
here are more natural, and hence more similar to the everyday choices we make.
The set of temporal prospects followed a factorial design combining five equally-spaced
delays between two and ten months with four equally-spaced positive amounts between
37An error proportional to the outcome amount is not proportional to a continuously compounded
interest rate.
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CHF 20 and 80.38 Every subject was confronted with the whole set of prospects once. To
avoid order eﬀects, the choice menus appeared in an individualized random order.
At the end of the experiment, one row of one choice menu was randomly selected for
each subject. The selected amount was paid out as cash by mail at the respective date.
On average, subjects earned CHF 51 for the time task, with average payoﬀs not diﬀering
significantly between juniors and seniors.
We took special care with the payment procedure: First, every single subject got
paid for her intertemporal choices. Since incentives need to be salient, intertemporal
choice experiments tend to be quite expensive. For this reason, experimenters often pay
oﬀ only a few participants. While selecting one of the subject’s choices at random is
unavoidable, not paying oﬀ everyone brings out the stochastic nature of the experimental
earnings and interferes with the objective of eliciting time preferences over guaranteed
amounts of money. For this reason, everyone got paid for the time task. A second issue
concerns the credibility of payment. In order to control for uncertainty arising from
subjects’ doubts about the experimenters keeping their promises, a payment certificate
signed by the institute’s head was issued to them. The actual payment was then sent
by mail at the respective date.39 This payment method was explained in detail in the
instructions. Therefore, subjective uncertainty presumably originated for reasons other
than potential contract breach by the experimenter.40 A third possibly confounding factor
are transaction costs. Transaction costs should be the same regardless of the payment
date in order to avoid inducing present bias in subjects’ responses. Therefore, the earliest
possible payment date was the next day and not the same day to ensure equal modalities
for all possible payment dates.
The second task served to elicit certainty equivalents over a large set of lotteries. Sub-
jects were confronted with 20 risky prospects R = (p1, x1, x2), summarized in Table B.1.
The choices also appeared in individualized random order and were framed as investment
decisions.
The choice menus look very similar to those in the time task. Figure B.5 displays
an example.41 Subjects had to choose between a risky payment consisting of a binary
38Remember that experimental designs with tradeoﬀs between two far-future outcomes are not suited
to disentangle constant from decreasing discount rates (see Section B.2).
39The Swiss mail service has an excellent reputation and is renowned for its reliable and punctual
deliveries.
40We asked subjects how they assess the risk of not getting the money from the experimenter. Almost
everyone (96%) answered that such considerations played no or no relevant role in their decisions.
41The elicitation method is extensively discussed in Epper et al. (2009), Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) and
Bruhin et al. (2010).
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Table B.1: Risky Prospects
x1 x2 p1 x1 x2 p1
80 60 0.10 60 20 0.05
80 60 0.90 60 20 0.25
80 40 0.05 60 20 0.75
80 40 0.25 60 20 0.95
80 40 0.50 60 0 0.10
80 40 0.75 60 0 0.90
80 40 0.95 40 20 0.10
80 20 0.50 40 20 0.50
60 40 0.25 40 20 0.90
60 40 0.75 40 0 0.50
lottery with outcomes x1 > x2 and probabilities (p1, 1− p1), and a guaranteed payment.
Specifically, Option B presented a risky payment of CHF 60 with a probability of 75%
or CHF 40 with a probability of 25%, and Option B oﬀered 20 alternative, but certain
amounts. The varying alternatives were sorted in descending order from the highest
amount to the lowest amount. The arithmetic mean of the two monetary amounts next
to the indiﬀerence point on the choice menu provided the certainty equivalent. For the
subject in Figure B.5, for instance, the certainty equivalent z amounts to CHF 53.50,
implying weak risk aversion.
We also randomly selected one specific choice of each subject at the end of the experi-
ment. However, the relevant amounts were, conditional on the subject’s choices, paid out
in cash immediately after the experiment. This is important as we intended to elicit the
instantaneous utility function using the data from this task.
Average payoﬀs for the risk task amounted to CHF 54. Therefore, total average
payments for both time and risk tasks were considerably larger than the usual hourly
income of our subjects. They summed to approximately two times their average hourly
wage reported in the questionnaire.42
The experiments were complemented by a question on subjective income expectations.
In particular, we asked subjects to answer the following question: “Do you expect your
income to rise over the next ten months starting from tomorrow? (Example: You expect
42The average per-month income at the subjects disposal amounted to CHF 526 (51) for juniors and
CHF 1224 (136) for seniors (standard errors in parentheses). As our subjects were students, however,
they only work part-time. Their average workload was 28% (compared to working 8.5h for five days per
week (100%)).
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Figure B.5: Choice Menu — Risk Task
a pay raise during this time period.)”. Possible answers were yes, no, and don’t know.
The measure for positive income expectations we use in the following is a binary variable
constructed from subjects’ answers, being one if a subject expects her income to rise during
this time period, and zero otherwise. Note that the wording of the question matches the
framing of the intertemporal choices. There, we asked subjects to trade oﬀ amounts
materializing at a fixed earlier date (the next day) against amounts materializing at some
later date.
B.3.2 Econometric Specification
One of our primary goals is to track down drivers of systematic departures from exponen-
tial discounting. For this purpose, we estimate a structural econometric model, henceforth
labeled expectations model. It is based on the theoretical model introduced in Section B.2
and allows us to test its core assumptions and to evaluate its explanatory power. Some
additional assumptions are needed to make the model operational and identifiable, how-
ever. In what follows, we motivate our approach to control for nonlinear consumption
utility and introduce the model’s functional form and its error specification. To keep
things simple, we focus on preferences and expectations aggregated by group of juniors
and seniors, respectively. According to our theoretical model, the presence of liquidity
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constraints should lead positive income expectations to be reflected in subjects’ consump-
tion plans. Such expectations should therefore have measurable eﬀects on behavior. Using
our structural model we are able to monetize these expectations. Indeed, what we measure
corresponds with what subjects were asked for in the question on income expectations.
The econometric specification we employ nests both, the model usually tested in em-
pirical studies and hyperbolic preferences, as special cases. While the former is essentially
an exponential discounted utility model with two additional (usually implicit) assump-
tions, the linearity of utility in outcomes and the evaluation of outcomes in isolation of
existing consumption plans, the latter allows us to assess how much of decreasing discount
rates is explained by our approach.
The choice of the risk model, on the other hand, is motivated by the empirical lit-
erature on decision making in this domain (see e.g. Starmer (2000)). We employ a
rank-dependent utility model (Quiggin, 1982) capturing both, preferences nonlinear in
outcomes and preferences nonlinear in probabilities. This allows decomposing observed
risk aversion into its two components, marginal utility and probabilistic risk aversion.
Wakker (1994) motivates this idea and argues that “utility should describe an intrinsic
appreciation of money, prior to probabilities or risk” (p.3). As we assume that outcomes
in the time task are certain and subjects’ expectations should already incorporate their
risk premia, this view supports the transferability of (riskless) utility between the two
domains.43 In other words, our instantaneous utility function captures subjects’ prefer-
ences over outcomes, having similar interpretations in both domains. Accounting for such
preferences is of particular importance, as the concavity of the utility function can play a
decisive role in intertemporal decision making (see Section B.2). By not doing so, one may
significantly overestimate the level of impatience, as well as its decrease in time horizon
and outcome magnitude.
Our theoretical model postulates that a subject evaluates any temporal prospect
Tk = (xk, tk), k ∈ {1, ..., K}, relative to her anticipated baseline consumption level (see
Equation B.2). For identifiability, we assume that the stationary part of baseline con-
sumption, i.e. baseline consumption shared by all time periods, equals zero. Moreover,
as we are only interested in the average rise of baseline consumption between tomorrow
and ten months, we only estimate one single parameter c per group. This parameter does
not depend on delay. Under these assumptions, indiﬀerence between the stated amount
yˆk and a temporal prospect Tk, is established if the following equation holds:
43One may relax the assumption that even guaranteed outcomes are perceived as certain (see Epper
et al. (2009)). To keep things simple, we ignore this additional dimension here.
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yˆk = u
−1 (d(s, tk) [u(c+ xk)− u(c)]) , (B.3)
where d is the discount function with the earlier and later outcome date as arguments.
As the earlier outcome date was held fixed at one day over all choices and hence diﬀers
from the decision date, we set s = 360−1.
In order to identify u, we further need to specify the risky choice model. We use a
rank-dependent specification. An individual values any risky prospect Rl = (p1l, x1l, x2l),
l ∈ {1, ..., L}, where x1l > x2l, by
V = w(p1l)u(x1l) + (1− w(p1l))u(x2l). (B.4)
As above, the function u describes how monetary outcomes are valued. The curvature
is now identifiable, however, since the risky prospects contain lotteries with two nonzero
outcomes (x1l > x2l > 0), and u appears in both model equations (Equation B.2 and B.4).
The function w assigns a subjective weight to every outcome probability p. A subject is
indiﬀerent between the stated amount zˆl, her certainty equivalent, if
zˆl = u
−1 (w(p1l)u(x1l) + (1− w(p1l))u(x2l)) . (B.5)
In order to make the model operational, we have to assume specific functional forms
for the discount function d, the instantaneous utility function u, and the probability
weighting function w. Since the main objective is to test the model introduced in the
main part of the paper, we choose a discount function nesting constant time preferences.
However, this function should be flexible enough to capture hyperbolic time preferences
as well. To allow for that, we use a function which can reproduce discount rates that
are constant, decreasing or increasing in time horizon. Bleichrodt et al. (2009) propose
such a discount function suiting our needs.44 We extend this discount function in a way
accommodating the fact that both outcomes lie in the future. We specify
44A subpart of this discount function was originally introduced by Prelec (2004). The extension by Ble-
ichrodt et al. (2009) can also account for strong decreasing and increasing impatience. This specification
directly nests the exponential reference case. Most other discount functions are limited in these respects.
The generalized hyperbola (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992), for instance, does neither allow for strong
decreasing impatience nor for increasing impatience, and does only contain exponential discounting as a
limiting case.
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d(s, t) =

eη(s
1−γ−t1−γ) if γ < 1
sηt−η if γ = 1
eη(t
1−γ−s1−γ) if γ > 1
, (B.6)
where η reflects the level of impatience, and γ how impatience evolves over time. For
γ = 0, η is equal to a continuously compounded discount rate and d takes on the typical
exponential form, where η = − ln(δ) (see Section B.2). For γ > 0 (γ < 0) the function
exhibits discount rates decreasing (increasing) in time horizon.45
We use a similar specification for the instantaneous utility function u. The power-
specification has been originally derived by Pratt (1964).46 It has the following form:47
u(x) = sgn(x)×

|x|1−ρ if ρ < 1
ln |x| if ρ = 1
−|x|1−ρ if ρ > 1
, (B.7)
where concavity is solely captured by ρ, with ρ/x being the Arrow-Pratt index of
concavity. For ρ > 0 (ρ < 0) the function is concave (convex). ρ = 0 reflects the special
case where utility is linear in outcomes. u links the two Equations B.3 and B.5.
A potential problem when using such an approach to account for nonlinear utility
may be that risk aversion is not solely driven by the curvature of the instantaneous
utility function. Rather, subjects may systematically under- or overweight probabilities.
Neglecting this source of risk aversion would lead to biased estimates of the curvature
parameter ρ. Our data is rich enough to separate these two eﬀects. We control for
probability weighting using the following two-parameter function (Prelec, 1998):48
w(p) = e−(1−β)(− ln p)
1−α
. (B.8)
45γ/t corresponds to the Pratt-Arrow convexity of the logarithm of the discount function, γ =
−t [ln(d(t,s))]￿￿[ln(d(t,s))]￿ , a measure for departures from stationarity proposed by Prelec (1989, 2004).
46See Wakker (2008) for a more recent discussion.
47Note that ln |x| is not defined for x = 0. Therefore, estimation is carried out after shifting all outcomes
by 1E − 10.
48We reparametrized the function slightly, such that departures from linear weighting are directly
testable. A more general form, also allowing for strong subproportionality, can be derived by extending
this model similarly as the discount and utility function showed above.
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Using this specification, α denotes an index for subproportionality, where the function
is inversely S-shaped for α > 0. Higher values correspond to stronger departures from
linear probability weighting (α = 0). On the other hand, β largely governs the elevation of
the curve. More risk proneness is associated with larger, positive β’s, where the function
intersects the identity line at p = 1/e ≈ 0.37 for β = 0.
So far, our model only explains deterministic choice. There may be, however, diﬀerent
sources of error, such as carelessness, hurry or inattentiveness, resulting in accidentally
wrong answers (Hey and Orme, 1994). As a consequence, the actual indiﬀerence amounts
are bound to deviate from predicted indiﬀerence amounts by an error. That is, an indi-
vidual i exhibits yik = yˆk + ￿ik (in an intertemporal choice) and zil = zˆl + υil (in a risky
choice). We assume that the error terms are independent within each individuals’ choices
and normally distributed.
We allow for three diﬀerent sources of heteroskedasticity in the error variance. First,
for each prospect, subjects had to consider 20 certain outcomes, which are equally spaced
throughout the prospect’s range xk (for intertemporal prospects) and x1l − x2l (for risky
prospects), respectively. Since the observed equivalents are calculated as the arithmetic
mean of the smallest earlier or certain amount preferred to the temporal or risky prospect
and the subsequent amount on the list, the error is proportional to the prospect range.
Second, as the subjects may be heterogenous with respect to their previous knowledge,
their attention span as well as their ability of finding the correct equivalent, we expect
the error variance to diﬀer by individual.49 Third, temporal prospects may be evaluated
diﬀerently from risky prospects. Therefore, we allow for task-specific variances in the
error term. This yields the form τik = ξixk for the time task and σil = νi(x1l−x2l) for the
risk task for the standard deviation of the error term distribution, where ξi and νi denote
the task-specific parameters of individual i. Note that the model allows to test for both
individual-specific and task-specific heteroskedasticity by either imposing the restriction
ξi = ξ (νi = ν), or by forcing ξi = νi. Both types of restrictions are rejected by their
corresponding likelihood ratio test in both samples with p-values close to zero. It turns
out, that errors between the two tasks are not significantly correlated (p-values > 0.14
for both data sets).50 Therefore, we control for all three types of heteroskedasticity in the
estimation procedure.
Having discussed all the necessary ingredients, we now turn to the model specification.
49In this simple model, individual-specific heterogeneity in expectations is solely captured by individual
error variances.
50Based on paired sample tests following Pearson’s product-moment correlation.
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We are interested in the parameter vector θ = (b, η, γ, ρ,α, β)￿, where θ(T ) and θ(R) extracts
the relevant parameters of the time and risk equation from the vector θ, respectively.
Given the assumptions on the distribution of the error term, the density for the i-th
individual can be expresses as
f(yi, T ; θ(T ), ξi) =
K￿
k=1
τ−1ik φ
￿
yik − yˆk
τik
￿
(B.9)
for the time task, and
g(zi,R; θ(R), νi) =
L￿
l=1
σ−1il φ
￿
zil − zˆl
σil
￿
(B.10)
for the risk task, where φ(·) denotes the density of the standard normal distribution.
The log-likelihood of the model is then given by
lnL (θ; y, z, T ,R) =
N￿
i=1
￿
ln f(yi, T ; θ(T ), ξi) + ln g(zi,R; θ(R), νi)
￿
. (B.11)
The parameters are estimated by maximizing lnL(·) with respect to θ using a quasi-
Newton method. We do this for each data set separately, which allows a comparison
and interpretation of group diﬀerences. Confidence intervals are derived by the 2.5% and
97.5% percentiles of the bootstrap distribution (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). We account
for the structure of the data and thus restrict the resampling procedure to draw with
replacement from individuals (clustering).
B.3.3 Results
Descriptive Overview
Figure B.6 presents median discount rates for each time horizon and outcome magnitude
subjects were confronted with.51 Both student groups reveal very impatient behavior,
with aggregate median discount rates lying at 70.80% per year. That is, discount rates
51The discount rates are calculated using the same methodology used in Section B.2 and described in
Appendix B.5. We report per annum rates only and account for the fact that subjects trade oﬀ between
two future outcomes.
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Figure B.6: Observed Discount Rates
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are considerably larger than market interest rates. These rates decline in time horizon
and outcome magnitude, however, lending support for both, the prevalence of decreasing
discount rates and the magnitude eﬀect in our data. In summary, observed behavior is
consistent with previous experimental evidence on intertemporal decision making. All the
typical “anomalies” are found in our data as well.52
At first sight, the two groups do not appear to diﬀer substantially. Juniors and se-
niors show similar median rates. The senior group’s discount rates, however, seem to
converge more quickly to constant rates. This group also reveals a comparatively more
pronounced magnitude eﬀect. On aggregate, their discount rates decline more steeply in
outcome magnitude than those of juniors, with the sharpest diﬀerence at the smallest
outcome. Earlier in this paper we pointed out that for liquidity-constrained, impatient
consumers the magnitude eﬀect should be more pronounced the higher subjective income
expectations are. Thereby, smaller outcomes are aﬀected more strongly than larger out-
comes, ceteris paribus. As we expect the majority of seniors to enter the job market
within the next few months, we also expect them to hold higher income expectations, and
hence exhibit a more pronounced magnitude eﬀect. This finding therefore fits well to the
prediction of our model.
52A short descriptive overview for the risk data can be found in Appendix B.9.
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Liquidity Constraints and Income Expectations
Positive income expectations should aﬀect behavior if subjects face liquidity constraints.
It seems very likely that the vast majority of our subjects are bound by such constraints.
Students typically do not have a guaranteed monthly income, neither did they had such
an income in the past. As a consequence, they usually do not hold many liquid assets
and only have limited borrowing capabilities.53
In our experiments we asked subjects whether they had an immediate need for money,
i.e. whether they are cash-constrained or not. A considerable fraction of 46.36% of all
students reported that they were so.54 We use this binary variable as a proxy for liquidity
constraints.
Figure B.7 illustrates our findings. For each time horizon it plots discount rates for
subjects facing diﬀerent constraints and holding diﬀerent income expectations. Aside
from a few exceptions, qualitative behavior between subjects facing and not facing cash
constraints does not diﬀer greatly. How discount rates evolve in time horizon seems to
depend strongly on the income expectations subjects hold, however. In particular, we
find the following. First, as predicted by our model, subjects without positive income ex-
pectations reveal discount rates which remain for the most part constant in time horizon
(see Panel I and III).55 The most salient diﬀerence between these figures is that subjects
facing cash constraints show much higher discount rates. Obviously, having an immediate
need for money should lead to more impatient behavior.56 Second, we also find clear evi-
dence for decreasing discount rates for cash-constrained subjects holding positive income
expectations (Panel IV). Both, juniors and seniors, exhibit such patterns. This is one of
53Their limited income does not only prevent students from accumulating much liquid assets. As banks
generally do only issue credit cards to account holders if they can document a guaranteed monthly income,
they may also have problems accessing liquidity through theses channels. Deaton (1991), for instance,
points out that “[...] there has always been somewhat of a puzzle in the consumption literature as to
why individuals who anticipate substantial income growth (e.g. students) and who have a preference for
smooth consumption [...] do not borrow large sums in early life. While there are a number of possible
answers, particularly at the aggregate level, the existence of borrowing limitations has always been a likely
explanation” (p.1236).
54For the two student groups, these fractions are nearly the same (47.37% for juniors and 45.28% for
seniors). Standard errors are 4.78 (all subjects), 6.67 (juniors) and 6.90 (seniors).
55Both groups exhibit considerably larger rates for the shortest delay in Panel III. While this behavior
can be traced back to single individuals, we can only speculate about its causes. One possible explanation
may be that our experiments took place some weeks before the spring break. Cash-constrained subjects
who have plans for their holidays, but do not expect a rise in their income soon, may favor payments
before the holidays, but may still not be willing to sacrifice much of the outcomes in the longer-delay
choices.
56While these findings support our model it is clear that there may be a reverse causality: More
impatient people may be more likely to face cash constraints as they have a higher marginal propensity
to consume.
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Figure B.7: Cash Constraints and Income Expectations
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our model’s central predictions. The senior group exhibits a similar behavior in Panel II.
Not being cash-constrained does not mean that these subjects have full access to liquidity,
however. As we expect senior students to enter the job market soon, and hence to hold
much higher income expectations than juniors, a likely explanation is that the expected
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rise in income is simply too large to be smoothed away. As predicted for subjects without
liquidity constraints, juniors show rates which hardly decline in time horizon. Note that
the group in Panel II is by far the smallest of the four displayed in Figure B.7. Only five
(six) subjects out of 57 (53) are not cash-constrained and simultaneously hold positive
income expectations.
To keep things simple and to have a suﬃcient number of subjects in each group,
our subsequent analyses focus on the expectation dimension. This seems adequate as the
most striking diﬀerences are driven by income expectations rather than cash constraints.57
Moreover, we are confident that the large majority of our students is limited with respect
to access sources of liquidity. For these subjects, positive income expectations should
drive departures from standard predictions. Equipped with our binary measure for income
expectations, we are able to test this hypothesis explicitly.
Table B.2: Positive Expectations
Group Fraction Std.Err.
Juniors 0.298 0.061
Seniors 0.283 0.062
About 30% of our subjects reported that they expected their income to rise in the time
period between the next day and ten months into the future (see Table B.2). Assuming
standard preferences, i.e. diminishing marginal utility of consumption and impatience,
our model predicts that these subjects should reveal higher discount rates which de-
cline more strongly in time horizon and a more pronounced magnitude eﬀect if they are
liquidity-constrained compared to subjects not facing such constraints or not having such
expectations.
We first illustrate our main results on income expectations graphically. Later, we show
linear regressions confirming our findings.
Figure B.8 shows our first result. On aggregate, students with positive income expecta-
tions (dark bars) exhibit much higher impatience than students without such expectations
(light bars). Both, juniors and seniors expecting an income increase within the relevant
time horizon, show much larger discount rates (117.38%) compared to those who do not
(48.44%). A nonparametric test indicates that the diﬀerence is indeed statistically highly
significant for both groups (one-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test, p-values close to zero).
57The alternative interpretation we provide in the concluding section gives a possible explanation for
this finding.
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Figure B.8: Positive Expectations
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What is really surprising, however, is how large actual diﬀerences between discount rates
of the two expectation types are, when bearing in mind that our indicator for subjective
income expectations is quite a crude one.
Our second result concerns decreasing discount rates. The upper panel of Figure B.9
depicts clear support for our model. It reproduces what we saw in Figure B.7, but
aggregates over the two types with diﬀerent constraints. Observed discount rates decline
much more steeply in time horizon for subjects holding positive income expectations
compared to those who do not. This result supports the conjecture that subjective income
expectations drive hyperbolic discounting behavior in our data.
While arguably much less pronounced, subjects without positive income expectations
still show discount rates declining in time horizon.58 There are a number of possible
explanations for this result. First, we only know whether subjects have positive income
expectations or not. Obviously, these expectations are unlikely to be perfectly correlated
with subjects’ consumption plans. For example, small increases in future income expected
soon are still easily smoothed away by dissaving from liquid assets.59 As we will see later,
58This is also visible in Figure B.7, Panel I.
59In a similar fashion, subjects may expect their future expenditures or savings ratio to change.
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there is indeed evidence for a gap between measured and estimated expectations. Second,
these discount rates are still confounded by nonlinear outcome utility. The eﬀect may be
significantly biased upwards if instantaneous utility is actually concave. Results reported
later indicate that this is also the case here.
Our theoretical model also posits a link between income expectations and the magni-
tude eﬀect. How strong prospective outcomes are discounted is largely governed by how
much and when the agent expects her income to rise. Individual diﬀerences may therefore
play an important role in whether such an eﬀect can be found on the aggregate level.
The lower panel of Figure B.9 juxtaposes median discount rates for the two expec-
tation types conditional on outcome magnitude. While we found clear evidence for the
magnitude eﬀect on the aggregate level (see Figure B.6), it seems that our income ex-
pectation measure is not rich enough to draw clear conclusions here. As subjects are
very heterogenous with respect to their income expectations, this finding is likely a result
of aggregating over subjects.60 Analyzing data of two student groups diﬀering with re-
spect to their expectations, however, allows us to test this hypothesis without requiring
finer measures on income expectations. In the descriptive part, we found that senior stu-
dents exhibit a more pronounced magnitude eﬀect. This group should therefore also hold
higher consumption expectations. The econometric model we estimate quantifies these
expectations for both groups, and hence provides an answer to this question.
The regression results listed in Table B.3 further support the results we obtained
graphically. In the Columns I, we regress observed discount rates on positive income
expectations, arguments of the temporal prospects and their interaction. This allows us
to test how discount rates depend on these variables.61
First of all, the relationship between revealed impatience and income expectations is
both, quantitatively and statistically significant. Discount rates for subjects with posi-
tive income expectations are on average about 88.7 (67.2) percentage points larger than
subjects without positive income expectations (about 82.6% (80.1%) per annum). In-
come expectations also have considerable explanatory power. As additional regressions
in Table B.7 (Appendix B.10) show, about 15-20% (!) of the variation in individual
median discount rates can be attributed to diﬀerences in this binary measure of income
expectations.
Second, the regression results also highlight that the large part of the decline of dis-
60Another reason is that we use a very simple measure which only allows to keep subjects expecting a
rise in their income apart from those that do not.
61As we expect subjects to vary greatly in their impatience, we allow them to diﬀer in this respect
(random intercept term).
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Table B.3: Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Observed Discount Rate η˜(1)ik
Juniors Seniors
Coeﬃcient I II I II
Intercept(2) 0.826∗∗∗ 0.242 0.801∗∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.909) (0.113) (0.688)
Positive Expectations 0.887∗∗ 0.977∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗ 0.716∗∗
(0.318) (0.344) (0.224) (0.239)
Time Horizon (in months)(3) -0.102∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012)
Time Horizon × Pos. Expect. -0.097∗∗ -0.097∗∗ -0.095∗∗ -0.095∗∗
(0.045) (0.046) (0.040) (0.040)
Outcome Magnitude (in CHF 10)(3) -0.051∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014)
Outcome Magnitude × Pos. Expect. -0.032 -0.032 0.007 0.007
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.040)
Log-Income(4) 0.163 0.002
(0.156) (0.086)
Investment Experience -0.152 0.006
(0.488) (0.244)
Female -0.312 -0.002
(0.253) (0.221)
CRT Score -0.443 -0.457
(0.337) (0.339)
σIntercept 0.875 0.840 0.643 0.627
logL -1268 -1268 -903 -906
BIC 2599 2626 1869 1901
Subjects 56 56 50 50
Observations(5) 1101 1101 1000 1000
∗∗∗ (∗∗) indicates significance on the 1% (5%) level; standard errors (in parentheses) are based on a
∗∗∗ cluster bootstrap using 999 replications
1 discount rate observed by subject i for temporal prospect k
2 random intercept
3 we subtracted the mean value from both prospect arguments, i.e. 6 months (time horizon), CHF 50
3 (outcome magnitude)
4 the exact transformation is log(income+1) as there were subjects with zero income; income was
∗∗∗ measured in CHF; summary statistics for all variables are listed in Appendix B.10, Table B.6; qualitative
∗∗∗ results remain the same when restricting on subsamples of the data, such as gender
5 subjects with missing observations in income and the CRT score are omitted
− estimation procedure accounts for prospect-specific heteroskedasticity
− we do not include higher-order interactions or interactions with controls as their coeﬃcients were
∗∗∗ either insignificant or did not change the results
− using binary variables for the levels of time horizon and outcome magnitude instead of the original
∗∗∗ variables leads to qualitatively similar results
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count rates in time horizon is explained by positive income expectations. Subjects holding
such beliefs are about twice as sensitive to changes in time horizon compared to the ref-
erence group. On average, their discount rates decline by 19.9 (juniors) or 15.8 (seniors)
percentage points when outcomes are delayed by one more month. In comparison, sub-
jects not holding such expectations still show discount rates depending negatively on time
horizon, but these rates decline much less sharply, indicating that at least our simple proxy
measure is not able to explain the full extent of decreasing discount rates.
Third, the results concerning the magnitude eﬀect comply with our findings above.
Increasing the outcome by CHF 10 leads to an average decrease in discount rates by
only 8.3 (juniors) or 7.5 (seniors) percentage points. Due to the same reasons already
mentioned, however, our measure for income expectations is not capable of explaining
much of the decline of discount rates in the outcome dimension.
The Columns II show similar regressions, but include some additional controls. In
particular, we control for income, experience with investment decisions (dummy), gender
and cognitive ability (cognitive reflection test (CRT) score (Frederick, 2005)).62 As it
turns out, these controls do not contribute much to explaining the variation in discount
rates. None of these variables is statistically significant and some even do not show very
coherent results for both groups.63 Moreover, adding these variables to the regression
does not change the coeﬃcients for positive income expectations much, and hence do not
aﬀect our results.
Parameter Estimates
The discount rates we analyzed so far do not only contain subject’s preference for im-
mediate over delayed consumption, but are potentially also confounded by other factors,
such as subjects’ aversion towards consumption fluctuations and their subjective income
expectations. On the observational level, it is therefore not possible to get a clear under-
standing of the drivers of intertemporal choice behavior. Moreover, the methodology we
used so far does not allow to quantify group-specific expectations. In what follows, we
resolve these issues by presenting estimation result of the structural econometric model
introduced in Section B.3.2.
Table B.4 presents point estimates (p.e.) and the corresponding 95% confidence inter-
62We did not include age or semesters as controls because there is almost no variation within the two
student groups.
63A likelihood ratio test suggests that the restricted model should be preferred. Regressing individual
median discount rates only on the controls results in R-squares near 2%. Results are available on request.
92
Table B.4: Estimation Results - Expectations Model
Juniors Seniors
p.e. q0.025 q0.975 p.e. q0.025 q0.975
c 3.697 0.709 9.473 5.414 2.918 19.515
η 0.118 0.071 0.306 0.086 0.023 0.327
γ -0.008 -0.650 0.708 -0.325 -1.547 0.302
ρ 0.237 0.177 0.296 0.198 0.140 0.261
α 0.497 0.419 0.576 0.614 0.556 0.670
β 0.006 -0.064 0.058 0.102 0.000 0.192
lnL -7163 -6769
BIC 15168 14318
Subjects 57 53
Observations 1117 1060
Parameters 120 112
95% confidence intervals are derived by the percentile bootstrap method with 9999
replications. The resampling procedure accounts for the panel structure of the data
(clusters). Parameters include additional estimates for ξˆi for domain- and individual-
specific error variances.
vals (q0.025, q0.975) for the two groups’ model parameters. The upper three rows contain
the expectation and time preference parameters, the rows below the utility function and
risk preference parameters. For both student groups we find concave instantaneous utility
and a positive shift in the baseline level. The relevant parameters ρ and c are significantly
larger than zero, indicating that the basic assumptions we made in the theoretical part
of the paper comply with our data.
There are no substantial diﬀerences between the curvatures of the two groups’ utility
functions. Both show similar concavity. Our estimation results, however, point out how
important it is to isolate marginal utility from risk aversion observed in lottery choices.
Not doing so would lead to substantially biased estimates for the rate of time preference
and hyperbolic discounting. The estimates for the probability weighting functions reveal
that there is considerable probabilistic risk aversion in our data. We find significant
probability distortions (α > 0) and systematic underweighting of probabilities (β ≈ 0)
by both groups, results which are in accordance with previous findings on risk taking
behavior (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Seniors show a weighting curve with a more
pronouncedly inverted S-shape than juniors do, but they seem to underweight probabilities
less systematically.64
In accordance with our model, we interpret c as the average growth of baseline con-
64Figure B.12 in the Appendix plots group-specific probability weighting functions against each other.
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sumption expected to occur between the next day and ten months into the future. As we
suspected earlier, estimated expectations are much larger for seniors, the group of higher-
semester graduate and post-graduate students, compared to juniors, the undergraduate
students. This finding dovetails nicely with our descriptive results: On aggregate, seniors
show a more pronounced magnitude eﬀect. Our model links the comparatively higher ex-
pectations to the comparatively stronger eﬀect for this group. The average expectations
of this group are estimated to about CHF 5.41, which is considerably larger than those of
the junior group amounting to CHF 3.70. In accordance with the information provided
to participants (see Section B.3.1), we interpret these amounts as per hour expectations.
Average expectations are then equivalent to a rise in monthly consumption by CHF 919.70
(seniors) or CHF 629.00 (juniors).65 Hence, seniors show expectations that are on average
approximately 1.5 times larger than those of juniors. The confidence intervals, however,
overlap, indicating that expectations of the two groups do not diﬀer significantly. Nev-
ertheless, there seems to be much heterogeneity with respect to subjective expectations,
something one should take special care of when predicting choices.
A crucial question is how much of the findings on the observational level can be
explained by our model. It is relatively easy to answer this question for the size of
discount rates and their decline in time horizon. Our descriptive analyses revealed rather
large median discount rates for the two student groups. These rates amount to 70.8%
per year. Estimation results of the expectations model, listed in Table B.4, also contain
estimates for the rate of time preference η. These rates lie in the vicinity of 10% per year
for both groups, and hence are much closer to market interest rates. On average, seniors
seem to be a little bit more patient than juniors. They exhibit a rate of time preference
of 8.6%, compared to the 11.8% of juniors.
Similar results arise for decreasing discount rates. Our model explains a remarkably
large fraction of the hyperbolic discounting patterns found in the data. The parameter
γ in Table B.4 captures the hyperbolicity of time preferences. Confidence intervals of
this parameter include zero for both groups, indicating that, on aggregate, time prefer-
ences do not diﬀer significantly from constant ones. This result empirically confirms that
expectations can drive decreasing discount rates even if time preference are constant.
To get an idea of how much the change in baseline consumption contributes to de-
creasing discount rates, we also estimated a restricted-form model not incorporating ex-
65 Monthly amounts are calculated by x CHF/hour × 8.5 working hours/day × 20 working days/month.
This calculation assumes that the marginal propensity to consume out of additional income is one. Hence,
it can be considered as the lower bound of the expected growth in income.
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pectations. In particular, we set c to zero, such that u(c + x) − u(c) = u(x). Time
preferences and behavior are then solely characterized by the CRDI discount function.
In this model, decreasing discount rates are fully attributed to hyperbolic preferences,
captured by the parameter γ > 0. Such a model, however, is not able to accommodate
magnitude-dependency.
As it turns out, the expectations model shows a considerably better goodness of fit
compared to the CRDI-model (estimation results for the latter are listed in Appendix
B.11, Table B.8). A likelihood ratio test between the two models reveals p-values close to
zero for both groups.66 This is no big surprise, however, as the full model is also capable
of explaining behavioral diﬀerences in discounting amounts of varying size (magnitude
eﬀect).
Departures from exponential discounting (γ) are much more pronounced when c is
set to zero. This parameter now lies in the range of 0.7 to 0.8 and is significantly larger
than zero. That is, discount rates decline sharply in time horizon and take a clear hy-
perbolic form. In comparison, for the expectations model we found time preferences not
distinguishable from constant ones.
To graphically illustrate the diﬀerences in estimated time preference parameters of
the two models, we rely on the discount rates inferred from η and γ. Figure B.10 plots
these functions for both student groups. The dashed curves shows time preferences based
on the estimated parameters of the expectations model and the solid curves those of the
CRDI-model. The figures depict that our model explains the large part of the decline of
discount rates in time horizon. Inferred time preference curves for both student groups
become very flat for our model, and, as indicated by the parameter estimates in Table
B.4, are not distinguishable from horizontal lines. On aggregate, behavior is therefore
reproduced adequately by constant time preferences.
All in all, our structural econometric model explains a larger part of the huge discount
rates and their decline in time horizon than we were able to explain with our binary
measure for income expectations. We also found indirect evidence for the magnitude eﬀect.
The group with higher estimated consumption expectations shows a more pronounced
eﬀect.
66Estimating the expectations model where γ is set to zero makes no diﬀerence here, as γ is not
significantly diﬀerent from zero in the unrestricted original specification. Note that this model also fits
better than any hyperbolic discounting model we tested. Results are available on request.
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B.4 Discussion and Conclusion
We introduce a novel and unifying explanation for “anomalies” in intertemporal choice
and present empirical support for it. In the theoretical part of the paper, we find that
subjective expectations can have significant eﬀect on discounting behavior and drive sys-
tematic departures from exponential discounting. We discuss one particular situation
where such departures naturally occur. Limited access to liquidity can prevent impatient
consumers with positive, rational expectations to reach a smooth consumption path. Opt-
ing for new alternatives materializing at dates where income is expected to be relatively
low can help them to, at least partly, overcome these limitations. Our approach stands
in contrast to Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) and others, who do not only criticize the
assumptions underlying the exponential discounted utility model, but also argue that
consumer’s preferences are the ultimate driver of “anomalies”. This is not the case in
our model. The typical consumer may still comply with the standard assumptions, but
the limitations imposed by the environment constrain her scope of action which may
lead her to reveal anomalous behavior. Moreover, our approach is not a descriptive one,
but, rather, it provides a clear intuition for why and by how much people depart from
exponential discounting.
The results in the empirical part of the paper lend strong support for our hypothesis
that subjective expectations govern intertemporal choice behavior. Subjects with positive
income expectations and limited access to liquidity reveal much higher discount rates and
a sharper decline of these rates in time horizon. The student group with higher estimated
expectations also exhibits a more pronounced magnitude eﬀect. An interesting insight is
that the majority of empirical studies so far was conducted with relatively poor subjects,
i.e. subjects who only hold few liquid assets and typically only have limited borrowing
opportunities. Students, for example, are not only exceptionally exposed to such liquidity
constraints, but usually also hold substantial positive income expectations. According
to our model, we therefore expect them to depart much more strongly from exponential
discounting than groups not holding such expectations or not facing such constraints. This
should be taken into account when predicting behavior of other groups or recommending
policies based on experimental findings.
Liquidity constraints may not be the only explanation for a link between subjective
expectations and discounting behavior, however. Empirical evidence reports that people
are often too optimistic when it comes to evaluating future life events (Weinstein, 1980,
1987; Armor and Taylor, 2002). People typically overestimate their future earnings (Do-
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minitz, 1998) and their ability to resist future temptations (Nordgren et al., 2009). While
such consumers obviously do not have rational expectations, this alternative explanation
does not contradict our basic model. Having a too optimistic consumption plan can be
suﬃcient to generate the typical “anomalies”, even if no liquidity constraints exist or the
consumer is not suﬃciently impatient.67 Such consumers’ behavior, however, will never
be dynamically consistent.
Our results have strong implications. The fact that rational planners, i.e. consumers
with positive, rational expectations facing liquidity constraints, and myopic fools, i.e.
consumers with dynamically inconsistent preferences or too optimistic beliefs, can reveal
observationally equivalent behavior poses important challenges for the prediction of be-
havior and the design of suitable policies. One basic problem is that constant discount
rates are no longer the proper criteria to identify rational types. Additional informa-
tion about subjective expectations and liquidity constraints may therefore be needed to
make predictions. Similar problems arise when searching for policies which help irrational
consumers to behave more rationally. Interventions not taking into account the diﬀerent
causes underlying behavior, may fail to have the desired eﬀect, be a waste of money or
even have detrimental eﬀects for those consumers with rational intentions. Policies geared
at undersavings, for example, should only aﬀect those consumers not being aware of what
they do, but not those with a rational plan and limited liquidity. Mechanisms distinguish-
ing rational planners from myopic fools are therefore needed. Possible starting points for
the development of such mechanisms are these types’ diﬀerent preferences for commitment
and the dynamic consistency of their behavior. The rational consumer, for example, is
willing to insure herself against exogenous income shocks, but not against her own future
behavior. Conversely, hyperbolic or overoptimistic consumers should be concerned about
their own behavior. Whether or not they show a preference for commitment, however,
depends on their degree of sophistication (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999).
We see a number of directions our work may be extended to. First, our model gen-
erates numerous sharp predictions not made by other discounting models. Examples are
conditions for which we predict increasing discount rates, magnitude-dependency, the
close connection between the “anomalies” or the eﬀect subjective expectations have on
behavior. These predictions are testable and make our model falsifiable.
Second, richer expectations (and possibly even liquidity constraints) data can help to
67Formally, ct > c0 ≥ 0 ∀t > 0 must hold. This does not necessarily require the consumer to have a
precise consumption plan in mind. The consumer’s beliefs about the future, however, must imply that
marginal utility derived from consumption is always larger today compared to tomorrow.
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better understand how people’s beliefs govern behavior. There are a number of papers
proposing methods to elicit subjective expectations (Dominitz and Manski, 1996, 1997;
Dominitz, 2001; Manski, 2004). Such procedures can be adopted to account for the
magnitude, timing, uncertainty and heterogeneity of subjects’ expectations. Embedded
in dynamic choice experiments, they can provide additional insights into how expectations
are formed and how they drive consumer behavior.
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Figure B.9: Positive Expectations and Prospect Arguments
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Figure B.10: Inferred Time Preferences
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B.5 Appendix: Imputed Discount Rates
Our analyses in the theoretical and the empirical part of this paper rely on imputed
discount rates. Here we show how these rates are calculated. The basic procedure follows
that used in most empirical studies on intertemporal choice (see e.g. Thaler (1981)).
Consider a subject stating her present equivalent y which makes her indiﬀerent to a
temporal prospect (x, t). The per annum imputed discount rate η˜ is then directly inferred
from indiﬀerence between y and x. That is,
y ∼ e−η˜tx , (B.12)
from which it follows that
η˜ = −1
t
ln
￿y
x
￿
. (B.13)
Intuitively, imputed discount rates reflect the revealed propensity to exchange sooner
for later consumption. Most empirical studies reject the exponential discounted util-
ity model because these rates are not constant in time horizon and/or depend on out-
come magnitude or outcome sign (see for instance Thaler (1981); Benzion et al. (1989);
Ahlbrecht and Weber (1995); Chapman (1996) among many others). As our analyses illus-
trate, however, there are other reasons for subjects to depart from exponential discounting
than non-constant time preferences. Subject’s imputed discount rates may therefore diﬀer
from their rate of time preferences.
To predict behavior, we simply substitute y in Equation B.13 by the present equivalent
inferred from our model (see for example Appendix B.6.1).
B.6 Appendix: Anomalies
B.6.1 Time Horizon
According to our model, the present equivalent y making the consumer indiﬀerent to the
temporal prospect (x, t) is y = u(−1) [E{δt (u(ct + x)− u(ct)) | I0}+ u(c0)] − c0. For the
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following proofs, we assume that ct is a priori known and that c0 = 0.68 Note that this
consumption plan already contains the consumer’s information about liquidity constraints.
An expected rise in the consumption plan only takes eﬀect if it occurs prior to the point
in time the temporal prospect materializes.
Calculating the discount rate inferred from our model by inserting the predicted
present equivalent y = u(−1) [δt (u(ct + x)− u(ct))] into Formula B.13, diﬀerentiating with
respect to t, and reordering, leads to
∂η˜
∂t
= −1
t
−1t ln￿yx￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
η˜
−(− ln(δ)￿ ￿￿ ￿
η
)
u(y)
yu￿(y)￿ ￿￿ ￿
1/ε
 . (B.14)
The interpretation of the term in square brackets is straightforward. It is the diﬀerence
between the consumer’s behavior, i.e. her imputed discount rate η˜, and her preferences,
i.e. the product of the her rate of time preference (impatience) η and the reciprocal of
the elasticity of her utility function 1/ε. The wedge between these two terms is largely
governed by how large the consumer expects her consumption to rise during the relevant
time horizon. The following comparative statics make that clear.
For u concave and ct > 0, the fraction y/x decreases as ct increases, ceteris paribus.
This is the case since larger ct’s lead to stronger discounting of prospective consumption
utility, i.e. due to concavity u(ct + x) − u(ct) becomes smaller the larger ct. As δt is
a constant (with 0 < δt ≤ 1) and u(−1) is a strictly monotone function, the imputed
68The first assumption is purely technical and allows to ignore the expectation operator. Relaxing
the second assumption does not aﬀect our basic result that discount rates decline in time horizon for
positive expectations and concave instantaneous utility. The fact that new alternatives are not evaluated
in isolation, but integrated into existing plans, however, can produce decreasing discount rates by itself
without requiring increasing baseline consumption. For u concave and δ < 1 (impatience), for instance,
discount rates decline if c0 = ct = c > 0. Even if u is isoelastic, u(ct + x) is not if c > 0 is included into
the function for the same reason described in Wakker (2008). Distortions, i.e. departures from constant
imputed discount rates, are then produced by positive rates of time preference. Although this eﬀect has
the same sign as the one produced by positive expectations, it seems very unlikely that the empirical
findings are driven solely by it. There are two reasons for that. First, if this would be the case, we
should not find a correlation between self-reported income expectations and decreasing discount rates.
We do, however, find such a relationship in the empirical part of the paper. Second, there are no plausible
parameter combinations fitting the hyperbolicity of behavior in our data. A calibration exercise shows
that behavior revealed by the two student groups in the empirical part of this paper are only consistent
with baseline consumption levels of CHF 25.50 (juniors) or CHF 35.90 (seniors), respectively. Interpreting
these amounts as per-hour consumption, as done in Section B.3.3, leads to baseline consumption levels
of CHF 4335 to CHF 6103 per month, i.e. consumption levels that are five to over eight times larger
than the average subjects monthly income. The calculations are based on the assumptions described in
Footnote 65.
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discount rate η˜ increases as consumption expectations ct grow larger. If u is isoelastic,
1/ε is constant. Under our assumptions, the diﬀerence in square brackets is positive
and ∂η˜/∂t < 0. Hence, imputed discount rates decline in time horizon, with higher
consumption expectations leading to a more pronounced eﬀect. ￿
A number of additional findings result from Equation B.14. First, (expected) baseline
consumption changes do not take eﬀect under utility linear in consumption, simply be-
cause ct cancels out in η˜ and 1/ε = 1. The same is the case for ct = 0 if u is isoelastic.
Second, in the long run, imputed discount rates are not distinguishable from constant
rates even if ct > 0, since
lim
t→∞
∂η˜
∂t
= 0 . (B.15)
Third, contrary to hyperbolic discounting models, decreasing discount rates are not
“hardwired” in the consumer’s preferences, but are the result of the consumer’s expecta-
tions and the borrowing limitations preventing her from smoothing away the preceding
low-consumption periods. The size of the eﬀect therefore depends on ct in our model, but
there should be no such dependence in hyperbolic preference models not incorporating
these drivers of behavior. Fourth, it directly follows from Equation B.14 that there is an
interaction between decreasing discount rates and the magnitude eﬀect. Holding ct con-
stant, imputed discount rates decline less strongly in time horizon the larger x becomes,
ceteris paribus (see Appendix B.6.2).
B.6.2 Outcome Magnitude
The derivative of the imputed discount rates with respect to the outcome magnitude is
∂η˜
∂x
=− 1
t
δtu￿(ct + x)u￿(y)￿ ￿￿ ￿
MRSct,c0
1
y
− 1
x
 (B.16)
where y = u(−1) [δt (u(ct + x)− u(ct))].69 The size of the magnitude eﬀect largely
69We make the same assumption as in Appendix B.6.1 to eliminate the expectation operator. Due to
the same reasons described in Appendix B.6.1, we prove the existence of the magnitude eﬀect for the
case where the stationary component of baseline consumption is zero. Positive, but constant baseline
consumption levels can induce an opposite magnitude eﬀect. There is, however, no reasonable parameter
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depends on how much the consumer expects her consumption to rise during the relevant
time horizon. The first term in square brackets, the product of the marginal rate of
intertemporal substitution between future and present consumption MRSct,c0 and 1/y,
rises as ct becomes larger.
The following comparative static proves the magnitude eﬀect and its dependence on
ct. Consider two outcomes with x¯ > x > 0. u￿ > 0 implies that yx¯ > yx, ceteris paribus.
From u￿￿ < 0 it follows that
￿
u(−1)
￿￿￿
> 0 and y￿￿ > 0. As a result, the discount fraction
yx¯/x¯ is larger than the discount fraction yx/x. Since η˜x¯ < η˜x, imputed discount rates
decrease as x grows larger. Using the same procedure it can easily be shown that the
eﬀect is more pronounced as ct increases, holding x and all other things fixed. ￿
Some additional findings result from Equation B.16. First, (expected) changes in
baseline consumption do not take eﬀect if u(z) = z, i.e. if u￿(z) = 1. For this case,
no magnitude eﬀect is predicted. Similar results are obtained if ct = 0 and u isoelastic.
Then, the first term in square brackets reduces to 1/x, which is the lower bound of this
product given that ct ≥ 0 and u concave. Second, imputed discount rates converge to
rates constant in outcome magnitude as x grows to infinity, holding all other things fixed,
as
lim
x→∞
∂η˜
∂x
= 0 . (B.17)
Third, the magnitude eﬀect diminishes as the time horizon tends to infinity, since
lim
t→∞
∂η˜
∂x
= 0 . (B.18)
Once again, this result indicates that the two eﬀects, diminishing impatience and the
magnitude eﬀect, are closely intertwined.
combination which fits the magnitude eﬀect in our data, given that u is concave, 1 ≥ δ > 0 and c0 =
ct = c > 0.
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B.7 Appendix: Dynamically Consistent Hyperbolic
Discounting
Hyperbolic discounting can be dynamically consistent if the consumer holds rational ex-
pectations, such that her expectations do not diﬀer systematically when reevaluating the
same choice at some later point in time.
Dynamic consistency, or stationarity, implies that no preference reversals occur if
outcomes are shifted by a common delay (Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982)).
Definition 1 (Stationarity) If (x, t) ∼ (y, t+ λ) then (x, s) ∼ (y, s+ λ),
for all outcomes {x, y}, all dates {t, s, t+ λ, s+ λ} and λ > 0.
Consider a consumer who is indiﬀerent between the two temporal prospects (x, t) and
(y, t + λ) when evaluating them now. At this point in time she expects her baseline
consumption to be ct for t and t + λ.70 For stationarity to hold, indiﬀerence must still
be established when evaluating the same two prospects in t − s periods from now. New
information about future consumption becoming available in the meantime, however, may
lead the consumer to update her expectations such that cs = ct + µ.
Formally, our model implies that the following indiﬀerence condition holds when the
two temporal prospects are evaluated now:
δt [u(ct + x)− u(ct)] = δt+λ [u(ct + y)− u(ct)] . (B.19)
Rational expectations imply that µ is independent and identically distributed with
expected value of zero. In this case, the consumer is still indiﬀerent between the two
prospects, when evaluating them in t− s periods, as the following holds:
δs[u(ct + µ+ x)− u(ct + µ)] = δs+λ[u(ct + µ+ y)− u(ct + µ)] . (B.20)
In other words, discounting does only depend on the delay λ and the consumer will
not reverse preferences. ￿
70For expositional simplicity, we leave the expectation operator aside.
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B.8 Appendix: Consumption Spendings
Table B.5: Planned Appropriation of Payouts
Purpose Tomorrow Later
consumption(1) 94.55% (104)(2) 76.36% (84)
savings(3) 3.64% (4) 6.36% (7)
debt repayments 1.82% (2) 0.91% (1)
spend before received - 2.73% (3)
no specific plans 0.00% (0) 13.64% (15)
1 Consists of daily consumption spendings, installments against
1 consumer durables and gift purchases. We also asked subjects
1 whether they plan to donate the payouts. No single subject did so.
2 Number of subjects in parentheses (total: 110 subjects).
3 None of the 110 planned to use the payout for capital investment.
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B.9 Appendix: Descriptive Results for Risk Data
Figure B.11 shows median relative risk premia for the probabilities subjects were con-
fronted with. This measure is defined as
rrp(R) = ev(R)− ce(R)|ev(R)| , (B.21)
where ev(R) denotes the expected value of the lottery R and ce(R) the observed
certainty equivalent. rrp > 0 (rrp < 0) represents risk aversion (proneness), and rrp = 0
risk neutrality.
As depicted by the figure, risk aversion strongly depends on the probability under
consideration. On aggregate, subjects are risk-seeking for low-probable gains, but risk-
averse for medium- and high-probably gains. This motivates the use of a inverted S-shaped
probability weighting function as we do in our econometric model.
Figure B.11: Relative Risk Premia
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B.10 Appendix: Income Expectations
Table B.6: Summary Statistics
Juniors Seniors
Mean Std.Err. Mean Std.Err.
Positive Expectations 0.301 0.014 0.260 0.014
Income 525.840 11.378 1231.000 31.072
Investment Experience 0.105 0.009 0.320 0.015
Female 0.501 0.015 0.500 0.016
CRT Score 0.561 0.011 0.647 0.010
Observations(1) 1101 1000
1 omitting subjects with missing observations in income and CRT
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Table B.7: OLS Regressions
Dependent Variable: med(η˜i)(1)
Juniors Seniors
Coeﬃcient I II I II
Intercept 0.672∗∗∗ 0.100 0.686∗∗∗ 0.853
(0.090) (0.825) (0.102) (0.645)
Positive Expectations(2) 0.827∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.315) (0.200) (0.215)
Log-Income(3) 0.144 0.004
(0.140) (0.083)
Investment Experience -0.137 0.035
(0.403) (0.229)
Female -0.189 0.032
(0.218) (0.199)
CRT Score -0.370 -0.355
(0.285) (0.312)
R2 0.195 0.246 0.142 0.172
Observations(4) 56 56 50 50
∗∗∗ indicates significance on the 1% level; standard errors (in parentheses) are based
∗∗∗ on the bootstrap method (999 replications)
1 calculated by taking the median over all observations of subject i
2 summary statistics for all variables are listed in Table B.6; coeﬃcients are robust
∗∗∗ when restricting on subsamples of the data, such as gender
3 in CHF; the exact transformation is log(income+1) as there were subjects with
∗∗∗ zero income
4 subjects with missing observations in income and the CRT score are omitted
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B.11 Appendix: Additional Estimation Results
Figure B.12: Probability Weighting Functions
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— Juniors — Seniors
dashed curves are 95% confidence
bands based on percentile bootstrap;
probabilistic risk neutrality holds
if w(p) = p; dotted lines mark 0.5
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Table B.8: Estimation Results - CRDI-Model
Juniors Seniors
p.e. q0.025 q0.975 p.e. q0.025 q0.975
η 0.345 0.130 0.894 0.235 0.173 0.742
γ 0.795 0.536 0.963 0.719 0.505 0.940
ρ 0.237 0.172 0.300 0.188 0.111 0.251
α 0.497 0.419 0.575 0.614 0.556 0.670
β 0.007 -0.065 0.059 0.098 -0.013 0.189
lnL -7206 -6832
BIC 15247 14438
Subjects 57 53
Observations 1117 1060
Parameters 119 111
95% confidence intervals are derived by the percentile bootstrap method with 9999
replications. The resampling procedure accounts for the panel structure of the data
(clusters). Parameters include additional estimates for ξˆi for domain- and individual-
specific error variances.
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Appendix C
Preferences or Constraints?
A Rational Explanation for
Probability-Dependent Risk
Attitudes
This chapter has not yet been published elsewhere.
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C.1 Introduction
A large body of empirical evidence, accumulated over the last half century, shows that
despite its normative appeal expected utility theory is not suited well as a descriptive
theory of choice under risk. None of its key premises has been challenged more severely
than the postulate that preferences are linear in probabilities.1 Empirical evidence sug-
gests that humans and animals alike systematically violate this assumption (Allais (1953),
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Battalio et al. (1985), Kagel et al. (1990), among others).
They tend to overweight small-probability outcomes and underweight large-probability
outcomes. This finding compromises expected utility theory at its core. It appears that
risk taking behavior can be characterized only inadequately by the curvature of the utility
function. Instead, there seem to be other important factors shaping behavior.
Richer models of choice under risk have been proposed, the most popular class being
rank-dependent utility (RDU) models (Quiggin, 1982; Luce and Fishburn, 1991; Tver-
sky and Kahneman, 1992).2 RDU models preserve many of the normatively appealing
properties of expected utility, but are less restrictive about how preferences depend on
probabilities.3 As nonlinear weighting of probabilities seems to be a pervasive feature of
individual risk taking behavior (see for instance Bruhin et al. (2010)), RDU models turn
out to be a useful descriptive generalization of expected utility.
The availability of better descriptive theories of choice under risk, however, is only
one side of the coin.4 For most applications it is inevitable to understand what actually
drives risk taking behavior. The design of appropriate incentive schemes, for example,
often requires the policy maker to know the reasons underlying behavior. In particular, if
the policy maker aims at preventing individuals from taking excessive risks in a particular
situation, she must know whether such behavior is due to errors, trait or rational rea-
sons.5 Only with this knowledge is it possible to implement policies which aﬀect the right
people in the right way. This is of particular relevance for policies obeying the principle
of asymmetric paternalism (Camerer et al., 2003). This principle says that corrective
interventions geared towards particular behaviors should only have an impact on those
1The independence axiom states that if the decision maker prefers (￿) a lottery A over a lottery B,
i.e. A ￿ B, then pA+ (1− p)C ￿ pB + (1− p)C for all lotteries C and all probabilities p ∈ (0, 1) must
hold. The axiom restricts the functional form of the model to be linear in probabilities (see Machina
(1982) for a more elaborate discussion on this).
2See Gilboa (1987) and Schmeidler (1989) for similar theories of choice under uncertainty.
3Quiggin (1993) provides an extensive discussion on this topic.
4See also Starmer (2000).
5A more specific and contemporary example are incentive schemes which aim at preventing fund
managers from investing in too risky assets.
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economic agents who behave in an irrational way.6 If policy interventions aﬀect rational
agents or are based on incorrect assumptions about preferences, they may be a pure waste
of money, or even worse, have adverse welfare eﬀects.
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that apparent probability distortions
can be the result of rational choice. We argue that the carriers of risk taking behavior are
not only individual preferences, but also restrictions imposed by the environment, and
present the following main insights.
First, it is easy to find situations in which the environment can be identified as a
predominant driver of risk taking behavior. We give three examples that underscore the
wide economic relevance of such situations and their prevalence in various choice domains.
Without needing ancillary assumptions about the utility function, these examples illus-
trate how environmental factors can force decision makers to undertake excessive risks.
Example 1 (Foraging) Imagine a bird in an environment which does not provide much
food (e.g. a cold winter). The bird only has very little energy reserves left and, hence,
needs to find some food to survive the upcoming night. In its struggle for survival, it is
confronted with two foraging alternatives: A) either picking the few remaining grains from
a feeding place, or B) picking a larger quantity of grain from the ground where a cat is
lurking. If the few grains in the feeding place preclude reaching the minimal subsistence
level, i.e. if choosing option A leads to certain death, it must opt for the risky option B,
although there is some likelihood of getting eaten by the cat. Only the risky choice involves
the possibility of survival.
Example 2 (Consumption) Consider a liquidity-constrained consumer, i.e. a con-
sumer who only holds few liquid assets and is not permitted to borrow money. The
consumer has to meet her existential needs (e.g. to consume food), has to honor her
contracts (e.g. to pay rent) and has to settle her bills. Assume that she has the choice
between two investments: A) a certain one leading to a small interest payment (bank), and
B) a risky one leading either to a large gain or nothing (stock). For simplicity, assume
that the outcomes of these investments are paid out immediately after making the choice.
If the outcome from option A together with the consumer’s liquid assets does not allow
her to satisfy her needs, she should opt for option B. This option gives her the chance of
escaping from getting prosecuted or starving.
Example 3 (Firm) Assume a firm is running out of liquidity. The management must
realize suﬃcient profits in order to avoid Chapter 11 bankruptcy. It has the choice to
6This excludes the case where rational behavior has negative external eﬀects.
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invest in one of two projects: A) a project generating only small profits, but for sure, and
B) a risky project generating large profits if it succeeds, but none if it fails. If paying oﬀ
suﬃcient debts to avoid bankruptcy or significant costs of distress is not possible with the
profits generated by project A, the management should better opt for project B. Only this
project allows the company to avert imminent bankruptcy.7
All these examples have a number of features in common. The decision maker must
achieve a certain, possibly exogenously given, threshold (minimal energy level required
to survive or suﬃcient profit to avoid bankruptcy). We refer to it as the minimal sub-
sistence level. Not reaching it leads to direct negative consequences (death, prosecution
or bankruptcy), so-called costs of distress. The commodity the decision maker requires
(food or liquidity), however, is scarce in that she only possesses a small quantity of it and
only has limited (or no) market access. This latter restriction prevents her from trading
another commodity (e.g. money) in exchange to additional units of the commodity of
interest, and from intertemporally reallocating units of the commodity in order to have
more of it at the disposal today. Therefore, to reach the minimal subsistence level, the
decision maker has no other option but choosing the more risky option B. Only with this
choice, she may attain a terminal outcome, i.e. the assets at her disposal plus the outcome
from the option she has chosen, lying above the required level. These examples there-
fore illustrate that the pressure imposed by the environment can have decisive impact on
behavior.
Second, we derive a simple model capturing this intuition. We show that risk taking
behavior can be adequately modeled using standard expected utility, but taking into
account the negative consequences materializing when the minimal subsistence level is not
achieved. Being exposed to constraints may lead even rational expected utility maximizers
to reveal risk attitudes which naturally depend on probabilities. It is their response to the
environment which generates systematic departures from standard behavior. Our model
produces a wide range of predictions beyond probability-dependent risk attitudes which
dovetail nicely with observed risk taking behavior. Among others, these concern common
ratio violations, stake eﬀects, the heterogeneity in risk taking behavior and choice domain
dependent risk attitudes. Probably most interestingly, most of the patterns we predict
are usually explicitly listed as evidence against expected utility theory. Put diﬀerently,
our approach constructs the theoretical bridge between the standard preference model
7Consistent with this example, Bowman (1980, 1982) finds that managers of troubled firms take risks
that they would not take in other situations. Similar findings are reported for farmers (Kunreuther et al.,
1979).
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and eﬀectively observed behavior.
Third, our findings have material implications. We already mentioned that the design
of appropriate policies commonly requires to know the actual drivers of behavior. This
paper provides one possible answer to that question and stresses the importance of de-
veloping mechanisms which allow to distinguish between diﬀerent causes of probability
distortions. Apparent violations of expected utility theory, and especially violations of
the assumptions that preferences are linear in probabilities (i.e. the independence axiom),
may be due to environmental constraints rather than to a failure of the standard prefer-
ence model. This is an important finding. Preferences, as a central primitive of economic
behavior, should be stable across diﬀerent choice domains and over time.8 Evidence sug-
gest that they are not (e.g. Deck et al. (2009) and Zeisberger et al. (2010)). This issue
may be resolved by taking into account exogenous factors aﬀecting choice behavior. In
fact, our model shows that it is possible to accommodate the most important behavioral
patterns of choice under risk without discarding or needing to generalize expected utility.
While both, our model and models incorporating probability weighting capture similar
properties of risk taking behavior, there are many situations for which their predictions
diﬀer in fundamental ways. For example, our model predicts that risk taking behavior
depends on both, stake size and choice domain. Decision makers are predicted to depart
less strongly from linear probability weighting as stakes grow larger or the commodity of
interest in the respective choice domain becomes less scarce, ceteris paribus. Facilitating
market access may be one possible policy intervention encouraging economic agents to act
in a way closer to their true preferences. In contrast, RDU models do neither make such
predictions, nor do they point at solutions for such problems. They only capture revealed
preferences and not the mechanism generating behavior. RDU parameter estimates stem-
ming from one study should therefore only be used with care when making predictions
or calibrating models for diﬀerent choice domains, diﬀerent subjects or diﬀerent points in
time.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section C.2 reviews the related
literature. Section C.3 derives a simple model of choice under risk and fleshes out its basic
properties leading to departures from standard expected utility. Section C.4 presents the
predictions the model makes in a constrained environment and compares these predictions
to settings where no such limitations apply. Section C.5 summarizes the most central
results, outlines their implications, and concludes.
8We abstract from changing tastes.
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C.2 Related Literature
This paper is related to previous theoretical and empirical research focussed on departures
from standard expected utility behavior. Here, we briefly review the - in our opinion -
most relevant theoretical contributions. Specifically, we compare our approach to rank-
dependent probability weighting and other models which (can) induce nonlinearities in
probabilities. References to empirical studies can be found in Section C.4.
Our approach compares to RDU evaluation (Quiggin, 1982). Rank-dependent weight-
ing posits that cumulative probabilities are transformed into decision weights.9 Under
this weighting scheme, the decision maker ranks all outcomes in the probability distri-
bution with respect to their size and attaches to each outcome utility the corresponding
weight, where the sum of all weights is equal to one. The decision weight associated with
a particular outcome remains the same as long as the ranking of this outcome relative
to all other outcomes in the distribution remains the same, but it can change abruptly
when the rank order of the outcomes changes. While sharing some characteristics with
this weighting scheme, our approach diﬀers in several important aspects. On the level of
preferences, we still retain linearity in probabilities, i.e. the independence axiom. How-
ever, as terminal outcomes below a certain minimal subsistence level lead to costs - costs
which the decision maker integrates - behavior may depart from standard expected utility.
The imputed weighting scheme is dichotomous in the sense that it is not the original rank
of an outcome in the distribution, but the position of the terminal outcome relative to
the minimal subsistence level which governs its attractiveness. The ties between outcome
and probability evaluation are therefore much stronger as compared to RDU.10 As a con-
sequence, the predictions our model makes diﬀer in some parts substantially from those
made by RDU models. We discuss some examples in Section C.4.
Mainly motivated by the co-existence of gambling and taking out insurance, nonlinear
weighting of probabilities has become a central ingredient of the most popular descriptive
theories of choice under risk. Numerous explanations have been proposed for why people
distort probabilities.11 In particular, it has been suggested that perceptional, motivational
or emotional processes, or an interaction between these processes, drive expected utility
9Earlier approaches used direct transformation of probabilities into decision weights (Handa (1977);
Karmarkar (1978); Kahneman and Tversky (1979), among others). This may lead to violations of domi-
nance.
10There exists empirical evidence showing that the dependency between the evaluation of outcomes
and probabilities is only inadequately captured by RDU models (Fehr-Duda et al., 2010).
11Not all papers cited in the following do explicitly discuss probability weighting. However, all these
theories can, in principle, produce patterns similar to probability distortions.
124
violations.
Perceptional and psychophysical explanations for overweighting of small probabili-
ties and underweighting of large probabilities have been brought forth by psychologists.
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), for instance, argue that subjects perceive certainty and
impossibility as natural reference points on the probability scale.12 Subjects become less
sensitive to changes further away from these reference points, i.e. the probabilities zero
and one.13 This diminishing sensitivity implies that the probability weighting function
is steepest near the endpoints, but becomes flatter as probabilities become more remote
from the extremes. Inverted S-shaped probability transformations capture this charac-
teristic. Taking up this reasoning, Gonzalez and Wu (1999) allude that the probability
weighting function “characterizes the psychophysics of chance” (p.135). Due to this inter-
pretation, departures from linear probability weighting are often attributed to optimism
or pessimism (see for instance Quiggin (1982); Yaari (1987)).
Another strand of research claims that motivational reasons drive departures from
expected utility theory. Lopes (1986) argues that “weights reflect individuals’ goals and
not their perception of probabilities or values” (p.276). Her theory, labeled security-
potential/aspiration (SP/A) theory, encompasses “two logically and psychologically sepa-
rate criteria” (Lopes and Oden (1999), p.290). First, the security-potential (SP) criterion
which is represented by a probability transformation function. This criterion captures
the decision maker’s predisposition to risks. Motivated by fear or hope, decision mak-
ers are either security-minded (risk averse) or potential-minded (risk seeking). Second,
the aspiration (A) criterion which governs the attractiveness of certain lotteries given
the decision maker’s goals. These two separate criteria conjointly determine the decision
maker’s choice. However, Lopes argues that “strategies that involve maximizing the prob-
ability of meeting a goal or aspiration level are fundamentally diﬀerent from strategies of
maximizing expected utility” (Lopes (1986), p.277).
The diﬀerences to our approach are twofold. First, we integrate expected utility maxi-
mization and environmental pressure into one coherent maximization problem and, unlike
Lopes, allow for utility nonlinear in outcomes. In our model, the costs of not meeting the
minimal subsistence level go directly into the utility function. Second, in our approach
probability distortions emerge endogenously from the decision maker’s response to envi-
ronmental constraints. They are inextricably linked to the minimal subsistence level she
12See Tversky and Kahneman (1986) for a related discussion.
13The gap between objective and subjectively perceived intensities to stimuli was already discussed by
Weber (1834) and Fechner (1860).
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has to attain, and are not a separate criterion.
In the context of configural-weight theory, Birnbaum et al. (1992) present a diﬀerent
motivational explanation. They point out that over- and underestimation of probabilities,
i.e. errors or deviations, lead to asymmetric negative consequences. The decision maker
anticipates these consequences and adjusts her behavior by minimizing them.14 This
approach shares some similarities with regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden,
1982).15 As its name implies, regret theory conjectures that the decision maker experiences
regret when uncertainty is resolved because she ponders on how much better the outcome
would have been had she chosen diﬀerently.
Also very closely related to these approaches are disappointment aversion models (Bell,
1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986; Gul, 1991; Walther, 2003). Similar to the motivational
explanations, the decision maker expects a specific outcome to materialize. As actual
outcomes, however, may diﬀer from expected outcomes, the decision maker experiences
disappointment if the actual outcome lies below her expectations or experience elation if
it lies above her expectations. These emotions are anticipated at the decision stage.16
Our explanation has the following distinguishing features when compared to explana-
tions involving motivational processes (in particular Birnbaum et al. (1992)) or anticipa-
tory feelings (regret and disappointment theories). First, it is not the expected outcome
which separates elation from disappointment outcomes or higher from lower psychological
“costs”, but an exogenous minimal subsistence level entailing monetary costs only in the
case the terminal outcome falls below it. Said diﬀerently, it is not a subjective reference
point formed by endogenous expectations discriminating gain from loss outcomes, but
the final state relative to an objectively given, exogenous threshold level which builds
the core of our model. Second, we primarily see the consequences as monetary costs of
quantifiable size. The problem with integrating psychological or emotional “costs” is that
the existence and size of such consequences is hardly objectively verifiable. Consequently,
such approaches may be used to rationalize almost any behavior. Third, contrary to
14An example may be a cook who must decide how much chicken soup to prepare for his guests.
When cooking too much he wastes food (and money), when cooking too little his guests will not have
enough. Similar reasons are discussed by Hogarth and Einhorn (1990), Weber (1994), and Weber and
Kirsner (1997). Hogarth and Einhorn (1990) argue that “cognitive and motivational factors [...] both
play important roles in determining decision weights” (p.780). Weber (1994) examines the Birnbaum
argument in a detailed manner. Weber and Kirsner (1997) conduct an experiment and apply a number of
manipulations in order to test diﬀerent reasons for RDU evaluation. They find partial support for both,
the Birnbaum hypothesis and perceptual biases.
15Preferences in this class of models are not necessarily transitive.
16It may be argued that departures from expected utility due to anticipated regret or disappointment
aversion are rational. Such a view is defended by Loomes and Sugden (1982) (regret theory) and Loomes
and Sugden (1986) (disappointment aversion theory).
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most models above, these costs are of an absolute nature and only aﬀect terminal out-
comes smaller than the minimal subsistence level. That is, there is no additional function
penalizing and rewarding outcomes relative to a certain reference level.
Another explanation that has been proposed for probability weighting are dual process
or dual self models. An example is Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2007). They argue
that probability weighing is the result of an interplay between emotional and cognitive
processes. The diﬀerence to our approach is evident: Our model is a single process (and
single self ) model. As such it is much more tractable, has testable implications and makes
more precise, verifiable predictions.
There are some interesting parallels between our work and risk-sensitive optimal forag-
ing theory (see McNamara and Houston (1992) for a review). This branch of the literature
is concerned with optimal behavior in risky and changing environments (see e.g. McNa-
mara (1996)). McDermott et al. (2008) use such a model to show that the S-shaped
value function of prospect theory may have resulted from evolutionary adaption, i.e. our
ancestors’ adjustment to their environment. Our model can be used to develop a similar
foundation for nonlinear weighting of probabilities.17 We motivate such an approach in a
later part of this paper.
C.3 Model
In this section we obtain and motivate a simple model of choice under risk. Our main
interest thereby lies on how the environment can force an expected utility maximizer to
deviate from standard behavior. The section starts with a discussion of our modeling
assumptions. They consist of three parts: the decision maker’s preferences, the limita-
tions imposed by her environment and the actual choice problem. An illustration of the
mechanism generating apparent expected utility violations closes this part of the paper.
C.3.1 Preferences
Our decision maker obeys the von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) (vNM) axioms.
Her preferences are characterized solely by a utility function u. u satisfies the common
assumptions imposed on utility functions, i.e. it is globally diﬀerentiable and strictly
increasing in outcomes. If not stated otherwise, we assume that the function is concave,
17It would be interesting to see how these two approaches integrate into one unifying model. A dis-
cussion of this point, however, is beyond the scope of this paper and we leave it up to future research to
answer this question.
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i.e. that the decision maker is risk averse. On the level of preferences all attractive
properties of expected utility theory are therefore retained, the most prominent one being
the linearity of utility in probabilities.
Consistent with expected utility theory, we presume asset integration.18 The decision
maker evaluates all lottery outcomes by first integrating them with her assets ω. Accord-
ingly, we define u over terminal outcomes ω + x. If not stated otherwise, we consider
the decision maker’s assets as part of her environment as it turns out to be a crucial
determinant of whether or not she is restricted with respect to her behavior.
C.3.2 Environment
The decision maker’s environment is made up of three components: a constraint limiting
her scope of action, an assumption which ensures that the constraint is binding, and the
consequences she faces if the terminal outcome falls below the minimal subsistence level.
In what follows, we motivate these three components in detail.
First, the constraint in our model takes the form ω ≥ 0, i.e. the decision maker holds
a zero or positive quantity of assets ω.19 This assumption ensures that the decision maker
only has at her disposal the quantity of the commodity in question she accumulated
over past periods. Put diﬀerently, it prevents her from borrowing additional units of
the commodity or to trade quantities of a second commodity in for additional units of
the commodity. Such limitations apply if either the commodity is not tradable, i.e. if
no corresponding market exists, or if the decision maker’s access to such a market is
restricted. We further assume that the decision maker is relatively poor with respect to
the commodity, i.e. that her assets ω are relatively small.
Second, obviously, such constraints are not binding if there exists no immediate ne-
cessity to obtain additional units of the commodity. We ensure this by introducing the
minimal subsistence level τ . The decision maker is required to reach a terminal outcome
which satisfies this threshold level. We shall assume that she cannot achieve this goal by
her assets alone.
Third, if the decision maker does not reach the minimal subsistence level, she faces
some immediate and detrimental consequence. We model this consequence as a cost and
refer to it as cost of distress κ. To keep our analysis concise, we assume that the actual
18Although von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) do not explicitly state this assumption, Wakker
(2005) defends this position by pointing out that behavior can only be considered as rational if outcomes
are defined in terms of final wealth.
19Deaton (1991) proposes a buﬀer-stock model of consumption-saving behavior and makes similar
assumptions.
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consequence is known in advance and that the corresponding cost is deterministic.20 It
becomes immediately apparent what role the assets ω play in this context. Holding all
other things fixed, the likelihood of falling below the minimal subsistence level decreases
as the decision maker’s assets grow larger. Decision makers who are relatively poor
with respect to the commodity in question are therefore more likely to bear the negative
consequences associated with low terminal outcomes. As a result, they should be more
susceptible to departures from standard behavior. We come back to this conjecture later.
In the examples presented in the introduction, the environment is characterized as
follows. It is the limited energy reserve (foraging example) and the limited access to
liquidity (consumption and firm example) preventing the decision maker from choosing
according to her true preferences. In all situations, the two crucial requirements are met:
First, the decision maker is not endowed with a suﬃcient quantity of the commodity, and,
second, there is no possibility to circumvent this restriction by accessing a market. The
constraint is binding because in all cases there exists a minimal subsistence level larger
than the decision maker’s assets. The bird in the foraging example needs to attain a
suﬃciently large energy level to survive. The consumer has to meet her existential needs,
e.g. by purchasing food, and has to comply with her contracts, e.g. paying her rent. The
firm has to realize enough profit to pay oﬀ its debts and avoid Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Not accomplishing these goals has direct consequences. The bird may die from starvation,
the consumer may be prosecuted because she does not fulfill her contracts, and the firm
may go bankrupt.
C.3.3 Choice and Maximization Problem
We consider the choice among a finite set of simple lotteries L, i.e. probability distribu-
tions on the outcome spaceX. X is defined over terminal outcomes and has finite support,
i.e. ∃ {ω+x,ω+x} with ω+x > ω+x such that X = [ω+x,ω+x]. In other words, the
outcome space is delimited by the worst possible terminal outcome ω + x and the best
possible terminal outcome ω + x in the choice set L. In our introductory examples, the
elements in the choice set are foraging places (foraging example), investment alternatives
(consumption example) or projects (firm example), where, typically, the decision maker is
uncertain about the final outcome of an option at the point in time the decision is made.
Unless stated otherwise, we take probabilities as objectively given. Our approach,
20A decision maker may be uncertain about the size of the actual cost materializing when the minimal
subsistence level is not reached. In this case, κ is the expected value of the probability distribution over
all possible consequences. We do not discuss this refinement in this paper.
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however, extends to situations where this is not the case (see Savage (1954)). To keep
things simple, we restrict our attention to atemporal settings. That is, the environment
remains unchanged between the point in time the decision is made and the point in time
uncertainty is resolved. During this time, the decision maker is not allowed to consume
out of her assets. In this sense, the situation we consider is very similar to the typical
setting usually implemented in risky choice experiments.21
In the situation considered here, the decision maker has to choose her preferred option
from the set of lotteries. In a perfect world without environmental restrictions, she simply
chooses according to her preferences. More precisely, she chooses the option maximizing
her expected utility. We refer to this case as standard expected utility.
Our approach extends this model by introducing the cost of distress κ, which, how-
ever, only becomes eﬀective if the respective terminal outcome lies below the minimal
subsistence level τ . For continuous probability distributions on X, the decision maker
maximizes
VL =
￿
X
u(ω + x− h(ω + x))dF (x) , (C.1)
where h is the cost function depending on the terminal outcome ω + x. Consistent
with our assumptions, h takes the simple form
h(ω + x) =
￿
0 if ω + x ≥ τ
κ otherwise
, (C.2)
where κ > 0. We refer to the case where options in the choice set include the risk of
falling below the minimal subsistence level as expected utility with constraints.
Depending on whether or not τ lies on X, one of three cases applies. First, if all
achievable terminal outcomes ω + x ∈ X lie above the minimal subsistence level τ , the
model reduces to standard expected utility. This is the case if either the minimal subsis-
tence level τ is suﬃciently small or the decision maker’s assets ω are suﬃciently large so
that the constraint does not bind. Second, if all possible terminal outcomes lie below the
minimal subsistence level τ , the whole outcome space is shifted to the left by κ. This spe-
cial situation is only of limited interest for our analyses and we do not discuss it in detail.
Third, and most interesting, if the minimal subsistence level τ lies within the bounds of
the outcome space X, the decision maker may have an incentive to systematically depart
21As nonlinear probability weighting is not only found in temporal settings, an appropriate model must
also predict it in settings where time plays no role (see also Epper et al. (2010)).
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from standard behavior. In what follows, we will mainly focus on this particular case.
C.3.4 Illustration
Having discussed our modeling assumptions, we are now prepared to take a closer look at
the mechanism generating apparent expected utility violations. We do this by studying
the impact of environmental factors on risk taking behavior. For illustrative purposes,
we make the following two assumptions: First, we only focus on the most important case
where the minimal subsistence level lies between the smallest and the largest terminal
outcome achievable by the lottery, i.e. τ ∈ (ω + x,ω + x). Second, we restrict our
attention to a binary gain lottery L = (x, p; x), where x > x ≥ 0 and p denotes the
probability of the larger lottery outcome to materialize.
To analyze the gap between risk preferences and risk taking behavior, we compare two
utility functions: The utility function representing the decision maker’s preferences (see
Section C.3.1), henceforth referred to as true utility function u, and the utility function on
the grounds of which the researcher infers risk attitudes, henceforth referred to as ascribed
utility function u˜.22 This analysis is possible since our model still retains the EU axioms
on the level of preferences.
Figure C.1 plots these two utility functions. The thin, globally strictly concave curve
is the decision maker’s true utility function. Again, concavity of the function implies that
the decision maker has risk-averse preferences. That is, in the absence of environmental
constraints, the certain amount making the decision maker indiﬀerent to the lottery L,
her certainty equivalent, lies below the expected value of the lottery.23 The line CA
connecting the utility derived from the smaller terminal outcome with the utility derived
from the larger terminal outcome therefore lies below u for any terminal outcome on the
interval (ω + x,ω + x). Hence, if the decision maker faces no constraints, her risk taking
behavior is entirely determined by her risk preferences.
In the presence of constraints of the form described above, however, optimal behavior
may depart from true preferences. In such settings, all terminal outcomes below the
minimal subsistence level are subject to costs of distress κ. The decision maker integrates
these costs, and, consequently, she evaluates her true utility function at ω+x−κ instead of
ω+x for these terminal outcomes. The relevant segments on u are then [E ￿, D￿) and [B,A]
22An alternative way to investigate the implications of our model is to decompose the risk premium into
two parts: the contribution preferences have to risk taking behavior and the contribution the environment
has to risk taking behavior. A previous version of this paper followed this route.
23This is the case since u(E(L)) > E(u(L)) holds (Jensen’s inequality).
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Figure C.1: True vs. Ascribed Utility Function I
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instead of [C,A]. Since the costs of distress κ are not observable, the decision maker’s
risk attitudes are inferred from her choices over the objectively given lottery L = (x, p; x).
Therefore, the ascribed utility function u˜ is defined as
u˜(z) =
￿
u(z − κ) if ω + x ≤ z < τ,
u(z) if τ ≤ z ≤ ω + x, (C.3)
represented by the fat curves between [E,D) and [B,A] in Figure C.1. Due to the
discontinuity of u˜ at τ there are four distinct regions impacting lottery valuation. Starting
at the lower bound of the outcome space, ω + x, we find:
1. If E(L) ∈ [ω + x, q): E(u˜(L)) = pu˜(ω + x) + (1− p)u˜(ω + x).
In this region, the line EG represents expected utility E(u˜(L)). There, for p > 0,
E(u˜(L)) < u˜(E(L)), implying risk-seeking behavior. Note that the line connecting
E with A is much steeper than the respective one connecting E ￿ and A. Hence,
relative to the true unconstrained preferences, observed lottery valuation overreacts
to changes in the expected value E(L) and, hence, to changes in p.
2. If E(L) ∈ [q, τ): E(u˜(L)) = u(τ − κ).
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Figure C.2: True vs. Ascribed Utility Function II
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If the expected outcome exceeds the threshold q but does not meet the minimal
subsistence level τ , the maximum attainable utility level is u(τ − κ), i.e. lottery
evaluation is completely insensitive to changes in expected value. Behavior still
looks risk seeking as E(u˜(L)) < u˜(E(L)).
3. If E(L) ∈ [τ, q): E(u˜(L)) = u˜(τ).
As in the second case, lottery valuation is unresponsive to changes in expected value
here. As long as expected values lie below the threshold q, only subsistence utility
u˜(τ) can be attained. At τ , E(L) = u˜(E(L)) holds, implying risk neutrality. At
higher expected outcomes risk aversion prevails as E(u˜(L)) > u˜(E(L)).
4. If E(L) ∈ [q,ω + x]: E(u˜(L)) = pu˜(ω + x) + (1− p)u˜(ω + x)
The final case constitutes classical risk aversion, with the same feature of overreac-
tion as in the first case.
There are three major insights from this analysis.
First, the minimal subsistence level τ demarcates the ranges over which risk seeking
and risk aversion are observed, with risk neutrality at τ . Hence, increasing τ enlarges the
region of risk seeking behavior and compresses the respective one of risk aversion. The
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interval (q, q) delimits the range over which lottery valuation is insensitive to expected
value and, hence, to probability p.
Second, as changes in expected value for a given lottery range [x, x] are driven solely
by changes in probability p, our analysis implies the following pattern:
• overreaction to increasing p over [ω + x, q],
• insensitivity to p over (q, q),
• overreaction to increasing p over [q,ω + x].
We will explore this issue further in Section C.4 below.
Third, aside from the minimal subsistence level τ , behavior is driven by the costs of
distress κ. Figure C.2 displays, ceteris paribus, the situation for a smaller magnitude
of κ than is used in Figure C.1. Comparing the two figures shows that a reduction in
the costs of distress changes the slope of EA, moving it closer to the unconstrained line
E ￿A. This movement implies that distortions are less pronounced than for larger κ. It
already follows from this findings that the minimal subsistence level induces probability
distortions, the strength of which are governed by the costs of distress. The size of the
interval of insensitivity, (q, q), is mainly driven by the curvature of the utility function.
Our findings so far emphasize that the environment can force the decision maker to
exhibit behavior departing from her true preferences. In the next section we show what
this means in particular for revealed choice behavior.
C.4 Predictions
On the following pages, we show that our model can predict a broad range of empirical
findings. We devote special attention to the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, the behav-
ioral regularity capturing the coexistence of gambling and insurance, and demonstrate
that the mechanism underlying our model can generate probability distortions, a major
constituent of many novel theories of risky choice. A series of additional predictions are
presented in a separate subsection. Among others, these cover common ratio violations,
stake eﬀects and the heterogeneity in risk taking behavior.
C.4.1 The Fourfold Pattern of Risk Attitudes
A robust empirical regularity documented by the empirical literature is the fourfold pat-
tern of risk attitudes (see Tversky and Wakker (1995) for an elaborate discussion). Risk
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taking behavior is best characterized by (i) risk seeking for low-probability gains and high-
probability losses, and (ii) risk aversion for high-probability gains and low-probability
losses.
Here, we show that such behavior can naturally arise in a constrained environment,
even for decision makers with expected utility preferences. We proceed as follows. In a
first part, we illustrate our predictions concerning probability- and sign-dependent risk
attitudes. In a second part, we give a brief comparative static analysis which elaborates
on the drivers of systematic departures from standard expected utility. In a final part,
we discuss how these findings motivate probability weighting, and how our predictions
compare to the empirical evidence.
Our model suggests that lotteries with possible terminal outcomes below the minimal
subsistence level are treated diﬀerently from lotteries without this feature. The direct
cost associated with not meeting the minimum subsistence level drives a wedge between
the decision maker’s risk preferences and her revealed risk taking behavior. We expect
that systematic departures from standard expected utility are most pronounced when
environmental constraints only apply to a subset of terminal outcomes in the choice
set. As already noted in the last section, it seems therefore apparent that how strong
the decision maker departs from standard behavior depends on the respective weight (i.e.
probability) assigned to the utility derived from the respective terminal outcome. In what
follows, we show that this is indeed the case. We illustrate behavior for the most typical
situation where the decision maker has to state certain amounts making her indiﬀerent
to binary lotteries with varying probabilities.
We consider two binary lotteries: a gain lottery Lg = (x, p; x) and a loss lottery
Ll = (−x, p;−x), where x > x > 0. The outcomes of the two lotteries only diﬀer in
sign, but not in their absolute amount. p denotes the probability that the more extreme
outcome, i.e. the larger gain or the larger loss, materializes.
We analyze risk taking behavior by means of relative risk premia. The relative
risk premium rrp is the diﬀerence between the lottery’s expected value E(L) and the
(predicted) certainty equivalent c˜e(L), normalized by the absolute expected value, i.e.
rrp = (E(L)− c˜e(L))/|E(L)|. rrp > 0 indicates risk-averse behavior, rrp < 0 risk-seeking
behavior, and rrp = 0 risk neutral behavior.
For a given lottery, our decision maker states her certainty equivalent c˜e(L). For
the case where the minimal subsistence level lies between the worst and best terminal
outcome, the certainty equivalent is implicitly defined by
135
c˜e(L) = u(−1)[pu(ω + x) + (1− p)u(ω + x− κ)]− ω + h(ω + c˜e(L)) . (C.4)
The worse terminal outcome from the lottery, ω + x, is always associated with costs
of distress κ, and, hence, the utility derived from this terminal outcome is u(ω + x− κ).
It does, however, depend on the actual location of the terminal outcome derived from the
certainty equivalent, ω + c˜e(L), of whether or not the certain option is also aﬀected by
these costs. Only if the terminal outcome from the certainty equivalent falls below the
minimal subsistence level, the last term h(·) is equal to κ, but it is zero for all other cases.
Consequently, it is required to approximate predicted certainty equivalents numerically.
We do this by the algorithm described in Appendix C.6. Obviously, this procedure is not
required for calculating certainty equivalents under standard expected utility. For this
case, all κ’s in Equation C.4 cancel out.
Figure C.3: Predicted Relative Risk Premia
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Figure C.3 depicts our findings. It plots predicted relative risk premia for both, the
gain lottery Lg = (20, p; 10) (left panel) and the loss lottery Ll = (−20, p;−10) (right
panel) for varying probabilities p and the parameter configuration presented below. It
does this for two situations. First, where every attainable terminal outcome in the choice
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set exceeds the minimal subsistence level, i.e. where τ < ω + x (dashed curves), and,
second, where only the better lottery outcome allows the decision maker to reach the
minimal subsistence level, i.e. where τ ∈ (ω + x,ω + x) (solid curves). The graphical
illustrations are based upon the following parameter values. The utility function takes the
CRRA form u(ω + x) = (ω + x)0.8. We set ω = 30 to ensure that all terminal outcomes
are positive. The cost of distress are held fixed at κ = 10 for gains and losses, and the
minimal subsistence level is either τ = 45 (gains) and τ = 15 (losses) for the situation
where τ lies on the outcome space, or zero for the situation where τ lies below the minimal
terminal outcomes in reach.
The following results arise. First, if attaining the minimal subsistence level is not of
concern, the decision maker does not depart from standard expected utility. In this case,
risk aversion is solely determined by her risk preferences. This result is illustrated by the
dashed curves in Figure C.3. Second, if only the larger gain or the smaller loss allows
the decision maker to satisfy the requirement, behavior systematically departs from this
standard prediction. If τ lies between the worst and best terminal gain, the decision
maker exhibits risk-seeking behavior for small-probability gains and risk-averse behavior
for large-probability gains. If, instead, τ lies between the worst and best terminal loss, the
decision maker exhibits risk-averse behavior for small-probability losses and risk-seeking
behavior for high-probability losses.
To see why these patterns emerge, reconsider the intuition provided earlier. When
the probability of the better outcome is relatively small, the decision maker’s terminal
outcome from the certainty equivalent is more likely to lie below the minimal subsistence
level. There, the pressure imposed by the environment, in our model represented by the
cost of distress, forces her to opt for the more risky option. Only this choice gives her the
opportunity to meet the minimal subsistence level. The opposite reasoning holds for the
case where the probability of the better outcome is relatively large.
It also follows from this intuition why the rrp-curves take on such shapes. If it is
impossible that the better (or worse) outcome materializes, i.e. if p = 0 (p = 1) for
gains and p = 1 (p = 0) for losses, the decision maker’s certainty equivalent collapses
with the worse (better) lottery outcome. Hence, at the endpoints of the probability scale,
the relative risk premium equals zero. Behavior appears more risk seeking as the better
lottery outcome gains more weight (i.e. probability), but the decision maker’s certainty
equivalent still lies below the minimal subsistence level. The risky option becomes most
attractive when the distance between the certainty equivalent and the expected value
grows largest. As the probability of the better outcome further increases, it more and more
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compensates for the cost of distress associated with the certainty equivalent, leading the
decision maker to exhibit risk neutral behavior where the two factors fully counterbalance
each other. The reverse argument holds for the part of the curves where the relative risk
premium is positive.
These results also point out one particular limitation of our approach. According to
our model, a decision maker can never exhibit the above described systematic departures
for both, gains and losses, at the same time. Depending on where the minimal subsistence
level τ lies on the outcome space, either gain or loss behavior is aﬀected, but never both.
As we argue below, however, this finding does not necessarily contradict the empirical
evidence. In fact, we still predict the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes on the aggregate
level, and, under certain conditions, even on the individual level. As we do not claim
that our approach is the only possible explanation for this phenomenon, however, this
feature of our model may serve as a natural starting point to distinguish diﬀerent sources
of expected utility violations.
One of the central questions we have yet to answer is how the environment drives
these systematic departures. A comparative static analysis provides an answer to that
question. For the sake of brevity, we restrict our attention to gains.
Figure C.4: Comparative Statics for Gains
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Figure C.4 plots relative risk premia for two diﬀerent levels of minimal subsistence
τ (left panel) as well as of cost of distress κ (right panel). The solid curves as well as
the parameters not listed in the legend are identical to those in Figure C.3. Consistent
with our findings in the previous section, it turns out that the actual location of τ on the
outcome space governs for which probabilities the decision maker exhibits risk-averse and
risk-seeking behavior, respectively (see left panel). The closer the minimum subsistence
level lies to the worst terminal outcome (here: closer to p = 0), the smaller is the range
of probabilities for which risk-seeking behavior is predicted, ceteris paribus. Moreover,
departures are much more symmetric for the case where the minimal subsistence level
splits the outcome space into two parts of equal size (solid curve) than for the case where
it splits it by ratio 2:8 (dashed curve). The vertical lines in the left panel mark the actual
location of τ in the probability distribution. These lines actually define the probabilities
for which an expected value maximizer exhibits risk neutral behavior, i.e. they mark the
positions where τ is exactly equal to such a decision maker’s certainty equivalent, in this
case c˜e = ev. More generally, for τ = c˜e, an expected utility maximizer would never have
an incentive to depart from standard behavior irrespective of whether she is risk averse
or risk seeking.
The right panel makes clear that the extent of departures from standard expected
utility is predominantly driven by the size of the cost κ the decision maker faces if the
minimum subsistence level is not met. The figure plots rrp-curves for two configurations,
a smaller cost of distress (dashed curve) and a larger cost of distress (solid curve). As the
cost increases, the area under the curve with respect to the horizontal line (risk neutrality)
becomes larger, indicating that the environmental force acting on the decision maker’s
behavior grows stronger. This finding conforms with the result reported in Section C.3.4.
The results we obtained so far provide an explanation for why models incorporating
nonlinear probability weighting often describe empirical data much better than standard
expected utility (Starmer, 2000). To show this, we implement the following idea: Suppose
that a researcher observes stated certainty equivalents for binary lotteries generated by
a hidden data-generating process (our model) and fits a RDU model (Quiggin, 1982) to
the data. According to RDU, a decision maker values the lottery L = (x, p; x), with
x > x > 0, by
u(ω + ce(L)) = g(p)u(ω + x) + (1− g(p))u(ω + x)
= g(p) [u(ω + x)− u(ω + x)] + u(ω + x) ,
(C.5)
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where ce(L) is the certainty equivalent and g is the probability weighting function.
Rearranging this indiﬀerence condition, solving for g, and substituting ce(L) by c˜e(L),
the certainty equivalent predicted by our model, leads to
g˜ =
u(ω + c˜e(L))− u(ω + x)
u(ω + x)− u(ω + x) , (C.6)
where g˜ denotes the ascribed probability weight. Without making parametric assump-
tions about the weighting function, this procedure allows us to evaluate which part of
observed risk attitudes the researcher would attribute to probabilistic risk aversion. Using
the same model parameters and utility function as before (see Figure C.3) and inserting
them into Equation C.6 further permits us to control for the contribution the decision
maker’s preferences and her assets make to risk taking behavior. Hence, the procedure
we apply gives us an indication about how the (exogenous) environmental factors drive
departures from linear probability weighting.
Figure C.5: Ascribed Probability Weights
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Figure C.5 shows such ascribed probability weights for gains and losses.24 As prob-
ability weighting is just another way to account for the patterns described above, the
24Note that, as above, the gain and the loss weighting curves are plotted for decision makers facing
diﬀerent environments.
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comparative static results and the interpretations we obtained earlier also apply here.
While we do not recap these findings, the illustrations in Figure C.5 make a number of
points clear.
First, according to our model, risk taking behavior is probability dependent.25 If the
minimal subsistence level lies within the range of possible terminal outcomes, ascribed
probability weights look as if small probabilities were overweighted and large probabili-
ties were underweighted (black curves). The position of the minimal subsistence level in
the probability distribution governs how large the convex part of the probability trans-
formation function is.26 The negative consequence the decision maker faces when the
minimal subsistence level is not reached largely governs how strong she departs from
linear probability weighting (diagonal line). Although, in reality, the underlying data-
generating process may be unobservable, this result indicates why models incorporating
nonlinear probability weighting mostly provide a superior fit compared to models which
do not.
Second, the illustration makes apparent how the environment can aﬀect an expected
utility maximizer’s behavior. In particular, it is her striving to reach a terminal outcome
equal or higher than the minimal subsistence level which rationalizes apparent probability
distortions. For the situation where constraints are not binding, behavior is equivalent
to standard predictions (diagonal line), but it appears to depart from linear probability
weighting when the environment comes into play (black curves).
Third, it directly follows from these results that our approach can also explain the gap
in the valuation of certain and uncertain outcomes found in the empirical literature (see
e.g. Tversky and Kahneman (1992)). The environment can force the decision maker to
favor risky options over certain options in the region where the probability of the larger
gain is small, but it can force the decision maker to favor the certain option in the region
where the probability of the larger gain is large. This gives rise to a certainty eﬀect.
Fourth, the resulting picture clearly fits well to the empirical evidence at the indi-
vidual level. Gonzalez and Wu (1999), for instance, provide non-parametric estimates of
individual decision weights for gains. The vast majority of their subjects are insensitive
to changes at medium probabilities. Their findings therefore correspond well to the flat
region depicted in Figure C.5 for these probability levels.
Finally and most interestingly, while it is often argued that nonlinear probability
25As a consequence, our model can also explain why subjects make skew-loving choices. See Astebro
et al. (2009) for an empirical study on this.
26If τ lies close to ω + x, the convex part of the function is maximal. The location of q and q (see last
section) determine the range of probabilities for which the decision maker is insensitive.
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weighting is the result of perceptional biases, motivational reasons, anticipated emotions
or the result of an interplay between emotional and cognitive processes (see literature
review in Section C.2), our analysis points out that such patterns may naturally arise for
(rational) expected utility maximizers facing environmental constraints.
So far, we presumed that the decision maker states certainty equivalents for lotteries
which vary in probabilities, but not in outcomes. While it is apparent that the same
intuition we provided is also applicable for choices between two or more non-degenerate
lotteries, it is important to understand what implications our model has for choices over
broader sets of lotteries. This is of particular interest since most risky choice experiments
confront subjects with a variety of lotteries diﬀering in both arguments, probabilities
and outcomes. Our discussion above made clear that environmental constraints may
not aﬀect all lottery choices. According to our model, a decision maker will not depart
from standard expected utility if she faces the choice between lotteries with all possible
terminal outcomes far beyond the minimal subsistence level. We predict, however, that
this is not the case for choices between lotteries involving terminal outcomes not satisfying
this requirement. This hypothesis is testable. If departures from standard predictions are
less pronounced when probability distributions are shifted to the right on the outcome
space, this would support our conjectures. Hershey and Schoemaker (1980) do exactly
that. They find risk-seeking behavior for low and medium probability gains as well as high
and medium probability losses, whereby this behavior is much more pronounced for small
monetary amounts as opposed to large monetary amounts.27 It is therefore important to
bear in mind the eﬀect the composition of lotteries may have on the prevalence of certain
behavioral patterns in the data. According to our model, the structure of the data will
fundamentally diﬀer from that postulated by models assuming separability of marginal
utility and probabilistic risk attitudes. This may at least partly explain why such models
often do a rather bad job when it comes to predicting behavior for varying stake sizes or
diﬀerent situations.
A large amount of empirical evidence exists on the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes.
Most studies, however, only report choice frequencies of subjects exhibiting risk-averse
or risk-seeking behavior for diﬀerent levels of probabilities and outcome sign (Fishburn
and Kochenberger, 1979; Hershey and Schoemaker, 1980; Payne et al., 1984; Cohen et al.,
1987; Wehrung, 1989; Bruhin et al., 2010).28 Evidence on the individual level, however,
27More precisely, they find risk-seeking behavior for probabilities of higher gains and smaller losses
between 5-44%.
28These results are usually complemented by statistical tests showing that more subjects exhibit certain
behavior in a particular context, or that they are more risk averse in one category than another. This
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is scarce. An exception is the study by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). They report for
each individual the percentage of risky choices conditional on both, probability range and
outcome sign, and find considerable support for the fourfold pattern. Like most evidence
on the aggregate level, they only use hypothetical lottery choices, however.29 Note that
our model postulates that the rational decision maker evaluates lottery outcomes by first
integrating them with her assets. It is not clear, however, whether the lack of appropriate
incentives will prevent her from making such eﬀorts.30
Our model predicts the fourfold pattern on the aggregate level. This is the case when
subjects are suﬃciently heterogenous with respect to the minimal subsistence level they
face and the assets they hold. The co-occurrence of probability-dependent risk attitudes
for gains and losses can then be the result of aggregation. Our model also predicts the
fourfold pattern on the individual level if one of the following conditions holds.
First, for real monetary incentives we predict this pattern for common framings of
losses. Since it is impossible to oblige experiment participants to pay (back) money to
the experimenter, losses are often implemented using a suitable framing. Often, subjects
are provided with an initial endowment from which the lottery outcomes are subtracted
(see e.g. Bruhin et al. (2010)). If we take asset integration serious, a fully rational
decision maker should also integrate this endowment when evaluating lotteries. She should
therefore exhibit the same systematic departures for gains and for losses.
Second, the pattern can also be explained on the individual level by using an evo-
lutionary argument. For most time during human evolution, our biological ancestors
were confronted with an environment in which the essential resources such as food were
scarce. The absence of markets, missing payment instruments and limited storing capac-
ities further restricted our ancestors’ scope of action. It may therefore be argued that
risk attitudes are an innate characteristic of preferences which adapted over thousands of
years of human evolution. In this sense, our model may provide the underlying mecha-
nism which shaped these preferences, and, hence, may explain the Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) results.
does not, however, allow to trace back the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes to the individual level.
29Two exceptions of studies with real monetary incentives are Cohen et al. (1987) and Bruhin et al.
(2010). Both report evidence for the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes on the aggregate level, however.
30Many studies report diﬀerences in risk taking behavior when subjects were confronted with hypo-
thetical as opposed to real payoﬀs (see e.g. Slovic (1969) and Holt and Laury (2002)).
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C.4.2 Other Predictions
Common Ratio/Consequence Eﬀects
Our model accommodates probability-dependent risk attitudes. Hence, it is no big sur-
prise that we also predict common ratio31 and common consequence eﬀects, two behavioral
choice patterns which (seem) to violate the independence axiom (Allais, 1953). There is
one crucial diﬀerence between our approach and most previous attempts to capture these
phenomena. Our approach suggests that observed violations of independence are due to
exogenous constraints rather than nonlinear preferences. Although the decision maker in
our model obeys the independence axiom at the level of preferences, she may violate it at
the level of observed behavior.
Let us illustrate this by a simple example. We consider an expected utility maximizer
with the same preferences as above, i.e. u(ω+x) = (30+x)0.8. The environment restricts
her from choosing according to her preferences.
Table C.1: Choice Problem
(1) A1 = ($14, 0.2) B1 = ($20, 0.14)
(2) A2 = ($14, 1) B2 = ($20, 0.7)
Table C.1 presents a typical common ratio example. It is taken from Battalio et al.
(1990).32 In this problem, the subject has to make two choices: First, between A1 and B1,
and, second, between A2 and B2. The outcomes in both binary choices are the same, as are
the ratios between the probabilities. A common ratio violation is observed if a subject
does not consistently prefer the A- or the B-option in both cases, but either switches
from A to B or from B to A. Such behavior is commonly interpreted as a violation of the
independence axiom and, hence, of standard expected utility.
Battalio et al. (1990) find that about one half of their real-incentivized respondents
exhibit such violations for this example. Most prefer B1 over A1, but A2 over B2.
Figure C.6 demonstrates that common ratio violations are also predicted by our model.
It plots the diﬀerence in valuation of the two lotteries A and B, ∆VAB (ordinate), for
minimal subsistence levels τ varying between the lowest and highest terminal outcome
(abscissa).33 To ensure that behavior conforms to standard expected utility, both the solid
31The certainty eﬀect reported in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the Bergen paradox in Allais and
Hagen (1979) are special cases of the common ratio eﬀect.
32The choice problem is listed in Table 5 of Battalio et al. (1990) (Set 1).
33The vertical lines are for illustrative purposes only.
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Figure C.6: Common Ratio Eﬀect
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and the dashed lines must overlap. Only in this case, a decision maker who prefers A1
over B1 would also prefer A2 over B2. This is certainly not the case here. For the regions
between the horizontal lines, the decision maker switches from the A- to the B-option
(for τ ≤ ω + x = 44) or from the B- to the A-option (for τ > ω + x = 44), respectively.
However, if τ lies far below the minimal terminal outcome in reach, our model reduces to
standard expected utility. Then, the independence axiom is retained, even at the level of
behavior.
Stake Eﬀects and Heterogeneity in Risk Taking Behavior
Another prediction emerging from our model is that departures from standard expected
utility are largely governed by the magnitude of outcomes, the decision maker’s assets,
and the minimal subsistence level. Evidently, the likelihood that the environmental con-
straint is binding decreases as terminal outcomes rise, i.e. as stake size and assets grow
larger, and as the minimal subsistence level falls, ceteris paribus. As a result, violation of
independence at the observed level should be less prevalent when stakes grow relatively
large or the decision maker becomes relatively rich.34 These departures therefore depend
34In the most extreme case, the cost of distress will have no noticeable impact anymore. Then, behavior
will converge with the decision maker’s preferences.
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on the ratio between the terminal outcomes and the minimal subsistence level. The stake
eﬀect unfolds in two stages. In a first stage, the range of probabilities for which we observe
risk-averse behavior will grow larger. This can be seen in Figure C.4 (solid vs. dashed
curve). Relative risk aversion will therefore increase first. In a second stage, as the ratio
gets even larger, standard expected utility violations become less pronounced. For high
stakes, we therefore expect probability distortions to be less pronounced.
This result is particularly interesting in the light of Rabin’s calibration theorem (Rabin,
2000) which states that, in order that high stake risk aversion remains within a plausible
range, expected utility maximizers must be approximately risk neutral for small stakes.
Our results indicate that, in the presence of constraints, this is not necessarily the case.
Although the decision maker’s risk preference may be constant over outcome magnitude,
her revealed risk attitudes may not. The actual prediction our model makes strongly
depends on the environment the decision maker is confronted with.
Our observations seems to be confirmed by recent research examining stake eﬀects
and the determinants of risk taking behavior. Fehr-Duda et al. (2010), for example,
find increasing relative risk aversion for real gains when lottery outcomes are scaled up.
This eﬀect can be traced back to probability weighting and it appears that the same
subjects weight probabilities less optimistically in the large stake condition. This result
is qualitatively consistent with the prediction our model makes. Moreover, when taking
income as a proxy measure for the likelihood that subjects face liquidity constraints,
there also exists evidence supporting our conjectures. Donkers et al. (2001) find that
the diﬀerence between decision weights and objective probabilities decreases in income.
This result is in accordance with our prediction that richer subjects will be less prone to
probability distortions.
Our model also makes predictions on the composition of risk taking types in the
population. By estimating a finite mixture model, Bruhin et al. (2010) find that about
20% of their subjects do not distort probabilities, whereas about 80% do. This result
is quite robust when compared across diﬀerent data sets stemming from experiments
conducted with college students in Switzerland and China.35 College students typically do
not have much liquidity at their disposal as they do not have a fixed monthly income. This
may not only prevent (or have prevented) them from accumulating a large stock of liquid
assets. As banks generally only issue credit cards to account holders if they can document
guaranteed monthly earnings, they may also have problems accessing liquidity through
theses channels. Our model therefore predicts the prevalence of probability distortions
35Conte et al. (2010) find similar results for British students.
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among students. Nevertheless, we expect that the composition of behavioral types in
the population will be more in favor of standard expected utility rather than RDU when
richer subjects or subjects with less limited credit market access are examined.36 Policy
interventions which facilitate market access may help to counteract constraints imposed
by the environment.
Choice Domain Dependency and Temporal Variation
The last point we discuss in this section addresses a finding which goes much deeper than
violations of vNM axioms. Various studies report that risk taking behavior is not stable
across choice domains or tasks (Weber et al. (2002); Deck et al. (2009)). MacCrimmon
and Wehrung (1990), for instance, conduct a study with risk managers, and find diﬀerent
risk attitudes for choices involving company money and choices involving personal money.
Similarly, these managers also reveal diﬀerent risk taking behaviors for financial risks as
opposed to recreational risks.
To be a useful concept, preferences, as a central primitive of economic behavior, should
be stable across diﬀerent choice domains. Today’s descriptive theories of choice under risk,
among them RDU theories, however, do not diﬀerentiate between revealed and true pref-
erences. They attribute the entirety of observed behavior to preferences.37 In contrast,
our approach suggests a gap between risk preferences and risk taking behavior. It em-
phasizes that the environment, and in particular constraints, can play a decisive role in
shaping risk taking behavior. The managers in the study by MacCrimmon and Wehrung
(1990), for example, may not face liquidity constraints in their private life, but may only
have limited access to financial resources on their job (e.g. spending caps).
Likewise, the empirical literature documents that, even within the same choice domain,
individual risk taking behavior is subject to change over time (Baucells and Villasis, 2010;
Zeisberger et al., 2010). While being relatively stable at the aggregate level, a considerable
fraction of subjects change their risk attitudes if confronted with the same decision at
some later point in time. Our model provides an explanation for this finding. Although
preferences remain the same, the environment decision makers face may change over time.
Liquidity constraints, for example, often only have a transitory character. In accordance
36First results of a study conducted with subject of a representative sample from the Swiss German
population suggest that this is indeed the case. Using a similar design as in Bruhin et al. (2010), we find
about 40% of expected utility types in our data.
37Clearly, these models may be a good reduced form to describe actual behavior. However, estimation
results are usually interpreted as true preferences, not behavior, an interpretation which may only be
appropriate in the absence of constraints.
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with this conjecture, Love and Robinson (1984) find that measured risk attitudes are
stable when controlling on the income level. The least risk averse farmers in their study
are those in the smallest income group, whereas there is a tendency towards more risk
aversion as income grows larger. In this sense, our model provides an account for both,
choice domain dependency and temporal variation of risk taking behavior.
C.5 Conclusion
Our findings have material implications. In this last section, we discuss some of the most
important ones.
A first point concerns rationality. Our results indicate that there are situations in
which rational expected utility maximizers depart from standard predictions. In partic-
ular, we demonstrate that apparent violations of the independence axiom may be traced
back to environmental constraints rather than underlying preferences. These “violations”
occur since the expected utility maximizer must attain a certain minimal subsistence level
imposed by the environment, but is unable to do so with the limited quantities of the
commodity at her disposal and the limited market access she has. Not reaching this min-
imal subsistence level leads to potentially detrimental consequences. These consequences,
modeled as costs, are taken into account by the decision maker when making her choice.
On these grounds, our model is essentially a standard expected utility model incorporating
the anticipated cost of distress.
As it turns out, it is possible to seamlessly explain a broad number of patterns found
in the empirical literature which appear to be inconsistent with the standard model. Our
approach, for example, can explain why gambling behavior is observed even for decision
makers with risk-averse preferences. For more extreme situations, where there is no
option but to take a considerable risk in order to overcome the limitations imposed by
the environment, decision makers may do so as long as this risk gives them the chance
to find a way out of this desperate situation. It follows from this finding that our model
can generate risk attitudes depending on probabilities. Probability distortions naturally
arise from decision maker’s rational response to the constraints she faces. They can be
rationalized without requiring violations of independence on the level of preferences. All
in all, our approach closes the gap between observed risk taking behavior and true risk
preferences while retaining the desirable properties of expected utility theory. It further
brings out the need to account for exogenous factors driving economic behavior. In this
respect, risk taking behavior may only be one single instance where apparent violations
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of classical economic theory can be traced back to constraints rather than to a failure of
the standard preference model.38
The results that environmental constraints can promote probability distortions has
important consequences. Probability-dependence of risk attitudes is usually ascribed to
perceptional, motivational or emotional processes, or an interaction of those. The fact
that fully rational decision makers may act in a similar way, however, may lead to diﬃ-
culties in interpreting observed behavior. This has consequences for the design of proper
policy instruments helping economic agents to behave in a more rational way without
harming those that already do (Camerer et al., 2003). Such programs must be based
on a sound knowledge about the actual drivers of behavior. If they are built on wrong
presumptions about preferences they may be of no avail and waste money. Even worse,
such policies can lead rational agents to depart from optimal behavior, and thus induce
severe welfare losses. Our results stress the need for suitable mechanisms which allow
to distinguish between rational and irrational sources of probability distortions. Such
mechanisms can resolve the problem that a small number of observed choices are usually
not informative about the real source of behavior. A natural starting point for developing
such mechanisms are conditions for which competing explanations lead to distinct predic-
tions. For example, according to our model, behavior should diﬀer with respect to stake
size and the environment the decision maker is confronted with. If economic agents de-
part in systematical ways from standard expected utility because they face environmental
constraints, policy interventions facilitating market access may help them to behave in a
way conforming with their preferences.
Our results also make another important point. Risk taking behavior depends on the
choice domain, i.e. it hinges on the actual commodity under consideration. For diﬀer-
ent commodities, such as private money, company money or health, the constraints the
decision maker faces are unlikely to be the same. More precisely, she may be endowed
with diﬀerent quantities of the respective commodity, may have diﬀerent minimal sub-
sistence levels to reach, and may face diﬀerently harmful consequences when this goal is
not achieved. Moreover, as constraints are often only of a transitory character, revealed
risk attitudes are likely to change over time. Models that do not take into account these
disparities between domains and the dependence on a changing environment have only
limited predictive power. For example, it is highly questionable whether such models
together with estimated parameters from one experiment can be used to predict behavior
38A similar explanation can motivate systematic departures from constant time discounting (see Epper
(2009)).
149
for other domains, other subjects or other points in time. RDU models may still be a
good reduced form for describing behavior, but they are likely to be not suited well for
these purposes.
These models are further challenged by the fact that potential constraints driving
standard expected utility violations do not necessarily aﬀect all choices. As long as the
minimal subsistence level lies within the interval of possible outcomes, the systematic
departures described above should emerge. A typical example are risky choice experi-
ments. These experiments are often conducted among college students, i.e. subjects who
are exceptionally exposed to liquidity constraints. They confront subjects with a broad
number of choices over options with similar outcomes. If the constraint is binding, we
would predict all anomalously appearing patterns of risk taking behavior. Systematic
departures, however, may be less prevalent if choices over a wider range of outcomes are
made. Nonetheless, it can be argued that the repeated struggle for survival our ancestors
were confronted with may have shaped preferences in a way conforming to the typical
findings. Our model may therefore provide an evolutionary foundation for the fourfold
pattern of risk attitudes and a broad number of other stylized facts in choice under risk,
and, hence, may also predict apparent standard expected utility violations in the absence
of constraints.
It is obvious that the constraints limiting the decision maker’s scope of action must
not necessarily be exogenous, but may well be self imposed. The minimal subsistence
level in our model may then be interpreted as an aspiration level, and the cost of not
reaching the self-defined goal as psychological (or emotional) costs. While it is arguably
much harder to rationalize departures from standard expected utility in this case, and
such an approach is hardly testable, the predictions our model makes remain the same as
in the case with exogenous constraints. In particular, probability-dependent risk attitudes
still result endogenously from our model, without making additional assumptions about
how probabilities are weighted.
Our findings indicate that the descriptive inadequacies of expected utility theory can,
at least partly, be resolved when environmental constraints are taken into account. If
the researcher would observe the decision maker’s environment, she would be able to fully
reproduce her real preferences - preferences which do not necessarily violate independence.
Rabin and Thaler (2001) use a dead horse as a metaphor for expected utility theory. We
believe that the reports of the horse’s death are greatly exaggerated. While arguably being
injured - there are still issues such as framing eﬀects or the preference reversal phenomena
which are barely explainable by our approach - we are confident that the horse is still
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nickering.
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C.6 Appendix: Calculation of Certainty Equivalents
According to our model, the certainty equivalent for a given lottery is only implicitly
defined. We therefore need to approximate it numerically. The following lines contain the
receipt describing each step of the algorithm we implemented to do that.
1. Calculate the value of the lottery L, VL, according to Equation C.1.
2. Split the outcome space [x, x] into n equally spaced partitions, where n is a large
number (we took 200). Note that c˜e(L) lies by definition between the lowest and
the highest lottery outcome.
3. Calculate the value for each of the n+ 1 amounts, Vc˜e(L), again following Equation
C.1.
4. Find the smallest and the largest amount xl and xh lying below and above indiﬀer-
ence VL = Vc˜e(L) in the vector V ￿c˜e(L).
5. Determine the weight w representing relative distance from indiﬀerence to the xl,
i.e. w = xl/(xh − xl).
6. Obtain the approximate certainty equivalent c˜e(L) by the weighted mean c˜e(L) =
wxh + (1− w)xl.
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